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The development of the classification systems of psychiatric disorders illustrates a 
long-term debate on whether a discrete and categorical or a continuum and 
spectral view best describes psychiatric disorders. This is because comorbidity 
between mental disorders is common and the symptoms of the same psychiatric 
disorders are heterogeneous. These all increase the difficulty to diagnose and to 
treat mental disorders. Generally, the diagnostic systems have attempted to 
develop diagnostic criteria of psychiatric disorders that resemble a solid medical 
model, where each disorder is described by a discrete category of symptoms. 
However, these attempts have been plagued by problems. Even though having a 
categorical classification system makes diagnoses easier than having nothing to 
work from, a categorical classification system cannot explain clinical conditions. 
Having alternative classification systems such as one based on dimensions (spectra) 
or a mixture of categorical and spectral classification systems may be better than 
using either classification system alone. It has been suggested that a mechanistic 
property clusters (MPC) would be a suitable alternative (Kendler et al., 2011). The 
MPC described psychiatric disorders are caused by multi-level causal loops and 
interactions. A similar view of symptoms forming a causal network – the network 
theory – has been advocated (Borsboom, 2008, 2017). The network theory 
hypothesizes that the present psychiatric symptoms are caused by the same and/or 
other psychiatric symptoms occurred earlier.   
This PhD project investigated the heterogeneous nature of the symptoms of major 
depression (MD) by using their repeated measures in daily-life settings in three 
studies. We used on-line questionnaires, mobile questionnaires, and activity sensors. 
MD symptoms at the moment were measured using mobile questionnaires and 
daily physiological signals were recorded using activity sensors. The on-line 
questionnaires were administered before and after the participants completed the 
momentary questionnaires. Study 1 measured the momentary MD symptoms using 
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Android devices, Study 2 was a replicate of Study 1 and iOS devices were employed 
in Study 2. Study 3 measured the momentary MD symptoms and activity levels 
using Android and iOS devices and activity sensors. Study 3 was a replication of 
Studies 1 and 2. The replicability of the results across the three studies was tested. 
Meta-analysis was used to see whether there were similar patterns across studies.  
In addition to the network theory, discriminant and convergent validity of the 
mobile and retrospective MD assessments were tested. The heterogeneity of MD 
symptoms was examined in the relationships between momentary MD symptom 
ratings and controlling factors (i.e., age, gender, employment status, marital status, 
educational level, MD severity, circadian rhythm, personality traits and facets, daily 
activity and heart rate variability). The results suggested heterogeneity among MD 
symptoms in how they linked to other variables. These findings challenge the 
existing clinical practice of using the total sum-score of symptoms in clinical 
diagnoses. Marginal support for the network theory was reported. The findings 







Mental disorders are hidden disorders. Unlike some physical diseases that have 
apparent symptoms such as coughing, sneezing, or fevers, people with mental 
disorders usually do not show easily observable symptoms and the symptoms used 
to diagnose a mental disorder are fairly different. Despite the symptoms used to 
diagnose a single mental disorder being diverse, the diagnoses of mental disorders 
primarily rely on a single number – sum-total score of symptoms. This thesis 
explored the differences in the symptoms of a mental disorder – major depression 
(MD). In three studies, mobile questionnaires presented on applications in both 
Android and iOS devices were used to collect changes in MD symptoms 4–6 times 
per day for 14–15 days. On-line questionnaires were used to collect the 
demographics and baseline information. In one of the three studies, an additional 
device, activity sensors, were used to gather information on activity level and heart 
rate variability. The relationships between MD symptoms and the following were 
examined: moderators including age, gender, educational attainment, marital 
status, and employment status, MD severity, circadian rhythm, personality, activity 
level, and heart rate variability. One possible explanation for the causes of MD – 
whether the symptoms form an inter-connected network and exhibit time-varying 
causal relationship – was investigated, too. The results revealed variability among 
individual MD symptoms and suggested revising the diagnostic criteria currently in-
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Chapter 1 Literature review 
 
 
“Classification is usually said to serve one or more of three interconnected aims: (1) 
to help us understand, order, and communicate information; (2) to establish 
jurisdiction or boundaries – for example, between human beings and animals, what 
is edible and not edible, what is therapeutic and noxious; and (3) to establish 
legitimacy and thus facilitate control of the environment, animate as well as 
inanimate. …” (Szasz, 1997, p. 11) 
 
This chapter begins with the history of two classification systems of 
psychiatric disorders, followed by the diagnostic criteria of major depression (MD), 
heterogeneity of MD, the research method used in this thesis, and ended with a 
brief introduction of the following chapters.  
The history of the development of the classification systems of psychiatric 
disorders unveils the changes in the mainstream theories in psychiatry. There are 
two widely used classification systems – the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) 
and the International Classification of the Disease (ICD). Both classification systems 
pooled symptoms together to establish diagnoses of mental disorders. However, 
diverse symptom profiles have been observed in patients. It implies heterogeneity 
in MD symptoms and challenges the categorizations of mental disorders. It also 
brought about the first research question in this thesis – are MD symptoms 
homogeneous or heterogeneous? This question was tested by using measures of 
MD symptoms and variables including MD severity, demographics, circadian rhythm, 
personality traits and facets, activity level, and heart rate variability (Chapters 2–6).  
The other research question touched upon possible explanations of MD. 
One popular explanation is essentialist view (Kendler et al., 2011). It describes 
symptoms of a disease or disorders are caused by one underlying cause. A good 
example well-explained by essentialist view is infectious diseases, where patients 




though the two classification systems do not address the underlying causes of 
mental disorders, grouping different symptoms together and giving them equal 
weights (except the main symptoms) may imply a hidden assumption that the 
depressive symptoms are caused by one underlying cause (essentialist view or 
latent variable theory). However, diverse disorder profiles observed in depression 
patients and comorbidity between depression and other psychiatric disorders may 
suggest there are other explanations. The latent variable theory nicely explains 
infectious diseases but it might not be a satisfying explanation for mental disorders.  
Another theory that looks at the causal relationships among symptoms 
provides an alternative insight into depression. This theory is termed network 
theory. In my thesis, the network theory was tested by using time-series data from 
277 participants in three different studies and a meta-analysis of the three studies. 
The data were analyzed using temporal, contemporaneous, and between-subject 
networks to examine the numbers of significant associations in temporal networks 
and the topography of depressive symptoms in the three types of networks 
(Chapter 7).  
 
Classification system in psychiatry  
The study of the epidemics of mental disorders firstly began with studying 
the patients in asylums in the 19th century (Demazeux, 2014). There was no 
classification system to guide diagnoses until 1949 (Rössler, 2013). The early 
psychiatrists were not interested in having a classification system even though there 
was a need in diagnoses. They were more interested in applying classification 
systems in asylum management (Grob, 1991). Two main classification systems are 
used by psychiatrists – the ICD of the World Health Organization and the DSM of the 
American Psychiatric Association (APA). A section detailing psychiatric disorders was 
firstly included in the ICD in 1949 (Rössler, 2013; World Health Organization, 2006). 
Later in 1952, the first edition of the DSM was published (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2018). The ICD was developed by an international organization to be 




DSM was developed and mainly used by the psychiatrists in the U.S. (American 
Psychological Association, 2009; Jablensky, 2009). The WHO widely distributed the 
ICD at a low cost, but the DSM continued to generate huge revenue for the APA.   
Classification systems provide a common ground for clinicians and 
researchers to diagnose cases and conduct research. These classification systems 
are not flawless and several revisions and editions of the ICD and the DSM have 
been published after the release of the first editions of the two classification 
systems.  
The development of classification system is “shaped by a variety of factors: 
the social origins and ideological, political, and moral commitments of psychiatrists; 
their desire for status and legitimacy; the characteristics of their patients; the 
nature and location of their practices; and the broader social and intellectual 
currents prevalent at a given time” (Grob, 1991, p. 421). Looking at the brief history 
of the development of psychiatric classification system may help us to see how 
psychiatry becomes what it is today and the rises and falls of different theories. 
However, historical recollections are not without biases and potential flaws. The 
limitations of historical recollection are – “by the very selection of key historical 
phenomena deemed to be worthy of inclusion in any account, and by the different 
emphasis on, and chronological linkages between diverse components of such an 
account, the final product is often far from being wholly ‘objective’ and/or 
comprehensive” (Kawa & Giordano, 2012, p. 2).  
The pushes from outside of psychiatry – social sciences, federal census, and 
the statistics and epidemiology of psychiatric disorders – urged the compiling of the 
first edition of the DSM (Demazeux, 2014; Grob, 1991). Through studying the 
mental health condition of some communities in Chicago, several sociologists 
applied their research in medicine. Psychologists contributed in designing 
standardized tools, instruments and statistical methods, which shaped psychiatry 
and the structure of the psychiatric classification system. The federal census’ main 




knowledge could thus serve as the foundation for social policy and end the 
pernicious bickering over theory, principles, and politics” (Grob, 1991, p. 424).  
During the development of classification systems, there were times when 
the biological causes were favored and there were other times when the societal-
environmental causes were the mainstream. However, these two causes are not 
mutually exclusive, and they may both influence the formation of psychiatric 
disorders from different angles. Psychiatrists considered mental disorders were 
caused by both psychosocial and biological factors but they thought these two 
factors related inversely (Ahn et al., 2009). For example, if a psychiatric disorder was 
to have a strong root in biology, clinicians would regard psychosocial factors as only 
having a small influence on the disorder. Ahn et al. (2009) also found that 
psychiatrists gestated some mental disorders to have stronger roots in biology and 
others to have more psychosocial origins. They deemed biological-based psychiatric 
disorders would be better treated by using medications than other treatments and 
psychotherapy would be a more appropriate treatment for psychosocial-based 
psychiatric disorders. Psychologists and social workers were found to have similar 
thoughts to psychiatrists.  
The development of the DSM 
The competition between  the biomedical model and biopsychosocial model 
could be observed in the revisions of the DSM (Braslow, 2000). Before the DSM-I 
was published, psychodynamic theories dominated the field of psychiatry (Kawa & 
Giordano, 2012). As the influences of environmental stressors gradually gained a 
broad recognition, the concept of psychopathology shifted from discrete categories 
to a continuum of severity. The scope of the DSM-I was relatively narrow and it only 
covered organic and psychotic disorders (Blashfield et al., 2014). The next edition – 
the DSM-II – was released in 1968 to solve the problems found in the DSM-I. The 
DSM-II remained greatly influenced by psychodynamic theories (Kawa & Giordano, 
2012). In the 1960s, the attackers of psychiatry – anti-psychiatrists – argued 
because there had not been a clear boundary between the definitions of mentally ill 




(Wilson, 1993). Among those, Rosenhan (1973) reported researchers pretended to 
be psychiatric patients (pseudopatients) and some psychiatrists could not tell their 
disguises and they were later admitted into psychiatric hospitals. This article greatly 
challenged the field of psychiatry and put psychiatry in a trust crisis. In addition, his 
study spurred discussions on whether the diagnoses of psychiatric disorders were 
legitimate. Even decades later, there were replications (Slater, 2005) and 
discussions (Spitzer et al., 2005; Zimmerman, 2005) of his study. Other criticisms 
included social control of labelling and psychiatric disorders did not exist. While 
Rosenhan (1973) told a compelling story and threatened the existence of psychiatry 
as a discipline, there were criticisms of the experiment design and the 
interpretation of the results (Ruscio, 2004; Spitzer et al., 2005). In Cahalan's (2020) 
book, she delved into every identifiable trace she could find to put together the 
details of the Rosenhan experiment. Through several sources including interviews, 
Rosenhan’s archives, medical records and a commentary (Cahalan, 2017), she 
revealed questionable interpretations and even fabrications of the pseudopatients’ 
experiences in those hospitals. Cahalan cannot be certain whether Rosenhan had 
misconducted but her book did raised doubts toward Rosenhan's (1973) experiment. 
Researchers and policy makers should be more cautious when applying the results 
in the future. If Rosenhan’s experiment was included in textbooks, the authors 
could consider to cover the relevant criticisms to train critical thing skills in students 
(Bartels & Peters, 2017). 
Moreover, services provided by other health professionals within psychiatry 
also caused psychiatrists wanting to distinguish themselves from other health 
providers within psychiatry (Mayes & Horwitz, 2005). These are the historical 
backgrounds surrounding the development of the DSM-III. To address the problems 
and coincident the fall of psychoanalysis and the rise of psychopharmacology, the 
DSM-III was published in 1980. It adopted a biopsychosocial model (Ghaemi, 2009) 
and aimed to standardize the diagnostic criteria (Demazeux, 2014).  
Different from the previous editions where the definitions were short, 




lengthy explanations, which created categories of mental disorders (Blashfield et al., 
2014). The drastic changes in the DSM-III from psychodynamics (as best 
represented by Emil Kraepelin), were called neo-Kraepelinian (Compton & Guze, 
1995). These detailed descriptions worked well in setting up boundaries between 
psychiatric disorders and as a result, making it easier for psychiatrists to prescribe 
medications and for patients to apply for insurance compensations (Blashfield et al., 
2014). The DSM-III greatly influenced both the clinicians and researchers. It was 
widely adopted in psychiatric training and in academic publishing and by 
psychiatrists in practice. It also boosted psychopharmacological research projects 
funded by the U.S. government and pharmaceutical companies (Gambardella, 1995). 
Stringent diagnostic criteria greatly raised the reliability of diagnoses compared to 
the previous two editions of the DSM.  
But despite the improvements, the DSM-III was not problem-free. It still 
received lots of criticisms and the behind-the-scene story of how the DSM-III was 
developed revealed the decisions were made based on consensus of a small group 
of like-minded psychiatrists (Davies, 2017). The increases in prescribing psychiatric 
medications had raised some issues in several mental disorders including MD, 
where in some cases antidepressants were not used to cure or improve a medical 
condition in patients but to enhance mood in normal people (Kramer & Brody, 
1994). Other issues were simplifying social and familial problems by mass drug 
prescriptions to children diagnosed with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder 
(ADHD), diagnosing those who had symptoms of shyness as having social anxiety 
disorder, and people with less severe symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder 
received the diagnoses because of compensation claim applications (Bracken & 
Petty, 1998).  
A revision of the DSM-III, the DSM-III-R, was published in 1987 to correct the 
considerable mistakes in the diagnostic criteria in the DSM-III according to relevant 
empirical data (Blashfield et al., 2014). Some clinicians argued the DSM-III-R was 
essentially the DSM-IV rather than merely a revision (Zimmerman, 1988). The critics 




disorder in the DSM-III-R implied disorders were harmful and dysfunctional. Since 
both harmful and dysfunctional were based on value judgment and changing 
societal and personal values reflect changes in value judgement, using harmful and 
dysfunctional to define psychiatric disorders may affect how the disorders were 
viewed and diagnosed. This entailed the classification system may require periodical 
updates depending on changes in societal and personal values and there may never 
be a finalized edition (Blashfield et al., 2014). 
In 1988, less than one year after the publication of the DSM-III-R, the APA 
announced the preparation of the DSM-IV will start. The DSM-IV was published in 
1994, two years after its’ scheduled year of publication. The frequent revision of the 
diagnostic criteria drew the attentions of some clinicians. They felt confused with 
the changes and criticized the frequent revision of the diagnostic criteria had left 
them with limited amount of time to stabilize their diagnoses (Zimmerman, 1988).  
Clinical significance – whether the severity of symptoms resulted in 
significant distress or impairment in daily functioning – was included in the DSM-IV. 
This was used to reduce the rate of false diagnosis. The DSM-IV-TR, a text revision 
of the DSM-IV, contained some minor revisions was published in 2000 (Blashfield et 
al., 2014). Thirteen years later, the DSM-V was published in 2013. The number of 
psychiatric diagnostic criteria increased with the publication of the new editions and 
revisions of the DSM (Figure 1.1). Starting from the DSM-III, the shift from a 
continuum of symptom severity to discrete categories could be found in later 
editions or revisions of the DSM despite some broader definitions were included in 
the DSM-V – “an implicit flexible definition of mental disorder, including 
dimensional models for some disorders and retaining fuzzy prototypes for others” 
(Blashfield et al., 2014, p. 38). Rössler (2013) suggested returning to the broad and 
general continuum definition of diagnostic criteria may be the way forward. This is 
because many people who have sub-clinical disorders have functional disability, too. 
Also, by adopting the continuum definitions, the constant and normal fluctuations 
of psychiatric symptoms could be appropriately addressed. The possible 




number of symptoms or dimensions required in clinical diagnoses, missing matric in 
determining severity, and the applications in daily clinical practice were not as 
straightforward as the categorical models (Jablensky, 2009). Since both the 
categorical and the dimensional models have their advantages and disadvantages 
and they were not mutually exclusive, adopting both models in classification 




Figure 1.1 Year of publication and numbers of categories in different versions and 
revisions of the DSM 
 
The ICD vs. the DSM 
The publication of the DSM-I also revealed the existences of enormous 
disparities between the ICD-6 and the DSM-I (Blashfield et al., 2014). Later, the 
WHO assembled international committees in different countries around the world 
to establish a classification system. The resulting ICD-8 was nearly identical to the 
DSM-II. But the next version of the DSM-II, the DSM-III was quite different from the 
ICD-8 due to very few international participation in preparing for this edition of the 




9, no diagnostic criteria were included and it was very different from the DSM-III 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2018). Because of this, to use the ICD-9 in the 
U.S., a modification of the ICD-9, the ICD-9-CM, was published later. Even though 
the DSM-IV and the ICD-10 were developed closely together and they were highly 
similar, differences in concepts and matters such as ways of operationalizing 
diagnoses were reported (First, 2009). Among the 176 diagnostic criteria, only one 
disorder – transient disorder – had the same diagnostic criteria in both classification 
systems. The latest version of the ICD, ICD-11, was published in June 2018 (World 
Health Organization, 2018). 
It took longer to develop the latest versions of the DSM and the ICD. The 
gaps between the two latest editions of the DSM and the ICD are more than 20 
years – 21 for the DSM and 26 years for the ICD. Both the DSM-V and the ICD-11 do 
not include the explanations for the underlying causes of mental disorders. But they 
differ in the use of functional impairments, which are used in the DSM but not in 
the ICD (Gaebel, 2015). The ICD dominates clinical diagnoses in the U.K. while the 
DSM is the mainstream classification system of mental disorder diagnoses in the U.S. 
(Tyrer, 2014). In other countries, clinicians could either choose between the two 
classification systems or combine them depending on what they consider as useful 
in their clinical practices.  
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) in the U.S. is not satisfied with the 
DSM-V and funds a project to develop a new classification system to be used for 
research purposes – the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) (Insel, 2014; Insel et al., 
2010). The NIH also redirects research away from the DSM-V and encourage 
researchers to go beyond the existing categories to investigate a broader scope of 
mental disorders (Insel, 2013). Precision medicine – establishing “a diagnostic 
system based on a deeper understanding of the biological and psychosocial basis of 
a group of disorders” – for psychiatry was the goal set for the RDoC (Insel, 2014, p. 
396). This is carried out by incorporating data from several levels including 
symptom, society, genetics and neurology. An alternative classification system – the 




several psychologists and psychiatrists (Kotov et al., 2017). Closely related 
symptoms are grouped together to address issues in comorbidity and heterogeneity. 
Dimensional measures are used to cover a broad range of symptomatic states. The 
HiTOP model is still in its’ early stage and there are a few limitations such as lacking 
empirical research in some dimensions and in young people and the elderly. 
The brief history of psychiatric classification systems, especially the 
discrepancies between the two main classification systems, competing theories, the 
developing of new classification systems, and an unsettling problem in comorbidity, 
which describes the overlapping of symptoms between different psychiatric 
disorders, tell us that the field is still evolving. Despite classification systems are 
there to establish a common ground for professionals working within psychiatry to 
communicate and further the development of the field, thinking diagnostic criteria 
represent complete profiles of mental disorders in clinical care and research may 
stop the clinicians and researchers from exploring the characteristics of psychiatric 
disorders not currently covered in the diagnostic criteria in the DSM or the ICD. This 
may lengthen the search for other potentially effective treatments. The problem 
with comorbidity mainly lies in unspecific treatments, where the same medication is 
used to treat several psychiatric disorders (i.e., serotonin reuptake inhibitors is a 
commonly prescribed medication for MD, anxiety disorder, and obsessive-
compulsive disorder etc.). To see whether individual symptom of a psychiatric 
disorder, MD, relates similarly or differently to factors influencing MD, this thesis 
will take a closer look at the relationships between MD symptoms and several 
factors.  
Clinical diagnoses and the classification systems  
Even though the DSM dominate the training courses and programs 
psychiatrists attended, the guidelines the researchers must follow to publish in 
academic journals, and the research funding applications, little is known regarding 
how clinicians conceptualize mental disorders and how these resemble the 
categories of mental disorders listed in the DSM. Research into this would inform 




mental disorders are different from the DSM (Flanagan & Blashfield, 2007; Kim & 
Ahn, 2002). Clinicians’ taxonomies and the DSM correlate moderately and their 
taxonomies have a smaller number of diagnostic categories than those in the DSM 
(Flanagan & Blashfield, 2007).  Also, since neither the DSM nor the ICD are based on 
any theory and do not explain the causal mechanisms underlying psychiatric 
disorders, clinicians may make clinical decisions based on their own theory-based 
representations (Kim & Ahn, 2002). Clinicians tend to have better recall of the 
symptoms that were close to their theories than the symptoms that were further 
away from their theories.   
Biomarkers of psychiatric disorders 
The search for biomarkers of psychiatric disorders has been futile due to 
several reasons (Kapur et al., 2012). First, lacking a gold standard because the 
classification systems in use are not designed to explain the biological mechanisms. 
Second, there have been many underpowered studies. Third, the replications are 
close, but they are not exact replicates of the previous studies. Lastly, comparisons 
between patients and normal controls are commonly used in study designs, thus 
making such comparisons legitimate. However, it is uncommon that clinicians would 
compare mental disorder patients with normal people in clinical settings because 
these two groups are incomparable. This should be applied in empirical studies, too.  
Unable to identify biomarkers of psychiatric disorders may hinder the search 
for “personalized medicine” or “precision medicine” of psychiatric disorders. 
Therefore, Kapur and colleagues (2012) suggested replacing “personalized medicine” 
with a more realistic approach – “stratified medicine”, which was proposed by 
Trusheim, Berndt, and Douglas (2007). In stratified medicine, biomarkers or 
cognitive tests are used to stratify patients with diagnosed disorders into subgroups 
to assist the clinicians to prescribe the most suitable treatments. Adopting stratified 
medicine may be beneficial because of several reasons, which include avoiding the 
debates on the benchmark, does not require a full understanding of the etiology of 
psychiatric disorders, and could be readily applied in the classification systems 




introduced the RDoC to identify biomarkers, behavioral or cognitive symptoms that 
could be used in stratified medicine.  
Major Depression and its diagnostic criteria 
MD was reported as a common mental disorder in the National Comorbidity 
Survey Replication, which was a large national survey conducted in the U.S. in the 
early 2000s (Kessler, 2003). In another large group of American participants, the 
prevalence of MD among African Americans and Caribbean blacks was lower than 
that in non-Hispanic whites (Williams et al., 2007). A cross-cultural study showed 
the prevalence rate of MD differed from country to country – lifetime prevalence 
ranged from 1.9% in Taiwan to 19% in Beirut (M. M. Weissman et al., 1996). 
Another multinational study also reported similar results of varying prevalence 
between the countries been surveyed – lifetime prevalence ranged from 3% in 
Japan to 16.9% in the U.S. (Andrade et al., 2003). However, societal and cultural 
influences on how mental disorders are viewed and conceptualized in different 
countries may contribute to the disparities between countries.  
The impacts of MD are pervasive. Some MD patients had a hard time to fulfil 
their social roles and various aspects of their social capabilities were affected 
(Kupferberg et al., 2016). Having MD not only change the way people feel about 
themselves but also alter how they feel about the surrounding environments (Gotlib 
& Joormann, 2010). The diagnostic criteria for MD in the DSM-V covered nine 
symptoms – depressed mood most of the day, loss of interest or pleasure in almost 
all activities, altered appetite and significant weight loss or gain, psychomotor 
retardation or agitation, fatigue or loss of energy, feeling worthless or guilt, 
insomnia or hypersomnia, diminished ability to think, poor concentration, or 
indecisiveness, and recurring thoughts of death or suicidal ideation (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013a). The diagnosis of MD is established when five or 
more symptoms continuously cause clinical distress in an individual or greatly 
impair his/her social functioning for more than two weeks. In addition, one out of 




The life-time recurrence rate of MD is approximately 40% and ranges from 
17% to 76% (Mattisson et al., 2007). This indicates that on average, 60% of the MD 
patients only have one MD episode in their lifetime. The results from 12 cohorts 
reported the recurrence rates of MD ranged from 7% to 65% (Steinert et al., 2014). 
People who stayed in specialized mental healthcare settings had a higher 
recurrence rate of MD (85%) than the general population (35%) (Hardeveld et al., 
2010). These findings showed a noticeable proportion of MD patients fully 
recovered from the one and only MD episode they had. 
Comorbidity of MD and other psychiatric disorders 
Comorbidity describes the coexistence of more than one ailments (Feinstein, 
1970) and it is a common phenomenon in mental disorders. It has been a huge 
problem in mental disorder diagnoses and treatments and the clinicians are 
interested in finding methods to distinguish mental disorders sharing similar 
symptoms because it is clinically challenging (Kapur et al., 2012).  
The possible causes of comorbidity could be traced back to the development 
of the DSM and the ICD. The DSM was developed based on clinical experiences and 
it did not include explanations of disorders (Regier et al., 2009). Similarly, the 
development of the ICD was “a statistical classification of diseases and other health 
problems” (World Health Organization, 1992). The development of the classification 
systems may well justify why the classification systems do not include the 
underlying cause of the disorders but lacking such pivotal information might explain 
the prevalence of comorbidity in mental disorders. Clinical observations of 
syndromes, a group of correlated symptoms, are usually the initial stage of disease 
identification and follow by the discovery of pathology and etiology (Jablensky, 
2016). However, a clear cut between syndromes and diseases remains missing 
among psychiatric disorders (Jablensky, 2016). This may contribute to the high 
comorbidity in mental disorders. 
Comorbidity of several psychiatric disorders is common among patients and 
MD is no exception (Moscati et al., 2016; Thaipisuttikul et al., 2014). Comorbid 




2005). In most cases, the more psychiatric disorders one had the more severe are 
these disorders. Besides, having psychiatric disorders is the leading cause of suicide 
(Cavanagh et al., 2003) but comorbidity of mental disorders may not increase 
suicide risk. A Swedish study compared those who were diagnosed with severe MD 
and committed suicide with a matching group of controls who were diagnosed with 
sever MD but did not committed suicide (Heu et al., 2018). The two groups did not 
differ in the number of comorbid psychiatric disorders – whether there was/were 
one, two, three, or four different psychiatric disorders. Heu et al. (2018) concluded 
comorbidity of MD and other psychiatric disorders did not increase suicide risk.  
It has been observed that MD is comorbid with several mental disorders 
including dysthymia, anxiety disorders, social phobia, obsessive-compulsive disorder, 
post-traumatic stress disorder, alcohol dependence, psychotic disorder, antisocial 
personality, and eating disorders (Thaipisuttikul et al., 2014). Among these 
comorbid psychiatric disorders, generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) is the most 
common comorbid disorder (Heu et al., 2018). Comorbidity between MD and 
anxiety disorder could be as high as 95% (T. A. Brown et al., 2001). High comorbidity 
between MD and GAD spurred the research question on which one of the two 
disorders comes first. A widely accepted argument was GAD preceded MD. This 
account was challenged and a study reported MD preceding GAD happened as 
frequent (Moffitt et al., 2007). The research into the two mental disorders revealed 
baseline MD significantly predicted GAD onset and vice versa (Kessler et al., 2008). 
However, while baseline GAD significantly predicted MD persistence, GAD 
persistence was not predicted by baseline MD. The researchers were also interested 
in whether the two disorders shared the same risk factors and whether they had 
the same underlying cause. Related studies reported conflicting results and risk 
factors including childhood adversities, parental history of mental disorders, and 
personality traits were observed to have varied influences on GAD and MD (Kessler 
et al., 2008). Moscati et al. (2016) found stressful life events and high neuroticism 
were indicators of MD and GAD comorbidity. Neuroticism has genetic correlations 





Heterogeneity of MD  
MD overlaps with various psychiatric conditions. But is it a coherent entity 
itself or does it encompass a range of only loosely co-occurring symptoms? This is 
one of the central questions of this thesis.  
The act of putting depressive symptoms together to form a medical 
diagnosis of MD implied a hidden assumption that these symptoms are 
homogeneous and their expressions are the clinical indicators of MD. Assuming 
homogeneity in MD symptoms legitimatize using the sum-total or the numbers of 
MD symptoms observed in patients to diagnose and determine MD severity in 
clinical practices. The MD diagnostic criteria in the DSM-V was reported to be able 
to clinically tell apart those who are not depressed from those who have the mild 
and severe form of MD (Tolentino & Schmidt, 2018). In this regard, the diagnostic 
criteria of MD could greatly help the clinicians to prescribe the patients with 
appropriate treatments. This assumption was challenged and some claimed MD is a 
heterogeneous disorder (Fried & Nesse, 2015b; Fried et al., 2014; D. Goldberg, 2011; 
Lux & Kendler, 2010). The claim of the heterogeneity of MD is based on the idea 
that the descriptions of several MD symptoms are opposite, such as insomnia vs. 
hypersomnia, weight loss vs. weight gain, and psychomotor agitation vs. 
psychomotor retardation. Depressive symptoms varied in their impacts on 
impairment in psychosocial functioning (Fried & Nesse, 2014), in the underlying 
biological mechanisms and in the degree they were affected by life events (Fried & 
Nesse, 2015b). Using data from 1,015 American Caucasian same-sex twins, Lux and 
Kendler (2010) tested the validity of DSM-IV diagnostic criteria of MD for each 
depressive symptom and two sets of symptoms – cognitive (depressive mood, loss 
of pleasure, guilt, and concentration problems, suicidal ideation) and 
neurovegetative symptoms (weight gain/loss, insomnia/hypersomnia, psychomotor 
agitation/retardation, and fatigue). Each symptom and the two sets of symptoms 
varied in their predictabilities of comorbidity with other psychiatric disorders, a new 




two personality traits – neuroticism and extraversion, duration of a MD episode and 
chronic depression, and historical MD episodes. Lux and Kendler (2010) concluded 
that instead of homogeneity, there is hidden heterogeneity among the depressive 
symptoms.  
The heterogeneity of MD may also be illustrated by the heritability of each 
depressive symptom (Jang et al., 2004), highly diverse symptom patterns of MD 
(Fried & Nesse, 2015a), and different impacts of each MD symptom had on 
psychosocial functioning (Fried & Nesse, 2014). In a small group of Canadian twin 
participants, MD symptoms were explained by 14 genetic factors, where the 
heritability for each genetic factor varied greatly (Jang et al., 2004). The highly 
heritable factors are those associated with physiological functions (e.g., positive 
affect, insomnia, loss of pleasure, loss of appetite, suicidal ideation, and physical 
anxiousness). Other factors that were not heritable may be elicited by negative life 
events. A study found 1,030 possible unique symptom profiles in 3,703 MD patients 
(Fried & Nesse, 2015a) – there is a huge variety of ways to obtain a similar diagnosis! 
A review article presented evidences on MD symptoms differed in many aspects 
including underlying biology, risk factors, and their associations with difficult life 
events (Fried & Nesse, 2015b). These varied symptom profiles revealed a potential 
problem in clinical diagnosis - using the total sum-score of depressive symptoms 
may not be a reliable approach. Depressive symptoms had varying influences on the 
impairment of psychosocial functioning in work, home engagement, social activities, 
private activities, and close relationships, too (Fried & Nesse, 2014). The influences 
of the symptoms ranged from .7% (hypersomnia) to 20.7% (depressed mood). The 
impact of deeming whether MD symptoms are homogeneous or heterogeneous lies 
in its’ influences on related research. It may hinder the well-being of patients as well 
as the progress of MD research. 
The heritability of MD 
The concept of “a gene for a trait” had been the central phrase of “GeneTalk” 
for a few decades (Kendler, 2005). The concept was supported by preformationist 




and eventually become traits. However, the relationships between genes and 
psychiatric disorders are not that simple because many genes and the environment 
factors are involved. This implies the mechanisms of how genes caused psychiatric 
disorders may be complicated and lengthy. There have been many studies 
investigated the heritability of MD. Identifying loci for MD seemed to be particularly 
difficult compared to other mental disorders (Collins et al., 2011). Multiple loci 
contributing to the manifestation of MD may be one of the causes (Kendler et al., 
2013; Sullivan et al., 2017). Another possibility is the heterogeneity of MD – several 
disorders sharing similar symptoms or different mechanisms produced similar 
symptoms (Flint & Kendler, 2014). Despite the limitations of genotyping techniques, 
the high cost, and small numbers of participants, a large number of loci associated 
with MD were reported in some studies although the individual effect sizes 
pertaining to each locus tend to be extremely small – depression is highly polygenic 
(CONVERGE consortium et al., 2015; Mbarek et al., 2017; Okbay et al., 2016). 
Contradicting findings were also reported and the possible solutions and problems 
of these contesting results were addressed in a review (Cohen-Woods et al., 2013). 
A genome-wide association meta-analysis study included data from seven cohorts 
with a large group of participants of 135,458 MD patients and 344,901 normal 
controls identified 44 independent loci (Wray et al., 2018). These findings showed 
heritability studies may contribute to the search for the underlying biological 
processes of MD. The involvement of a large number of genetic variants with small 
individual effect sizes is consistent with the etiologically heterogeneous nature of 
the condition. 
 
The etiology of MD 
The studies investigating the etiology of MD are from various aspects 
including genetics, molecular biology, neuroimaging, and a combined approach of 
genetic, molecular, and neuroimaging (Hasler, 2010; Kupfer et al., 2012). Patten 
(2015) proposed eight medical models to explain possible causes of MD. These 




not only pinpointed potential directions in the search of biomarkers but also 
broadened clinical treatment options.  
Among the physiological indicators of MD, elevated hypothalamic-pituitary-
adrenal (HPA) axis activity, which controls physiological responses of stress in 
human, has been found to be consistently related to MD (Juruena et al., 2018). An 
increase in cortisol level is an indicator of increased HPA axis activity. This 
association may be applied to explain the relationship between serotonin, stress 
and MD (Gotlib et al., 2008). Many of the broadly-prescribed antidepressants used 
in treating MD are designed to increase the amount of serotonin between neuron 
cells – synaptic clefts (Segi-Nishida, 2017). This type of antidepressants works on 
different mechanisms to increase serotonin level in the brain. Serotonin selective 
reuptake inhibitors (SSRI) is one of this type of antidepressants. It has several 
limitations including low efficacy, long therapeutic lag, and undesirable side effects 
including increase suicide risk (Gerhard et al., 2016; Kupfer et al., 2012). Ketamine 
has recently emerged to be a potentially effective and fast treatment for MD. Some 
reported it could decrease MD symptom severity in a few hours after 
administration and it was effective in treatment-resistant MD and bipolar depressed 
patients (Blynn G. Bunney & Bunney, 2012). The application of ketamine has been 
discussed extensively mostly due to its notorious history of abusive usage and 
psychomimetic side effects. The Food and Drug Administration in the U.S. had 
approved a new medication – nasal spray containing ketamine – to treat patients 
with treatment-resistant depression in March 2019 (Canady, 2019). In clinical 
treatment, switching between different antidepressants has been a common 
practice but this approach did not increase treatment effect as reported in a review 
article (Bschor & Baethge, 2010). In a review of MD treatments, however, treatment 
strategies including using augments, combining treatments, or switching 
antidepressants did not show lasting benefits (Connolly & Thase, 2011). 
Antidepressants medication is commonly used in treating MD but there are 
pros and cons in antidepressant treatment. Antidepressants did not show specificity 




depression (Arnow et al., 2015). A systematic review of 522 studies with 116,477 
patients compared the efficacy of 21 antidepressants and found all the 
antidepressants were more effective in treating MD than placebo (Cipriani et al., 
2018). However, a meta-analysis of 17 studies reported the antidepressants 
increased the mortality in MD patients who did not have pre-existing cardiovascular 
diseases by 33% (Maslej et al., 2017). But the mortality of MD patients with pre-
existing cardiovascular diseases was not affected by antidepressants. Again, this is 
consistent with the etiologically heterogeneous nature of MD and may hint that its 
symptoms are to a substantial extent autonomous. 
The efficacy and acceptability of antidepressants were studied and it was 
reported that the efficacy and acceptability of antidepressants in the head-to-head 
trials were greater than those in the placebo-controlled trials. Cipriani et al. (2018) 
observed greater dropout rate and smaller response to antidepressants in placebo-
controlled trials and attributed these as a possible explanation for the disparity 
between placebo-controlled trials and head-to-head trials. The trustworthiness of 
head-to-head trials was challenged (Flacco et al., 2015). Among the 319 trials 
included in the analyses, 82.3% of the participants participated in trials were funded 
by pharmaceutical companies. Flacco and colleagues (2015) found 96.5% of the 
company-funded trials yielded results supporting the proposed treatments. Their 
results greatly challenged the credibility of these trials. An extensive discussion on 
the placebo response in antidepressant clinical trials produced several explanations 
and approaches to minimize the problem (Rutherford & Roose, 2013). These studies 
seemingly left the impression of new antidepressants are superior treatments than 
placebos and researchers should work towards minimizing placebo responses, 
which may be a potentially biased presumption.  
Despite the progresses in various fields to understand MD, due to the 
heterogeneous nature of MD, the actual causes of MD remained obscure and no 





Prevalent comorbidity, differences in disorder severity among patients, and 
missing biomarkers of mental disorders have increased the difficulties in treating 
mental disorders. Deducing symptoms to a few core symptoms shared by comorbid 
mental disorders – trans-diagnostic factors – may increase our understanding of 
mental disorders (Krueger & Eaton, 2015). The distinguishes between different 
mental disorders are obscure and unstable; therefore, adopting trans-diagnostic 
factors may provide a good alternative perspective in mental disorder research.  
To distill trans-diagnostic factors, an internalizing-externalizing model is used. 
Mental disorders could be divided into internalizing and externalizing disorders 
based on the symptoms. MD belonged to the internalizing group together with GAD, 
panic disorder, and social and specific phobias etc. Based on this model, several 
symptoms could be used as potentially good trans-diagnostic factors were 
proposed – maladaptive repetitive thought (Kaplan et al., 2018) and distortions in 
metacognition (Rouault et al., 2018).   
All these indications that the MD symptoms may be etiologically, 
descriptively and functionally heterogeneous points to the necessity to better 
understand the degree to which they operate separately as opposed to working in 
tandem. In this dissertation, I will mostly focus on short-term within-individual 
variability in depression symptoms to address the symptomatic heterogeneity of 
the condition. This can be efficiently done with modern mobile technology. 
High-functioning MD 
While many people have recurring MD episodes throughout their lives, 
many who used to have MD recovered from it and not only so. They even went on 
and achieved greatly both in their personal lives and at work (Rottenberg et al., 
2018). According to Rottenberg et al. (2018), a strict definition of high end-state 
functioning after depression (HFAD) included three criteria – having a record of MD 
diagnosis, having fully recovered from MD with only minor or zero symptoms, and 





Experience Sampling Methodology (ESM) 
Experience sampling methodology (ESM) has been widely used in studying 
various topics including daily activity, social interaction, changes in location, 
psychological states, and thoughts (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 2014). One 
advantage of ESM is that it allows the studying of participants’ responses in real life 
settings. As a result, the data would have higher ecological validity compared to 
data collected in laboratories. In addition, using random sampling time scheme 
rather than a fixed sampling schedule also increases ecological validity by 
eliminating expectancy effect of future assessments due to previously completed 
questionnaires. Depending on the questions included, ESM enables the research 
into the inner processes of people’s thoughts – “The objective is to identify and 
analyze how patterns in people’s subjective experience relate to the wider 
conditions of their lives. The purpose of using this method is to be as ‘objective’ 
about subjective phenomena as possible without compromising the essential 
personal meaning of the experience” (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 2014, p. 37). The 
earliest ESM study could date back to as early as 1925 (Scollon et al., 2009). Despite 
the inconveniences, early researchers and participants managed to complete the 
ESM studies using pencil and papers, and phone calls. The advancement in 
communication technologies bring about devices such as pager, pre-programmed 
alarms, personal digital assistants, and smart phones, which greatly lower the 
technical and financial requirements to conduct ESM studies; therefore, ESM 
becomes an easily accessible methodology. 
The strengths of ESM include high ecological validity, measuring the 
underlying psychological processes within individuals, and reducing memory bias 
(Scollon et al., 2009). Nevertheless, ESM studies are not without defects. The great 
demand ESM studies posit on participants – frequency and number of responses 
required from participants – may result in a highly-selective group of participants. 
The participants completed ESM studies may be those who are highly motivated, 
conscientious, and agreeable and whose professions, age, and lifestyle allow them 




prompted to answer the questions. These drawbacks limit the generalizability of the 
results of ESM studies. Possible solutions may be to explain the purpose of the 
study to the participants to establish trust and to create a “viable research alliance” 
(Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 2014, p. 41), monetary incentives, and easing the 
burden of participants by decreasing the frequency and numbers of questions used 
in ESM studies.  
ESM in mental disorder research  
Viewing psychopathology as a dynamic construct of interwoven 
relationships between attributions, self-representations, and symptoms is 
suggested by Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood, and Kinderman (2001). ESM is 
a good tool to assess the underlying dynamics of psychiatric disorders. And it has 
been used in clinical research (Bos et al., 2015; Lane et al., 2011; Myin-Germeys et 
al., 2009; Trull & Ebner-Priemer, 2014). A review of 18 studies in 
psychopharmacology demonstrated a broad application of ESM in various stages in 
psychopharmacology studies ranging from before, during, and after treatments (Bos 
et al., 2015). In these studies, ESM was used to collect baseline symptoms to be 
used in predicting treatment responses and outcomes before treatments and to 
detect exquisite changes in symptoms and the influences of the environments and 
treatment side effects during treatments. Later, the data was also applied to predict 
relapses after treatments.  
ESM has been employed in MD research, too. An ESM study on MD reported 
people who experienced MD symptoms were more sensitive to social interactions (L. 
H. Brown et al., 2011). As a result, they would avoid social interactions with close 
friends even though these interactions may ease their MD symptoms – increase 
positive affect and decrease negative affect. Greater mood fluctuations were found 
in people with mild to moderate MD than those with severe MD (Nahum et al., 
2017). A review of 42 ESM studies revealed risk and protective factors of depressed 






In this project, three ESM studies were conducted. These three studies were 
replicates of each other so that robust patterns or trends may be observed. The 
data of the three studies were analyzed separately because the data was collected 
at different times. Therefore, the analyses and writ-up of chapter sections were 
done at different times to complete the thesis in a timely manner.  
Multiple variables and different analyses were used to compare MD 
symptoms to decipher the fine differences between MD symptoms – whether they 
are heterogeneous. Chapter 2 compares the inter-correlations between MD 
symptoms using retrospective and mean momentary MD ratings. Chapter 3 tests 
the predictability of MD severity and moderators including age, gender, educational 
attainment, employment status, and marital status on the variability of individual 
MD symptoms. Chapter 4 looks into whether MD symptoms vary in circadian 
rhythm and whether these variances correspond with MD severity. Chapter 5 
checks the relationships between MD symptoms and personality traits and facets. 
Chapter 6 investigates how MD symptoms associate with activity level and heart 
rate variability. Chapter 7 examines the temporal, within- and between-subjects 
relationships among MD symptoms. Chapter 8 concludes and discusses the findings.








Chapter 2 Retrospective versus momentary assessments: using momentary 





Retrospective assessments are widely used by clinicians to diagnose illnesses. 
Depending on the specific designs and purposes, assessments used to measure the 
same phenomenon may differ in recall periods such as those used to measure pain 
and fatigue symptoms (e.g., 4-week, 1-week, one-day, at rest and during activity, or 
hourly, morning, evening, and mean, or current recall) (Broderick et al., 2008; 
Litcher-Kelly et al., 2007). One possible explanation why retrospective assessment is 
the predominant form of assessment may be: for any condition to be considered as 
with medical relevance, and therefore worth medical attention, clinical diagnosis 
and treatment, it should last at least a prolonged period of time. Retrospective 
assessments are thought to be good at capturing these particular features than 
momentary assessments because they require respondents to mentally aggregate 
what has been typical for them over an extended duration. Another possible 
explanation might be because retrospective assessments are the most available and 
convenient way to evaluate a condition. Clinicians can easily estimate patients’ 
illness levels based on their retrospective ratings and, hopefully, render appropriate 
medical assistances or treatments. Despite these strengths, this method still has 
some drawbacks. Bhandari and Wagner (2006) reviewed 42 papers on self-reported 
utilization of health care services and concluded that the accuracy of self-reports 
were influenced by six factors – recall timeframe, type of health care service, 
frequency of utilization, questionnaire design, mode of data collection, and memory 
aids. 
The symptoms of major depression (MD) are diverse. Using retrospective 
assessments as the sole measurement may limit the scope the symptoms could be 




about. This may forsake the possibilities of discovering symptoms that are not 
covered in the retrospective assessment instruments. For example, the diagnostic 
criteria for MD in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric 
Association (DSM) only partially include or did not include some depressive 
symptoms mentioned in Psychiatry or Psychological medicine textbooks (Kendler, 
2016). The partially included symptoms are depressed mood or irritable and 
guilt/worthless and the symptoms not included are volition/motivation, problem in 
speech, anxiety, physical symptoms (e.g., headaches, aches and pains), and 
depersonalization/decreolization. All of these symptoms except 
depersonalization/decreolization could be measured using retrospective 
assessments because it is “a subtle concept, time-consuming to evaluate, and 
perhaps of limited reliability” (Kendler, 2016, p. 778). The two symptoms that were 
partially included in the DSM-V have a broad range of descriptions. The descriptions 
for depressed mood or irritable are “depressed, melancholy, blue, sad, lonesome, 
worried, homesick, and noted in the facial expression” and those for guilt/worthless 
are “self-derogatory, self-depreciatory ideas, ideas of unworthiness, guilt, sin, the 
source of trouble for others” (Kendler, 2016, p. 777). However, the range of 
depressive symptoms that retrospective assessment instruments collectively 
covered is diverse but each instrument covered only a small subset of these 
symptoms (Fried, 2017). 
Long vs. short recall periods 
Validity and reliability of assessments are crucial because they determine 
whether the results of these assessments are trustworthy. Also, “a respondent’s 
ability to accurately report their experiences” and “forgetting and differential 
forgetting are mechanisms which produce misclassification error” (Donald E. Stull et 
al., 2009, p. 930; Wells & Horwood, 2004, p. 1008). These implied potential 
problems of retrospective assessments and recall periods used in retrospective 
assessments may influence the validity and reliability of the assessments and result 




The results of assessments with long recall periods are usually less accurate 
compared to the assessments with short recall periods because recall biases 
increased with the increase in recall periods (Broderick et al., 2008). However, while 
short recall periods are excellent in detecting momentary fluctuations, using only 
short recall periods in assessments may not be the most optimal approach. 
Frequent assessments may not catch crucial events, which usually take time to 
manifest; therefore, these events could be captured by using repeated assessments 
with longer gaps or retrospective assessments whereby respondents mentally 
aggregate symptoms and events happened over a period. For example, since 
medication adherence usually stabilize over time, measuring AIDS patients’ 
medication adherence by using an assessment with a long recall period would be 
more accurate than using the same assessment with a short recall period (Lu et al., 
2008). When selecting the most appropriate recall period to be used in an 
assessment, researchers should base their decisions on the variability of the target 
phenomenon (Keller et al., 1997; Donald E. Stull et al., 2009). To investigate a 
frequently changing phenomenon, adopting a short recall period with repeated 
assessments or momentary assessments may be more promising in capturing a full 
picture of that phenomenon than using assessments with long recall periods. In 
addition, depending on the duration of a phenomenon, the assessment period is 
crucial to uncover the features of the target phenomenon. If the duration of the 
target phenomenon is short, researchers could easily gather enough information to 
put together the puzzle behind the target phenomenon simply by using an 
assessment with a short recall period. But if the target phenomenon lasts relatively 
long, a more assuring approach to unveil the hidden aspects of the target 
phenomenon would be to employ assessments with long recall durations (Donald E. 
Stull et al., 2009). 
Peak-end rule 
One well-studied phenomenon that may cause biases in retrospective 
assessments is the peak-end rule. Specifically, the nature of this phenomenon is 




end (the experiences of the end of events) experiences for certain events are more 
outstanding than their memories of other parts of these events. Peak-end rule has 
been observed in people suffering from chronic pain (Stone et al., 2000), university 
students’ affective experiences in watching a film (Fredrickson & Kahneman, 1993), 
in elementary, middle school, and undergraduate students’ evaluations of material 
goods (Do et al., 2008), and in patients’ experiences of invasive medical 
examinations (Redelmeier & Kahneman, 1996). However, the results of the studies 
measuring affective experiences for a prolonged period (e.g., one week) did not 
support the peak-end rule. For positive and negative affect, the averages of 
momentary ratings were superior predictors of retrospective ratings than the 
means of the peak and end ratings in both normal and depressed participants (Ben-
Zeev et al., 2009) as well as in university students (S. Kemp et al., 2008). These 
inconsistent findings might result from the long measuring period, which may 
increase recall bias. Also different from the studies on peak-end rule, where 
participants were asked to rate a specific experience (e.g., arthritis pain and pain 
experienced while undergoing colonoscopy and lithotripsy), participants were asked 
to rate their general feelings. 
Recall of depressive symptoms in people with depression 
People with depression generally have poor memories of their previous 
depressive symptoms. A New Zealand birth cohort study showed among people 
with depressive symptoms and people who met the diagnostic criteria of 
depression, only 22% and 44% remembered their previous key depressive 
symptoms, respectively (Wells & Horwood, 2004). Also, a study on lifetime 
depressive episode reports showed 57.5% of the people who had depressive 
episodes during their participation of the study (the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th interviews) 
did not remember having depressive episodes in the final interview (the 5th 
interview) (Aneshensel et al., 1987). The discrepancies were mostly on reporting 
having depressive episodes in previous interviews but did not report having 
depressive episodes in the last interview (86%). The remaining different reports 




and the 4th interviews but reported having depressive episodes in the last interview 
(14%). A study comparing positive and negative affect of healthy controls and 
people with depression found both groups tended to exaggerate positive and 
negative affect (Ben-Zeev et al., 2009). However, while healthy controls over-
reported their positive affect more than their negative affect, depression patients 
did not overstate their negative affect more than their positive affect.  
Although having poor recall of previous depressive episodes or symptoms is 
common among people with MD, some patients recalled better than others. People 
who had superior recall were also those who had been severely depressed, had 
been diagnosed with depression for three or more years, had suicidal ideation for 
three or more years, were currently depressed, were females, and had received 
depression treatments before they were 21 years old (Aneshensel et al., 1987; 
Kendler et al., 2001; Wells & Horwood, 2004). This may be explained by a 
phenomenon in memory processing, “state-dependence”, where current 
depression experiences may remind people having depression their previous 
symptoms and not having depressive symptoms may cause people to forget their 
past symptoms (Aneshensel et al., 1987; Blaney, 1986; Bower, 1987; Kendler et al., 
2001). 
Momentary assessment 
In contrast to retrospective assessments, momentary assessments measure 
real-time features of a phenomenon and are not subject to memory biases. Instead 
of rating what had happened in the past, respondents are asked to rate their 
feelings at the moment. As mobile technology becomes more mature and available 
to the general public, the time has come and the tools supporting momentary 
assessments have become more available than ever before. This provides 
researchers a great opportunity to compare and to research into the differences 
between retrospective and momentary measures. In a study on pain and fatigue 
patients, Broderick et al. (2008) compared the means of momentary ratings, which 
were measured seven times a day, and the retrospective assessments were 




and 28 days. In their report, the accuracy of retrospective ratings was measured by 
the correlations between momentary and retrospective ratings. The accuracy of 
retrospective ratings was influenced by the length of recall periods. The 
retrospective ratings were greater than the mean momentary ratings and increased 
as the recall period lengthened. The accuracy of retrospective ratings was higher for 
shorter recall periods and lower for longer recall periods, where the one-day recall 
was the most accurate and the seven-day recall was the least accurate. Surprisingly, 
in some items, the accuracy of the 28-day recall was not the least accurate among 
the various recall periods and its accuracy was greater than the seven-day recall.  
The decline in recall accuracy as the increase in the recall period revealed a 
potential issue in retrospective assessments. As mentioned earlier, retrospective 
assessments are widely used in medical practice and if they are unreliable indicators, 
basing diagnoses on these assessments would be problematic. Hence, this study 
adopted the Experience Sampling Methodology (ESM) and retrospective 
assessments to compare the momentary and retrospective assessments of MD to 
explore the differences between the two types of assessments. 
Study design 
Considering that both retrospective and momentary assessments have their 
strengths and weaknesses, three studies adopted both retrospective and 
momentary assessments to measure MD symptoms to compare the means of the 
momentary assessments with the retrospective assessments. Because the 
measurements were taken relatively frequently in the momentary assessments, this 
opens a door to observe the symptom variability within MD symptoms. In addition, 
if the total duration of momentary assessments and the recall period of 
retrospective assessments are long enough, the cycle of MD including the 
manifestation, duration, and the characteristics of different phases of MD could 
also be depicted. However, due to a practical issue – long period may decrease 
participant compliance and participants’ willingness of participation, the durations 




In this present study, depressive symptoms were firstly measured using 
retrospective assessment at the beginning of the study, followed by 15-day (Study 1) 
or 14-day (Studies 2 and 3) momentary assessments, and then a retrospective 
assessment at the end.  
Although retrospective assessments have their advantages and are the most 
widely used type of assessment, sometimes the accuracy of these assessments are 
questionable because of recall biases. Recall periods could greatly affect recall bias, 
where the longer the recall periods are, the less precise are the results. Previous 
studies have shown people tend to base their responses on their peak and end 
experiences of events. Nevertheless, momentary assessments are less subject to 
recall biases because instead of asking people to recall how they felt in the past, 
people are asked to answer questions based on their feelings at the moment. When 
combined with multiple sampling times design, momentary assessments are also 
good tools to measure highly variable constructs such as MD symptoms. 
The diagnostic criteria of MD include nine diverse symptoms. Although MD 
may affect different parts of the body therefore various symptoms are observed, 
people who have MD usually have different symptoms or other conditions (e.g., 
somatic symptoms, panic attacks, obsessional traits, physical illnesses, or dementia) 
(D. Goldberg, 2011). These constitute the heterogeneous nature of MD. In addition, 
the nine symptoms have varied levels of discriminant ability to distinguish people 
have MD from those do not have MD (McGlinchey et al., 2006). This raised a 
question of how similar or how different are the nine symptoms and how much 
could the retrospective assessments of MD distinguish the differences between the 
symptoms.  
The studies 
In this chapter, we tested the following hypotheses. H1: The correlations 
between items measuring different symptoms in retrospective and momentary 
assessments (discriminant validity) should, on average, be significantly smaller than 
those items measuring the same symptoms (convergent validity). H2: According to 




ratings) and the end ratings (the means of momentary ratings obtained on the last 
sampling day) of the momentary assessment should be more highly correlated with 
the retrospective ratings than the overall mean ratings of the momentary 
assessments. H3: Also, based on the peak-end rule, if end experiences taint the 
retrospective memory, the mean ratings of the second half of the sampling period 
should be superior predictors of the retrospective ratings to the means of the first 
half momentary ratings. H4: If MD symptoms fluctuate substantially over time and 
the momentary assessments could capture the fluctuations of MD symptoms (and 
not just fluctuations of underlying MD), then the inter-symptom correlations among 
retrospective ratings would be greater than those among the momentary ratings. 
In three studies, we employed a widely used retrospective measure of 
depression, the Patient Health Quality-9 (PHQ-9) and developed a momentary 
measurement, the Daily Depression Items, (DDI) based on the Zung Self-Rating 
Depression Scale (Zung, 1965), the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond 
& Snaith, 1983), and the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (Lovibond & Lovibond, 
1996). There were minor modifications of the DDI used in Studies 2 and 3. The 
mapping of the two measurements according to the DSM-V diagnostic criteria of 
MD was listed in Table 2.1. All p-values in the three studies were adjusted for 
multiple comparison using false discovery rate (FDR). Compared to Bonferroni 
correction, FDR is more lenient thus may avoid the possibility of falling into Type II 














Table 2.1 Mapping of the DSM-V diagnostic criteria for MD onto the momentary and 
retrospective assessments 
MD in the DSM-V  Retrospective assessment (PHQ-9) Momentary assessment (DDI) 
Depressed mood or 
irritable 
Feeling down, depressed, or hopeless I feel sad.** 
I feel irritable.* 
I feel happy. ** 
Decreased interest 
or pleasure 
Little interest or pleasure in doing 
things 
I enjoy what I am doing. 
I don't care about anything. 
Significant weight 
change (5%) or 
change in appetite 
Poor appetite or overeating I have no appetite during the 
day. 
Change in sleep Trouble falling or staying asleep, or 
sleeping too much 
I didn't have enough sleep last 
night.** 
I worry about sleeping. 
Change in activity Moving or speaking so slowly that other 
people could have noticed? Or the 
opposite - being so fidgety or restless 
that you have been moving around a lot 
more than usual 
I am restless. 
It is not effortful to do 
things.** 
I am doing things with my 
normal pace.* 
Fatigue or loss of 
energy 
Feeling tired or having little energy I am tired. 
Guilt or 
worthlessness 
Feeling bad about yourself - or that you 
are a failure or have let yourself or your 
family down 
I feel worthless. 
I feel that I can't get anything 
done.** 
I feel guilty.** 
Concentration Trouble concentrating on things, such 
as reading the newspaper or watching 
television 
I can't concentrate. 
I feel that I can’t make 
decisions.** 
Suicidality Thoughts that you would be better off 
dead of or hurting yourself in some way 
I feel hopeless. 
  How's your day? 
How would you rate your 
overall physical health today?* 
What time did you go to bed 
last night?** 
What time did you wake up 
this morning?** 







Study 1  
Materials and Method 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from on-line advertisements on an internal job 
searching website of the University of Edinburgh, invitation e-mails were sent to 
those who participated in other studies held in the Department of Psychology 
previously and indicated interests of participation in future studies, and an 
undergraduate student subject pool. In total, 238 participants expressed their 
interests in participating in this study by signing up on-line and completed the initial 
retrospective assessment (177 females and 61 males with mean age of 25.56 years 
and SD of 11.55 years), 153 participants partially completed or fully completed the 
momentary assessments, and 128 completed the final retrospective questionnaire. 
Among those, the following participants were removed from further analysis: two 
answered the momentary assessments carelessly as shown in the correlations 
among the questions, where there should be both positive and negative 
correlations because of several reverse-scoring items, but only positive correlations 
were observed in these two participants, and 109 participants did not complete the 
study due to personal reasons or technical problems (e.g., unable to couple their 
phones successfully). The following duplicated data were removed: two participants 
completed the initial retrospective assessment twice and one participant answered 
the final retrospective assessment twice. In addition, as a result of incomplete data, 
981 momentary observations were excluded from further analyses. The remaining 
127 participants (97 females and 30 males) completed this study and provided 
momentary data of 6392 time-points in total. The mean age of those who 
completed Study 1 was 24.87 years (SD = 10.6). After completing the study, 
participants recruited from the undergraduate subject pool received course credits 
and participants recruited from other places received either £5 cash or a £5 Tesco 
digital gift card as compensation. All participants also received a general 





were not notified whether their scores on the PHQ-9 exceeded the diagnostic 
threshold for MD. 
Materials 
 The Patient Health Quality of Somatic, Anxiety, and Depression Scale (PHQ-
SADS) was used to measure baseline depressive symptoms along with other 
symptoms or conditions relevant to depression. The PHQ-SADS consisted of the 
PHQ-9, General Anxiety Disorder-7, and Patient Health Questionnaire-15 with a 
total number of 37 items. A study measured the validity of the PHQ-9 in 6,000 
patients with the 20-item Short-Form General Health Survey as an assessment for 
construct validity and the mental health professional re-interview as the criterion 
standard, the results showed a PHQ-9 score of 10 or more indicates a sensitivity of 
88%, a specificity of 88%, and a positive likelihood ratio of 7.1 (Kroenke et al., 2001). 
Personality traits were measured using the 120-item International Personality Item 
Pool (IPIP) (L. R. Goldberg, 1999; L. R. Goldberg et al., 2006; J. A. Johnson, 2014). 
These personality data will be used in Chapter 5. The DDI was used to measure real-
time changes of depressive symptoms. A full list of the items in the DDI was shown 
in Table A.3 in Appendix A.  
 
Procedure 
 After participants indicating their interests of participating in this study by 
signing up on-line, they were directed to fill in the first on-line retrospective 
assessment comprising several demographic questions, the PHQ-SADS, and the IPIP. 
The consent form was part of the on-line sign-up form. Later, a researcher e-mailed 
them the instructions on preparing their Android smart phones including 
downloading and installing an app, movisensXS (Movisens GmbH), on their phones. 
Those who did not have an Android smart phone used our lab phones to participate. 
movisensXS has been used in several studies such as personality (R. Mõttus et al., 
2016; Wrzus & Mehl, 2015), stress (Stütz et al., 2015), and the compliance of 






A day after participants’ successfully set up their Android smart phones, they 
started to receive notifications to respond to the DDI four times per day over 15 
days. The participants’ responses were collected once in the mornings, twice in the 
afternoons, and once in the evenings. The notifications during weekdays was 
between 8 A.M. and 10:30 P.M. and between 9 A.M. and 11 P.M. during weekends. 
After the participants completed the momentary assessments, a researcher e-
mailed them the final instructions on uploading the remaining responses and a link 
to complete the second retrospective assessment. The data collected in this second 




The number of momentary questionnaires included in analyses was 6,372. 
The descriptive characteristics of the participants were listed in Table 2.2. 
Participants’ momentary ratings of the reverse scoring items were adjusted by 
subtracting the ratings from 100, which is the highest rating on the scale. The 
distribution of momentary MD symptoms in each participant varied substantially as 
shown in the means and standard deviations of all momentary ratings across 
participants in Table 2.3. The correlations between the retrospective and 
momentary assessments were analyzed by comparing the retrospective ratings 
obtained after participants completed the momentary assessments with the mean 
momentary ratings. The Spearman’s rank-order correlation was used to test this 
because the original data was non-parametric. The Spearman’s rhos were shown in 











Table 2.2 Descriptive characteristics of the participants 
 Study 1 
(n = 127) 
Study 2 
(n = 75) 
Study 3 
(n = 78) 
Age, M (SD) 24.87 (10.6) 20.51 (3.31) 25.46 (6.18) 
Sex, n (%)    
  Female 97 (76) 57 (76) 57 (73) 
  Male 30 (24) 18 (24) 21 (27) 
Education, n (%)    
  GCSE 1 (1) 0 (0) 2 (2.6) 
  A level/Highers 58 (46) 46 (61) 25 (32) 
  Bachelor’s degree 33 (26) 16 (21) 20 (25.6) 
  Master’s degree 32 (25) 12 (16) 24 (30.8) 
  PhD 3 (2) 1 (1) 7 (9) 
Marital status, n (%)    
  Single 77 (61) 56 (75) 54 (69) 
  Married 9 (7) 1 (1) 4 (5) 
  Divorced 3 (2) 1 (1) 2 (3) 
  In a relationship 38 (30) 17 (23) 18 (23) 
Employment status, n (%)    
  Employed or self-
employed 
5 (4) 1 (1) 9 (11.5) 
  Part-time employed 12 (9) 7 (9) 6 (7.7) 
  Full-time student 86 (68) 59 (79) 60 (77) 
  Retired 7 (6) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
  Unemployed 17 (13) 8 (11) 3 (3.8) 
Note. For the employment status in Study 1, five participants did not select the 
specified categories and were re-categorized to fit in the existing categories. These 
are one participant identified himself/herself as an underemployed freelancer was 
included in part-time employed, two participants identified himself/herself as a 
student and one participant regarded himself/herself as paid to be a full-time PhD 
student were included in full-time student, one participant who claimed that he/she 













Table 2.3 Means and SDs of the DDI items in Studies 1, 2, and 3 
DDI item 
Mean SD 
Study 1  Study 2 Study 3 Study 1 Study 2  Study 3 
I feel happy. - - 34.44 - - 22.06 
I feel sad. 32.83 31.02 26.29 21.97 21.35 23.60 
I feel irritable. 36.47 29.22 28.57 23.56 21.67 24.28 
I enjoy what I am doing. 34.01 33.40 32.94 23.05 21.87 23.73 
I don't care about 
anything. 
28.45 27.43 26.43 21.93 20.12 25.80 
I have no appetite during 
the day. 
26.69 29.39 23.52 24.75 22.50 22.70 
I worry about sleeping. 38.35 39.88 32.82 30.19 28.05 28.78 
I didn't have enough 
sleep last night. 
46.73 45.31 41.96 30.96 28.98 30.62 
I am restless. 39.12 35.82 32.01 26.65 24.03 26.65 
I am tired. 51.49 50.19 47.06 29.40 26.94 28.55 
It is not effortful to do 
things. 
54.95 50.12 - 26.78 25.45 - 
I feel guilty. - - 29.63 - - 30.38 
I am doing things with 
my normal pace. 
- 9.03 10.66 - 11.93 12.11 
I feel worthless. 29.73 29.69 24.40 24.92 22.80 26.71 
I feel that I can't get 
anything done. 
43.91 40.33 - 27.73 23.06 - 
I feel that I can’t make 
decisions. 
- - 28.92 - - 24.56 
I can't concentrate. 42.82 40.58 35.72 27.12 22.85 26.60 
I feel hopeless. 31.49 31.89 26.24 24.40 22.65 26.30 
How's your day? 35.28 37.35 34.98 24.04 22.38 23.02 
How would you rate your 
overall physical health 
today? 







Table 2.4 Spearman’s rhos between the PHQ-9 and DDI items in Study 1 
Note. Little interest = little interest or pleasure in doing things; feeling down = feeling down, depressed, or hopeless; trouble in sleep = trouble 
falling or staying asleep, or sleeping too much; tired = feeling tired or having little energy; altered appetite = poor appetite or overeating; feeling 
bad about self = feeling bad about yourself – or that you are a failure or have let yourself or your family down; concentration problem = trouble 
concentrating on things, such as reading the newspaper or watching television; psychomotor changes = moving or speaking so slowly that other 
people could have noticed? Or the opposite - being so fidgety or restless that you have been moving around a lot more than usual; suicidal 
ideation = thoughts that you would be better off dead of or hurting yourself in some way. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.


















I feel sad. .47*** .58*** .43*** .47*** .43*** .56*** .38*** .32*** .48*** 
I feel irritable. .47*** .57*** .45*** .49*** .45*** .54*** .40*** .34*** .46*** 
I enjoy what I am doing. .48*** .55*** .48*** .49*** .46*** .54*** .42*** .32*** .45*** 
I don't care about anything. .41*** .39*** .32*** .26** .32*** .33*** .22* .27** .33*** 
I have no appetite during the day. .36*** .38*** .32*** .35*** .35*** .33*** .23* .19* .34*** 
I worry about sleeping. .43*** .51*** .56*** .54*** .46*** .53*** .36*** .23* .42*** 
I feel that I didn't have enough 
sleep last night. 
.37*** .35*** .59*** .59*** .41*** .41*** .40*** .27** .32*** 
I am restless. .41*** .48*** .35*** .45*** .45*** .47*** .45*** .33*** .32*** 
I am tired. .40*** .46*** .49*** .60*** .46*** .44*** .47*** .27** .36*** 
It is not effortful to do things. .32*** .34*** .36*** .38*** .20* .38*** .43*** .15 .14 
I feel worthless. .57*** .73*** .48*** .55*** .48*** .72*** .50*** .40*** .48*** 
I feel that I can't get anything 
done. 
.51*** .51*** .51*** .56*** .39*** .55*** .57*** .26** .31*** 
I can't concentrate. .50*** .51*** .52*** .59*** .48*** .60*** .61*** .26** .31*** 
I feel hopeless. .55*** .68*** .50*** .54*** .52*** .66*** .46*** .40*** .49*** 
How's your day? .47*** .55*** .44*** .47*** .39*** .52*** .34*** .29** .46*** 




We firstly examined the discriminant and convergent validity of the 
retrospective and the momentary questionnaires by comparing the correlations 
among items measuring the same and different MD symptoms in the DSM-V 
diagnostic criteria using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. The Spearman’s correlations 
between the mean momentary ratings and the retrospective ratings were 
calculated and then these values were transformed to z scores by using Fisher’s 
approach before analyzing in the Wilcoxon test. The medians of Spearman’s rhos 
for the items measuring the same and different MD symptom were .56 and .44, 
respectively, and the two groups of the Spearman’s rhos transformed z scores were 
significantly different according to the Wilcoxon rank-sum test (W = 1204, p = .014). 
This indicated the items measuring the same MD symptoms showed higher 
convergence across rating methods (momentary vs retrospective) than did those 
measuring different MD symptoms, therefore supporting H1. This suggests that, 
generally, retrospective ratings are, at least to some extent, able to discriminate 
among depressive symptoms as perceived “real time”.  
The peak-end rule was tested by transforming the correlation coefficients 
between retrospective ratings and momentary ratings into z scores and then 
comparing the z scores in pairs using the Wilcoxon signed rank test. Specifically, in 
order to test the peak-end rule, we compared the correlations between the 
retrospective ratings and four different momentary ratings – the mean momentary 
ratings, the peak momentary ratings, the end momentary ratings, and the peak-end 
ratings (the averages of the peak and the end ratings of the momentary 
assessment). The Wilcoxon signed rank test was used to analyze the six pairs of 
comparisons – a) the mean momentary ratings vs. the peak momentary ratings, b) 
the mean momentary ratings vs. the end momentary ratings, c) the mean 
momentary ratings vs. the peak-end momentary ratings, d) the peak-end 
momentary ratings vs. the peak momentary ratings, e) the peak-end momentary 
ratings vs. the end momentary ratings, and f) the peak momentary ratings vs. the 
end momentary ratings indicated significant differences between all the pairs (ps 




momentary ratings correlated greater with the retrospective ratings (.43) than the 
end momentary ratings did (.38). However, the associations between the mean 
momentary ratings and the retrospective ratings (.45) and between the peak 
momentary ratings and the retrospective ratings (.44) were higher than those 
between the peak-end momentary ratings and the retrospective ratings. H2 was 
rejected.  
 
Table 2.5 The estimates and p-values of Wilcoxon signed rank test between 
retrospective ratings and four momentary ratings – the mean momentary ratings, 
peak-end momentary ratings, peak momentary ratings, and end momentary 
ratings and the medians of the Spearman’s rhos of the four momentary ratings in 




V p-value Median of Spearman’s 
rhos 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Mean       .45 .25 .44 
Mean vs. 
Peak 
5403 5788.5 8779 < .001 .089 < .001    
Mean vs. End 7558.5 8503.5 8108 < .001 < .001 < .001    
Mean vs. 
Peak-end 
4433 6597 5474 .029 < .001 .547    
Peak-end       .43 .24 .42 
Peak-end vs. 
Peak 
4469.5 3913.5 2911.5 .053 .001 < .001    
Peak-end vs. 
End 
368 8434 1790 < .001 < .001 < .001    
Peak       .44 .25 .41 
Peak vs. End 7005 7990.5 6409.5 < .001 < .001 .294    
End       .38 .18 .40 
Note. 1 = Study 1; 2 = Study 2; 3 = Study 3. 
 
Whether people’s memories of MD symptoms were more highly related to 
the means of the first half momentary ratings or the means of the second half 
momentary ratings was tested by using Wilcoxon signed rank tests. The first half 
momentary ratings were the momentary ratings recorded before the median of all 
momentary assessments in each participant. The remaining momentary ratings 
were the second half momentary ratings. The results showed the momentary 




5096, p = .004). The medians of the Spearman’s rhos of the first half momentary 
ratings and the second half momentary ratings were .43 and .41, respectively. This 
showed the first half momentary ratings correlated greater with the retrospective 
ratings than the second half momentary ratings. When asked to retrospectively rate 
their feelings, the participants referenced their experiences of the first half of the 
sampling period more than their responses of the second half of the sampling 
period (end experience). H3 was rejected. 
We further examined whether the inter-correlations among MD symptoms 
were stronger in the average momentary or retrospective assessments using the 
principal component analysis (PCA). The results showed the mean momentary 
ratings of MD symptoms revealed a slightly more uniform symptom structure than 
the retrospective assessments. The loadings ranged from .59 to .85 and from .45 
to .93 in the retrospective and the average momentary assessments, respectively. 
Table 2.6 shows the PCA loadings for the DDI and PHQ-9. The first principal 
components of the retrospective assessments explained 57 percent and those in 
the average momentary assessment explained 62 percent of the total variance 
among the variables. The medians of the Spearman’s rhos of the inter-correlations 
between retrospective ratings and between the mean momentary ratings were .51 
and .56, respectively. This showed the items in the momentary assessment 






Table 2.6 PCA Loadings for the DDI and PHQ-9 items in Studies 1, 2, and 3 
 DDI item 
Mean ratings First ratings 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
I feel happy. - - .89 - - .66 
I feel sad. .91 .86 .86 .76 .52 .73 
I feel irritable. .91 .79 .69 .74 .40 .40 
I enjoy what I am doing. .93 .82 .87 .61 .56 .43 
I don't care about anything. .70 .55 .73 .56 .11 .50 
I have no appetite during the day. .62 .58 .67 - - - 
I worry about sleeping. .63 .49 .33 - - - 
I didn't have enough sleep last night. .69 .40 .39 .63 .48 .46 
I am restless. .65 .74 .67 .47 -.01 .34 
I am tired. .77 .42 .60 .66 .56 .51 
It is not effortful to do things. .45 .55 - .34 .58 - 
I feel guilty - - .79 - - .46 
I am doing things with my normal pace.* - .34 .43 - 0 .29 
I feel worthless. .87 .79 .88 .76 .41 .70 
I feel that I can't get anything done. .82 .76 - .71 .58 - 
I feel that I can’t make decisions. - - .86 - - .53 
I can't concentrate. .85 .73 .86 .68 .66 .58 
I feel hopeless. .91 .85 .90 .79 .88 .54 
How's your day? .89 .64 .87 - - - 
How would you rate your overall physical 
health today?* 
- .67 .65 - - - 
PHQ-9       
Little interest or pleasure in doing things .80 .68 .72    
Feeling down, depressed, or hopeless .83 .78 .79    
Trouble falling or staying asleep, or 
sleeping too much 
.79 .67 .73    
Feeling tired or having little energy .85 .75 .79    
Poor appetite or overeating .68 .71 .67    
Feeling bad about yourself - or that you 
are a failure or have let yourself or your 
family down 
.81 .80 .76    
Trouble concentrating on things, such as 
reading the newspaper or watching 
television 
.76 .69 .73    
Moving or speaking so slowly that other 
people could have noticed? Or the 
opposite - being so fidgety or restless 
that you have been moving around a lot 
more than usual 
.59 .52 .62    
Thoughts that you would be better off 
dead of or hurting yourself in some way 
.67 .68 .73    





Although the difference was marginal, the higher inter-correlations among 
the mean momentary ratings could reflect their higher reliability (because they 
were aggregated across multiple measurement occasions). To rule out this 
alternative explanation, the correlations among the very first momentary ratings 
and the retrospective ratings were also compared. The loadings ranged from .34 
to .79 and the first principal components of the first momentary ratings explained 
43 percent of the total variance among the variables. These indicated there were no 
stronger inter-correlations among items in the momentary assessment – in fact the 
opposite. The median of the Spearman’s rhos of the first momentary ratings was .37, 
which was smaller than those of the mean momentary ratings and the retrospective 
ratings as mentioned in the previous paragraph. The weak inter-correlations implied 
the participants’ first momentary ratings varied hugely and supported H4. This 
revealed the highly variable nature of MD symptoms.  
To examine the results of Study 1, we conducted Study 2 as a replicate of 
Study 1 and included minor modifications. The major modification was adopting a 
different mobile phone application in data collection. In Study 1, movisensXS was 
the primary tool to collect momentary data but there was a problem of excluding 
participants using iPhone Operation System (iOS) devices including iPhones and 
iPads because movisensXS could only be installed in Android tablets or phones. 
Although we offered the iOS users an option of using our lab phones to participate, 
this was still not an optimal approach to recruit iOS users, therefore we conducted 
Study 2 to include iOS users. 
Study 2 
Materials and Method 
 This study was a replicate of Study 1 with minor modification to test the 
robustness of the results of Study 1. MovisensXS, the Android mobile phone 
application used in Study 1 was replaced with Qumi to include iOS users, some 




questionnaire to test potential factors influencing mood, and three items in the DDI 
were modified or added. 
Participants 
 Participants were recruited via the same approaches as those used in Study 
1. In total, 230 participants signed up for Study 2, data from 78 participants were 
collected. However, three participants did not complete the final retrospective 
assessment and only 75 participants (57 females and 18 males) fully completed this 
study (mean age = 20.51 and SD = 3.31). 
Materials  
Several lifestyle questions including questions asking participants’ diet, 
smoking, drinking, and exercising habits, and medical history (physical illnesses and 
psychiatric disorders) were included to control for variables influencing MD 
symptoms. Also, one anchoring point of the item, “I feel irritable”, in the DDI was 
revised from “cheerful” to “calm”. Two items were added. They were Items 11 “I 
am doing things with my normal pace” with anchor points of “faster”, “normal”, and 
“slower” and Item 17 “How would you rate your overall physical health today” with 
anchoring points of “very good” and “not very good”. The other items in the DDI 
were the same as those used in Study 1 (Table A.4 in Appendix A). 
Procedure 
 A procedure similar to that used in Study 1 was used. When the participants 
signed up on-line, they were asked to read and agree to the consent form before 
providing their e-mail addresses. Once the participants had signed up to participate 
in this study, the researcher of this study sent them instructions on how to set up 
their mobile phones, which included downloading and installing Qumi and loading 
the questionnaire file. Different from Study 1, where participants completed the 
momentary and retrospective assessments on two different platforms, movisensXS 
and Google Forms, respectively. In this study, all questionnaires were administered 
in Qumi and the researcher did not have access to participants’ responses until the 
participants e-mailed their responses to the researcher. The participants were 





A total of 3,955 momentary questionnaires were used in analyses. Technical 
problem was a major reason of participants missing questionnaires, where the 
participants did not receive notifications to fill out the momentary questionnaires. 
Table 2.2 shows the descriptive characteristics of the participants. During data 
preparation, all momentary ratings of four reverse scoring items were adjusted in 
the same way as in Study 1. The momentary ratings of the newly added item in this 
study – “I am doing things with my normal pace”, which had three anchoring points 
of “Faster”, “Normal”, and “Slower” – were adjusted by subtracting the ratings from 
50 and then converting to absolute values. Compared to the variabilities of 
momentary MD symptoms in Study 1, participants in Study 2 varied less in their 
momentary ratings because the SDs of all items were smaller than those in Study 1. 
Also, the mean momentary ratings of most items in Study 2 were also smaller than 
those in Study 1. The means and SDs of all momentary ratings were shown in Table 
2.4. Consistently with Study 1, the correlations between all items were positive and 






Table 2.7 Spearman’s rhos between the PHQ-9 and DDI items in Study 2 


















I feel sad. .38** .38** .18 .09 .25* .40*** .24* .24* .04 
I feel irritable. .33** .30* .15 .08 .20 .33** .29* .22 .04 
I enjoy what I am doing. .31* .26* .17 .09 .24* .37** .24* .14 .00 
I don't care about anything. .37** .31** .03 .00 .18 .37** .34** .38** .16 
I have no appetite during the day. .31** .33** .13 .12 .43*** .36** .31** .26* .06 
I worry about sleeping. .21 .20 .57*** .34** .31** .28* .19 .09 .13 
I didn’t have enough sleep last night. .24* .16 .32** .38** .19 .19 .21 .00 .08 
I am restless. .18 .24* .28* .13 .30* .34** .33** .21 .13 
I am tired. .20 .13 .34** .48*** .16 .25* .14 .00 .00 
It is not effortful to do things. .21 .20 .40*** .38** .21 .25* .10 .10 .11 
I am doing things with my normal 
pace. 
.32** .27* .35** .29* .36** .24* .55*** .30* .16 
I feel worthless. .33** .43*** .22 .12 .36** .55*** .39** .26* .23 
I feel that I can’t get anything done. .40*** .38** .26* .20 .24* .42*** .30* .14 .17 
I can’t concentrate. .38** .34** .35** .32** .30* .42*** .37** .10 .26* 
I feel hopeless. .41*** .52*** .25* .17 .31** .56*** .37** .28* .25* 
How’s your day? .12 .33** .13 .09 .29* .31** .20 .19 .05 
How would you rate your overall 
physical health today? 
.34** .35** .35** .19 .45*** .35** .38** .14 .10 
          
Note. Little interest = little interest or pleasure in doing things; feeling down = feeling down, depressed, or hopeless; trouble in sleep = 
trouble falling or staying asleep, or sleeping too much; tired = feeling tired or having little energy; altered appetite = poor appetite or 
overeating; feeling bad about self = feeling bad about yourself – or that you are a failure or have let yourself or your family down; 
concentration problem = trouble concentrating on things, such as reading the newspaper or watching television; psychomotor 
changes = moving or speaking so slowly that other people could have noticed? Or the opposite - being so fidgety or restless that you 
have been moving around a lot more than usual; suicidal ideation = thoughts that you would be better off dead of or hurting yourself 




The discriminant and convergent validity of items measuring the same and 
different MD symptoms were also tested using Wilcoxon rank-sum test. We firstly 
calculated Spearman’s rho between the mean momentary ratings over 14 days and 
the retrospective ratings measured after the participants completed all momentary 
assessments. Later, the calibrated z scores of the Spearman’s rho were analyzed 
using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. Consistent with the results of Study 1, the results 
supported the discriminant validity, which indicated the items measuring the same 
MD symptoms not only differed from but also converged more strongly across types 
of measurement than items measuring different symptoms (W = 1546.5, p = .003). 
This could be observed in the medians of the Spearman’s rhos of the items 
measuring the same and different MD symptoms were .37 and .24, respectively. H1 
was supported. 
In order to test what type of momentary ratings best predicted retrospective 
ratings, we examined the peak-end rule by comparing the momentary and the 
retrospective ratings using the Wilcoxon signed rank test. Also, to test the peak-end 
rule more extensively, we not only compared the correlations between the 
retrospective ratings and the mean momentary ratings with the correlations 
between the retrospective ratings and the averages of the peak and the end 
momentary ratings but also the relationships between the retrospective ratings and 
the peak and the end momentary ratings. The same analyses as used in Study 1 
were conducted on the same six pairs of comparisons. The peak momentary ratings 
represented the 75th percentile of the momentary ratings, the end momentary 
ratings were calculated by averaging the momentary ratings of the last sampling 
day, and the peak-end momentary ratings were the means of the peak and the end 
momentary ratings. If one or some of the mean end momentary ratings were NAs, 
the mean momentary ratings of the previous sampling day were used until there 
was no NAs. For example, if there were NAs in one participant’s mean momentary 
ratings of the last sampling day and the mean momentary ratings of the sampling 
day – Day 13 – of this participant were used. The results indicated significant 




momentary ratings (p = .089). The significant pairs were the peak-end momentary 
ratings and the mean momentary ratings (V = 6597), the peak-end momentary 
ratings and the end momentary ratings (V = 8434), the mean momentary ratings 
and the end momentary ratings (V = 8503.5), and the peak momentary and the end 
momentary ratings (V = 7990.5, ps < .001). Table 2.6 shows the estimates and the p-
values of the Wilcoxon signed rank tests and the medians of the Spearman’s rhos. 
The medians of the Spearman’s rhos of the mean momentary ratings (.25) and the 
peak momentary ratings (.25) were greater than that of the peak-end momentary 
ratings (.24). The median of the Spearman’s rhos of the end momentary ratings was 
the smallest (.18). Consistent with Study 1, H2 was rejected.  
Whether people rated their past MD symptoms less or more on their recent 
experiences were tested by comparing the mean momentary ratings of the first half 
of the sampling period (less recent) and the second half of the sampling period 
(more recent). The calibrated z scores of the Spearman’s rhos between the 
retrospective ratings and the first half momentary ratings as well as those of the 
Spearman’s rhos between the retrospective ratings and the second half momentary 
ratings were calculated separately. We then employed the Wilcoxon signed rank 
test to compare the calibrated z scores of the Spearman’s rhos in pairs. Significant 
differences between the first half and the second half momentary ratings were 
found (W = 7484, p < .001). The medians of the Spearman’s rhos between the 
retrospective ratings and the first half momentary ratings (.25) was greater than 
that between the retrospective ratings and the second half momentary ratings (.21). 
H3 was rejected. This was consistent with the results in Study 1. 
We then explored the inter-correlations among the items measuring MD 
symptoms in the momentary and retrospective assessments using the PCA. The 
Spearman’s rho of the retrospective ratings and the mean momentary ratings were 
used in the analysis. The loadings of the momentary and retrospective assessments 
ranged from .34 to .86 and from .52 to .80, respectively (Table 2.6). The first 
principal components of the retrospective explained 49 and those of the mean 




variables, respectively. The medians of the momentary assessment and the 
retrospective assessment were .39 and .44, respectively. The results were 
inconsistent with those in Study 1, where the amount of variance explained by the 
mean momentary assessment was greater than those explained by the 
retrospective assessment. Regardless of the inconsistent results, the differences 
between the retrospective and momentary assessments were small and this 
indicated the momentary and retrospective assessments had similar item inter-
correlations. 
 We also compared the item inter-correlations between the very first 
momentary ratings. The loadings ranged from -.01 to .88 and the first principal 
components only explained 26 percent of the total variance among the variables. 
The results demonstrated weak inter-correlations between the first momentary 
ratings, which was consistent with the results in Study 1 and confirmed the MD 
symptoms were highly variable and the momentary assessments could gauge these 
changes. The medians of the Spearman’s rhos of the mean momentary ratings (.39), 
the retrospective ratings (.44), and the very first momentary ratings (.15) also 
illustrated similar results. H4 was supported. 
Almost all results in Study 2 were consistent with those in Study 1. One 
minor exception arose when testing H4, the inter-correlations among the items in 
the retrospective assessment were greater than those among the items in the 
momentary assessment in this study, whereas the opposite was found in Study 1. 
However, these were merely minor differences and the inter-correlations were 
similar. As a replicate of Study 1, the results of this study increased the credibility of 
the results of Study 1. To further verify the results of Studies 1 and 2, Study 3 was 
conducted.  
Study 3 
Materials and Method 
 This was a replicate of Studies 1 and 2 with some minor modifications in the 




instrument – an activity sensor, Movisens EcgMove 3 (Movisens GmbH, Karlsruhe, 
Germany). The activity sensors collected data including heart rate, heart rate 
variability, numbers of steps participants took each day, activity classes, and energy 
expenditure. The data collected using the activity sensors will be used in Chapter 6. 
Participants 
Participants were recruited via e-mails through course organizers and 
department and school secretaries of the University of Edinburgh, posters in the 
campuses of the University of Edinburgh and in cafes and shops near the central 
campus, and social media. In total, 153 participants signed up for this study, 105 
participants completed the initial questionnaire, and 78 participants provided valid 
and completed data (mean age = 25.46 and SD = 6.18). There were 57 female and 
21 male participants.   
Materials  
 One item was added to the demographic and lifestyle questions, - "What's 
the quality of your closest relationship?". This item had two anchoring points of 
"very good" and "very poor" on a 9-point Likert scale. In the DDI, two items were 
added, one item was modified and expanded into two items, two items were 
modified, and one item was replaced. The two added items are "What time did you 
go to bed last night?" and "What time did you wake up this morning?". The item “I 
feel sad” with two anchoring points of "happy" and "sad" was modified and 
extended into "I feel sad" and "I feel happy" and both items had anchoring points of 
"not at all" and "very much". “I feel that I don’t have enough sleep last night” was 
revised and became “I didn’t have enough sleep last night”. “I feel that I can’t get 
anything done” was revised into “I feel that I can’t make decisions” and the 
anchoring points were changed from “getting things done” and “not getting things 
done” to “can make decisions” and “cannot make decisions”. “It is not effortful to 
do things” was replaced by “I feel guilty” and the anchor points were revised from 
“effortful” and “effortless” to “guilty” and “not guilty”. Table A.5 in Appendix A 






 After participants signed up online and indicated the time they were 
available to collect an activity sensor from the researcher in the Department of 
Psychology, the University of Edinburgh, the researcher contacted and confirmed 
the collection time with the participants via e-mail. The researcher then explained 
the procedure of the study, helped the participants setting up their phones, and 
gave them an activity sensor. Different from Study 2, where participants using iOS 
devices completed all questionnaires on the mobile application, Qumi, in Study 3, 
all participants completed the retrospective questionnaires on Google Form and the 
momentary questionnaires on the applications – movisensXS for Android phone 
users and Qumi for iOS users. Participants were asked to complete five momentary 
questionnaires daily over a duration of 14 days and wore the activity sensors 
around their chests between the first and the last momentary questionnaires. After 
completing the study, the participants were asked to return the activity sensor to 
the Department of Psychology, the University of Edinburgh. The participants 
received a £8 monetary compensation and a report on the associations of the DDI 
items except the items only measured once a day, a report on heart rate and heart 
rate variability, and a report on daily physical activity. 
The content of a heart rate and heart rate variability report included 
metabolic equivalent level, activity class (i.e., lying, sitting or standing, walking or 
active, jogging, and other), heart rate, heart rate variability spectrogram, low and 
high frequencies of heart rate variability spectrogram, the ratio of low and high 
frequency, and the Baevsky stress index, which is a measure of stress. Physical 
activity reports comprise activity class, hourly and daily breakdown of activity class, 
body position (i.e., lying supine, lying left, lying right, lying prone, upright, and 
other), number of steps participants took per day, and activity intensity.  
 
Results 
A total number of 4,297 valid momentary questionnaires from 78 




shown in Table 2.2. The reverse-scoring items were adjusted before further 
analyses. Table 2.8 shows the correlations between the mean momentary MD 
ratings (the DDI) and the retrospective MD ratings (the PHQ-9) in Spearman’s rhos. 
All correlations were positive, which aligned with the results in Studies 1 and 2. 
To test H1 of items measuring the same MD symptoms correlated greater 
than those measuring different MD symptoms, Wilcoxon rank-sum test was used. 
The Spearman’s rhos between the mean momentary ratings and the retrospective 
ratings were transformed to z scores and were used in the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. 
The result showed significant differences between the two groups (W = 1608, p 
= .005). The medians of the Spearman’s rhos measuring the same MD symptoms 
correlated greater than that of the Spearman’s rhos measuring different MD 
symptoms (the same vs. different = .58 vs. .43). H1 was supported.  
The peak-end rule was tested in H2 using Wilcoxon signed rank test. The 
same pairs of comparisons of the Spearman’s rhos transformed z scores as in 
Studies 1 and 2 were analyzed. The mean momentary ratings and the peak-end 
momentary ratings correlated similarly with the retrospective ratings (V = 5474, p 
= .547, Table 2.6). However, the associations between the peak-end momentary 
ratings and the retrospective ratings were significantly different from those 
between the peak momentary ratings and the retrospective ratings (V = 2911.5, p 
< .001) and those between the end momentary ratings and the retrospective ratings 
(V = 1790, p < .001). The median of the Spearman’s rhos revealed the peak-end 
momentary ratings (.42) were smaller than that of the mean momentary ratings 
(.44) but were larger than those of the peak (.41) and the end momentary ratings 






Table 2.8 Spearman’s rhos between the PHQ-9 and DDI items in Study 3 
Note. Little interest = little interest or pleasure in doing things; feeling down = feeling down, depressed, or hopeless; trouble in sleep = trouble 
falling or staying asleep, or sleeping too much; tired = feeling tired or having little energy; altered appetite = poor appetite or overeating; feeling 
bad about self = feeling bad about yourself – or that you are a failure or have let yourself or your family down; concentration problem = trouble 
concentrating on things, such as reading the newspaper or watching television; psychomotor changes = moving or speaking so slowly that other 
people could have noticed? Or the opposite - being so fidgety or restless that you have been moving around a lot more than usual; suicidal 
ideation = thoughts that you would be better off dead of or hurting yourself in some way. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.


















I feel happy. .57*** .66*** .40*** .55*** .27* .51*** .44*** .41*** .52*** 
I feel sad. .48*** .60*** .49*** .56*** .32** .55*** .48*** .51*** .53*** 
I feel irritable. .31** .40*** .31** .44*** .32** .31** .46*** .25* .33** 
I enjoy what I am doing. .57*** .58*** .45*** .57*** .33** .46*** .44*** .40*** .55*** 
I don't care about anything. .64*** .47*** .41*** .49*** .33** .40*** .45*** .34** .41*** 
I have no appetite during the day. .41*** .45*** .38** .45*** .28* .45*** .37** .43*** .43*** 
I worry about sleeping. .16 .21 .36** .39*** .00 .07 .25* .09 .03 
I didn't have enough sleep last night. .18 .27* .33** .48*** .08 .12 .30** .19 .28* 
I am restless. .21 .31** .23* .44*** .22 .40*** .37** .27* .38** 
I am tired. .24* .33** .29* .54*** .11 .31** .39*** .25* .27* 
I feel guilty. .48*** .58*** .43*** .51*** .39*** .59*** .45*** .33** .40*** 
I am doing things with my normal 
pace. 
.22 .39*** .21 .28* .29* .35** .24* .34** .23* 
I feel worthless. .45*** .60*** .48*** .62*** .40*** .66*** .52*** .46*** .57*** 
I feel that I can’t make decisions. .55*** .56*** .47*** .57*** .40*** .50*** .58*** .48*** .48*** 
I can't concentrate. .52*** .54*** .45*** .62*** .43*** .50*** .60*** .42*** .45*** 
I feel hopeless. .58*** .70*** .53*** .67*** .46*** .69*** .53*** .45*** .58*** 
How's your day? .53*** .60*** .44*** .57*** .31** .47*** .46*** .35** .44*** 
How would you rate your overall 
physical health today? 
.45*** .59*** .43*** .53*** .37** .41*** .46*** .35** .44*** 




H3 of recent experiences shaped people’s memories was tested using 
Wilcoxon signed rank test. The first half and the second half momentary ratings 
were grouped according to the same criterion as used in Studies 1 and 2 – for each 
participant, the momentary ratings recorded before the median of all completed 
momentary ratings were in the group of the first half momentary ratings and the 
remains were the second half momentary ratings. Significant differences between 
the two groups were found (V = 2836, p < .001). The second half momentary ratings 
correlated greater with the retrospective rating than the first half momentary 
ratings as shown in the medians of the Spearman’s rhos for the first half and second 
half momentary ratings was .39 and .44, respectively. H3 was supported, which was 
inconsistent with the results of Studies 1 and 2. 
The inter-correlations between items in the momentary and retrospective 
assessments were analyzed using the PCA. The loadings ranged from .62 to .79 in 
the retrospective assessment and from .33 to .90 in the momentary assessment 
(Table 2.6). The first principal components of the retrospective assessment 
explained 53 percent of the variance and those of the momentary assessment 
explained 55 percent of the variance, which was consistent with the results in Study 
1 but was inconsistent with those in Study 2, where the retrospective assessment 
explained more variance than the momentary assessment did. The medians of the 
Spearman’s rhos of the momentary and the retrospective assessments were .51 
and .47, respectively. This showed the items in the momentary assessment were 
highly correlated.  
The high inter-correlations within the momentary assessment may be due to 
the same reason as described in Study 1 – their higher reliability. Therefore, the 
very first momentary ratings were analyzed using the PCA to examine this 
possibility. The loadings ranged from .29 to .73 and the first principal components 
explained 28 percent of the variance. The median of the Spearman’s rhos of the 
very first momentary ratings was .22. The results showed no strong inter-




varied hugely. H4 was supported, which was consistent with the results in Studies 1 
and 2.   
As a replicate of Studies 1 and 2, the results in Study 3 did generally 
confirmed the results in Studies 1 and 2. The only exception was H3 was rejected in 
Studies 1 and 2 but it was supported in Study 3.   
 
Discussion 
 Items measuring the same MD symptoms in both the momentary and the 
retrospective assessments correlated stronger than those measuring different MD 
symptoms, which showed the same MD symptoms converged more comparing to 
different MD symptoms. This also demonstrated high internal consistency in items 
measuring the same MD symptoms in both assessments.  
The peak-end rule was rejected in Studies 1, 2, and 3 but there were slightly 
differences. Mean momentary ratings consistently correlated more greatly with the 
retrospective ratings than the peak-end, the peak, and the end ratings in the three 
studies. The correlations between the peak-end ratings and the retrospective 
ratings were only greater than those between the end momentary ratings and the 
retrospective ratings in Studies 1 and 2 but the associations were larger than both 
the peak and the end momentary ratings in Study 3. The results showed when 
participants were asked to rate their MD symptoms retrospectively, they rated their 
feelings based on their average experiences. Across the three studies, the mean 
Spearman’s rhos of the end momentary ratings correlated the least with the 
retrospective ratings, this may address a possible alternative explanation – the 
participants did not rate the retrospective assessments according to their end or 
more recent feelings (Broderick et al., 2008). In Studies 1 and 2, the comparison of 
the momentary ratings taken during the first half of the sampling period with those 
collected during the second half of the sampling period also demonstrated similar 
results, where people based their ratings of the retrospective assessment more on 
the first half than the second half of the sampling period. However, the results in 




recent experiences, which showed end experiences of an event may influence how 
people gauged their previous experiences of the same event. 
In three studies, the inter-correlations of the items in the retrospective and 
mean momentary assessments only differed slightly. But the inter-correlations of 
the very first momentary ratings were weak. This implied MD symptoms are highly 
variable and the momentary assessments could capture these changes. This finding 
may inspire some to reconsider the conventional view of MD as a coherent entity 
and the commonly used MD diagnostic criteria such as the total score in the DSM-V 
(Fried et al., 2014).  
The results from three studies displayed similar patterns and illustrated 
replicable findings. Therefore, increasing the credibility of the findings. The small 
inter-correlations between the very first momentary ratings showed the MD 
symptoms are highly variable. Looking into the momentary changes in symptoms 
and viewing single symptoms separately instead of all symptoms listed in the 
diagnostic criteria collectively may be the way forward to bring in more light in 
understanding the heterogeneous nature of MD and developing possible treatment 
methods.  
 The associations between the retrospective and momentary assessments 
were analyzed in this chapter. In the next chapter, we examined the variability of 
MD symptoms and its relationships with demographic factors as possible 
moderators. These include age, gender, educational attainment, marital status, and 












Symptom variability and disorder severity 
The diagnoses of psychiatric disorders are based on established diagnostic 
criteria. It has been argued, however, that symptoms fluctuate over time by being 
influenced by other time-varying factors. This may have crucial implications for the 
development of the disorders. Studying these variances might increase our 
understanding of psychiatric disorders (Hessler et al., 2013).  
Seeing disorders as collections of ever-changing symptoms is consistent with 
the dynamic systems perspective on them. Viewing psychiatric disorders from the 
perspective of a nonlinear dynamical systems model rather than a static and linear 
systems model has gradually gained popularity in health science publications 
(Rickles et al., 2007). Originated from mathematics and physics, this model has a 
broad application in many disciplines (Castillo & Melin, 2003). In a nonlinear system, 
the state of the system develops as time passes and its initial state and the rules of 
how the system operates determine how the process unfolds (Rickles et al., 2007). 
Inputs are disproportional to outputs in nonlinear systems. Nonlinear systems 
include complex and chaotic systems. In complex systems, the behaviors between 
units within systems are diverse and collective. Chaotic systems are characterized 
by complicated, random, and sporadic behaviors. If systems are subject to the 
influences of their surroundings, these are open systems. In such systems, changes 
are influenced not only by the elements inside the systems but also by the elements 
outside the systems and the changes are time-dependent. 
There have been many applications of dynamical systems model in studying 
psychiatric disorders (Hayes et al., 2007, 2015; Karp et al., 2004; Odgers et al., 2009). 
It was used to study the impact of psychotherapy on anxiety disorder, major 
depression (MD), personality disorder and substance abuse (Hayes et al., 2007), and 




changes brought about by psychotherapy were not linear and were discontinuous. 
Hayes et al. (2015) proposed a destabilization and transition model, where 
treatments destabilize the psychological system of an individual and then the 
system gradually transit to an improved state. A study on high risk violence 
associated frequent incidents of severe violence with symptom instability (Odgers 
et al., 2009). During maintenance treatments, higher symptom variability was linked 
to a greater possibility of future MD episodes but no difference between different 
treatment groups was reported (Karp et al., 2004). Items in the Hamilton depression 
scale displayed a range of variances between the participants in mean range of 
scores, possible range of scores, and mean range of scores divided by possible range 
of scores.  
Seeing psychiatric disorders from the perspective of dynamical systems 
model, symptom fluctuations may be considered changes within systems, where 
each individual represents a system. Symptom variability and symptom stability 
might be used as indicators of symptom fluctuations. However, the two terms are 
usually deemed of sharing the same meaning but they are different and they 
describe different aspects of changes in symptoms (Ebner-Priemer et al., 2009). 
Variability describes “the dispersion of scores from a central tendency, does not 
consider the temporal order of scores (Ebner-Priemer et al., 2009, p. 196) while 
stability takes both dispersion and temporal order into account. Several MD related 
studies examined how symptom stability and symptom variability related to suicidal 
attempt and other psychiatric disorders (Dawood & Pincus, 2017; Melhem et al., 
2019). Higher symptom instability and symptom variability of depressed mood and 
loss of interests and lower symptom instability and symptom variability in loss of 
interest were associated with pathological narcissism (Dawood & Pincus, 2017). 
Great MD severity and symptom variability were linked to high suicidal attempt 
(Melhem et al., 2019). We are curious about the relationship between MD symptom 
variability and MD severity. In this chapter, MD symptom variability was tested in 
three studies to assess the relationship between MD symptom variability and MD 




variability: people with greater load of depressive symptoms do not just have more 
of them but also fluctuate in them more. In addition to testing the direct links 
between MD severity, assessed with a one-off questionnaire, and symptom 
variability over time and across situations, we linked known correlates of 
depression severity with the variability in symptoms.  
 
Age and MD 
MD patient’s age of onset rather than their current age was related with MD 
morbidity, especially in those who had an early age of onset (Coryell et al., 2009). 
Studying the age of onset in mental disorders is difficult because the mostly used 
measurements are patients’ retrospective self-reports, where objective evidences 
are often missing due to the lengthy gaps between disorder onset and the first 
treatment (Angold et al., 1996; Kessler et al., 2007). Although no consensus has 
been reached regarding the cut-off age of late-onset MD or whether age of onset 
could be used to distinguish MD subgroups, the results from many studies have 
shown early- and late-onset MD are clinically different (Variend & Gopal, 2008). 
Late-onset MD related more with physical illnesses, structural changes in the brain, 
and cognitive deficits. Early-onset MD patients usually have personality disorders, 
are more neurotic, and encounter less of stressful life events than those with late-
onset MD (Bukh et al., 2011). It was not clear whether the treatment outcomes for 
early- or late-onset MD was better than the other because there were reports of 
similar level of treatment outcome (Bukh et al., 2011) as well as late-onset MD 
being harder to treat (Variend & Gopal, 2008). Controversial results were also found 
in MD relapse in those having early- or late-onset MD. However, starting treatment 
early had been reported as playing a pivotal role in the progression of MD. In a 
review, de Girolamo, Dagani, Purcell, Cocchi, and McGorry (2012) emphasized the 
crucial role of early discovery and early intervention to treat MD at an early stage. 
The benefits of early treatment included stopping the symptoms from becoming 
more serious and preventing MD patients from having other comorbid disorders. 




of chronological age had on MD symptom variability. We hypothesize age would not 
have any effect on MD symptom variability.  
Sex difference in MD 
There have been consistent reports on greater number of female MD 
patients than male patients (M. Weissman & Olfson, 1995). Gender biases within 
family may be one of the possible explanations because family members tended to 
attribute mental problems of females in a family as caused by MD and suggested 
them to seek clinical diagnosis and treatment (Brommelhoff et al., 2004). This may 
result in over-reporting in females. Also, gender bias in MD diagnosis may be 
another potential cause of the uneven number between female and male patients. 
In addition, both direct and indirect relationships between MD and gender may 
contribute to this disparity (Bertakis et al., 2001). The indirect association was 
mediated through medical use rate. Compared to males, females use medical 
services more frequently, which may explain why more females were diagnosed 
with MD. However, recurrent clinic visits were associated with incorrect and correct 
MD diagnoses. For both men and women, no matter what they scored on the Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI), they were more likely to be diagnosed with MD if they 
visited clinics more often. Females with a high BDI score were more likely to be 
diagnosed with MD than their male counterparts. These potentially incorrect 
diagnoses may result in an imbalance in medical resource distribution – those who 
need medical services could not receive suitable treatments because most of the 
resources were occupied by those who might not need them. Bertakis et al. (2001) 
also reported MD diagnosis was associated with educational attainment and marital 
status in women. Females were also more seriously affected by challenging changes 
in life, which caused those who have already being diagnosed with MD to develop 
more serious MD symptoms or those who had recovered from MD or had never had 
MD previously to receive MD diagnosis (Lorant et al., 2007).  
Interestingly, when the MD symptoms listed in the DSM and the alternative 
“male-type” MD symptoms were both assessed, the imbalanced gender ratio in MD 




women experienced different depressive symptoms (Addis, 2008; Lynch & Kilmartin, 
2013; Rutz, 1999; Rutz et al., 1995). Women usually have more internal emotion 
problems and sleep problems. Men have more external symptoms such as anger, 
substance abuse, womanizing, workaholism, gambling, feeling irritable, and 
aggressive behaviors. Although some studies reported no sex differences in the 
male-type symptoms, “qualitative gender-related differences” of greater inter-
correlations between these symptoms were found in men but not in women 
(Möller-Leimkühler et al., 2004, p. 90). Therefore, including the measures of male-
type MD symptoms may explain more variances in MD patients or participants of 
MD studies (Martin et al., 2013). Sex differences in MD has been studied in several 
aspects including stress responses (Bale & Epperson, 2015), pathways causing MD 
(Kendler & Gardner, 2014), and the influences of sex hormones (Altemus et al., 
2014). Extrapolating from this research, we explore whether MD symptom 
variability was more prominent in females than in males.   
Educational attainment and MD 
  Although there have been reports supporting that educational attainment 
was negatively related to MD, the association was not firmly established because 
both positive and negative associations were found. In a cross-nation study of 18 
countries, significant negative relationships between educational attainment and 
MD were found in two out of the ten high-income (Israel and the USA) and three 
out of the eight low- to middle-income countries (India, Mexico and Ukraine) 
(Bromet et al., 2011). But significant positive relationships were also observed in 
one high-income (Japan) and one low- to middle-income country (China). One 
possible explanation of why MD associated negatively with educational attainment 
was having an early onset of psychiatric disorders including MD may disrupt 
learning and resulted in low educational attainment (Berndt et al., 2000; Kessler et 
al., 1995).  
A multinational study of seven countries reported that comorbidities of 
anxiety disorders, mood disorders and substance-use disorders were more common 




Organization, 2000). However, the reverse association – high educational 
attainment and low comorbidity rate was not reported. Studies on the genetic 
correlation between educational attainment and MD showed both negative 
(Boardman et al., 2015; López-León et al., 2009) and positive associations (Mezuk et 
al., 2008; Peyrot et al., 2015). Low childhood intelligence was associated with higher 
chances of psychological stresses including anxiety and MD (Gale et al., 2009). High 
intelligence was linked to great educational attainment in England (Deary et al., 
2007). Therefore, a negative association may exist between intelligence and MD via 
educational attainment. 
Environmental influencers such as socioeconomic status (SES) may be the 
primary contributor of the association between educational attainment and MD 
(Peyrot et al., 2015). A meta-analysis study of 51 studies and six countries used 
educational attainment, income, and occupation, social class and other measures of 
SES (Lorant et al., 2003). The authors observed a negative relationship between 
educational attainment and MD onset as well as MD persistence. However, using 
educational attainment as one of the typical assessments of SES (Oakes & Rossi, 
2003), may complicate the disentanglement of the influences of educational 
attainment and other SES measurements on MD. To test the relationship between 
educational attainment and MD symptom variability, we hypothesize that people 
with low educational attainment would have greater MD symptom variability than 




Marital status and MD 
 There have been consistent findings of higher MD prevalence in those who 
were unmarried, widowed, or divorced than those who were married (Andrade et 
al., 2003). Varied associations were found in low- to middle-income and high-
income countries: in high-income countries, MD was associated with being 




divorced or widowed were related to MD (Bromet et al., 2011). Ending cohabitation 
also increased MD severity and the odds of MD diagnoses in women (Lorant et al., 
2007). Nevertheless, the causality between MD and marital status was not clear 
because psychiatric disorders was linked to a low marriage stability – high divorce 
rate and short years of marriage (Kessler et al., 1998). Contrasting likelihoods of 
being diagnosed with MD were observed in different union types (S. L. Brown, 2000). 
Cohabiting couples had a higher probability of being diagnosed with MD than 
married couples. This may be caused by higher level of relationship instability 
experienced among cohabiting couples than in married couples. Nonetheless, 
Perelli-Harris and Styrc (2017) suggested childhood selection might be a 
determinant factor of the mental well-being in married and cohabiting couples. 
They argued childhood selection, which was shaped by parental influences and was 
formed during childhood, caused people to choose whether to marry or cohabit. To 
test the relationship between marital status and MD symptom variability, we 
hypothesize those who were not married would have greater MD symptom 
variability than those who were married.  
Employment status and MD 
The link between employment status and mental health drew people’s 
attention particularly during economic recession. A review suggested a highly 
possible association between economic recession and mental health in Europe and 
North America (Frasquilho et al., 2016). The numbers of people having mental 
health problems, using substances, having suicidal behaviors, and deteriorated well-
being after recessions were greater than these prior to recessions. Vulnerable 
groups including those who were old, unemployed, indebted, or facing financial 
hardships, had insecure jobs, and had families and children. Despite the effect of 
parental unemployment on the mental health of children and young people being 
indirect, it may have lasting consequences even after these children and young 
people have entered adulthood.  
The health benefits of employment on MD and psychological stress were 




or reemployment and health outcome (van der Noordt et al., 2014). Due to a lack of 
consistent evidence, whether employment had any effect on general health, 
physical health, and mortality was unclear. But being employed did protected 
people from having MD. Several studies have reported unemployment was 
positively correlated with depression in many countries including Portugal 
(Rodrigues et al., 2017), Greece, and Spain (Gili et al., 2013; Iglesias Garcia et al., 
2014).  
Other dimensions of work and aspects of the workplace may influence the 
mental health of jobholders. These include job authority, job demand, and social 
support, task variation, and learning opportunity. The Demand-Control model 
demonstrated a combination of high job demand and low level of control over one’s 
job would cause mental stress (Karasek, 1979). A later expansion of this model – the 
Demand-Control-Support model – assumed social support among colleagues at 
work would enhance workers’ capacity to handle stress (J. V. Johnson & Hall, 1988). 
Vanroelen, Levecque, and Louckx (2009) examined these two models and found 
employees’ mental health was mainly affected by job demand and social support. 
We test how employment status linked to MD symptom variability with a 
hypothesis of employment status correlates with MD symptom variability – those 
who are unemployed had higher level of MD symptom variability then those who 
are employed. 
The studies 
The relationships between the moderators discussed above and the 
variabilities of MD symptoms are tested in three studies and the following six 
hypotheses are tested. We also explore whether MD is a homogeneity or 
heterogeneity entity in these relationships. We expect that if depression is a 
heterogeneous entity, this would reflect in the ways different symptoms relate to 
MD severity and assorted fluctuations would be observed.  
H5: High variability in momentary ratings reflects MD severity as defined by 
retrospective ratings; after all, mood variability is a definitional symptom of MD. 




correspond with high scores in the retrospective MD symptom ratings – the Patient 
Health Questionnaire 9 (PHQ-9) – completed after the momentary assessments. 
The influences of age, gender, educational attainment, marital status, and 
employment status on MD severity are also tested. For example, it could be that 
people with different levels of education vary in how their MD symptoms fluctuate. 
H6: Chronological age has no effect on MD symptom variability. H7: MD symptom 
variability is more prominent in females than in males. H8: People with low 
educational attainment would have greater MD symptom variability than those 
with high educational attainment. H9: Those who were married have less MD 
symptom variability than those who were not married. H10: Employment status 
correlates with MD symptom variability such that unemployed have higher level of 
MD symptom variability then those who are employed. All p-values were corrected 
using false discovery rate. 
 
Materials and Method 
The materials, procedure, and participants were the same as described in 
Studies 1, 2, and 3 in Chapter 2. Kroenke, Spitzer, and Williams (2001) reported a 
PHQ-9 score 10 or larger had a sensitivity of 88%, a specificity of 88%, and a positive 
likelihood ratio of 7.1 in diagnosing MD. Here, a PHQ-9 score of 10 or larger was 




 Standard deviation (SD) of each item in the Daily Depression Items (DDI) 
were used as an indicator for symptom variabilities (Table 3.1). The minimum and 
maximum SDs among the participants were listed in Table 3.1. The differences 
between the minimum and maximum SDs in the overall SDs ranged from 21.93 (for 
the item “I don’t care about anything”) to 30.96 (for the item “I feel that I didn’t 




The associations between MD severity, age, gender, educational attainment, 
marital status, and employment status and the variability of each item in the DDI 
were tested using a linear model. The R code of this model was listed in Appendix B. 
In linear models, variability of each item in the DDI was the dependent variable (DV) 
and PHQ-9 score, age, gender, marital status, educational attainment, and 
employment status were the independent variables (IVs). Among the IVs, age and 
educational attainment were continuous and gender, marital status, and 
employment status were categorical. Educational attainment was treated as a 
continuous variable because the levels were in a chronological order Employment 
status had six levels and marital status was consisted of five levels. Considering 
treating these two variables as factors may cause collinearity issues or undermine 
power, therefore, they were collapsed into fewer levels. Employment status was 
collapsed into two groups, where employed or self-employed and full-time student 
were in one group and part-time employed, retired, and unemployed were in 
another group. Marital status was collapsed into two levels where single, divorced, 
and widowed were collapsed into one group and in a relationship and married were 
in another group. 
In addition, five participants provided answers for their employment status 
other than the provided options, so their answers to this question were re-
categorized to fit into the five existing options and then into the two groups 
described above. These were one participant identified himself/herself as an 
underemployed freelancer in the part-time employed group, two participants 
identified himself/herself as a student and one participant regarded himself/herself 
as paid to be a full-time PhD student in the full-time student group, and one 





Table 3.1 SDs of the DDI items in Studies 1, 2, and 3 
DDI item 
Overall SD Minimum SD Maximum SD 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
I feel happy. - - 22.06 - - 0 - - 32.29 
I feel sad. 21.97 21.35 23.60 2.53 1.25 0 34.76 29.20 29.45 
I feel irritable. 23.56 21.67 24.28 2.35 .79 0 34.09 31.99 35.08 
I enjoy what I am doing. 23.05 21.87 23.73 2.10 .64 5.17 36.37 34.91 34.88 
I don't care about anything. 21.93 20.72 25.80 2.27 3.30 0 35.89 32.67 40.19 
I have no appetite during the day. 24.75 22.50 22.70 .77 0 0 46.06 40.44 43.59 
I worry about sleeping. 30.19 28.05 28.78 2.22 2.00 0 49.94 65.76 47.38 
I didn't have enough sleep last night. 30.96 28.98 30.62 1.73 3.56 0 45.89 43.40 48.34 
I am restless. 26.65 24.03 26.65 1.97 0 4.47 39.47 32.28 36.81 
I am tired. 29.40 26.94 28.55 1.99 2.42 5.22 40.78 35.28 39.95 
It is not effortful to do things. 26.78 25.45 - 1.46 6.48 - 39.44 36.35 - 
I feel guilty. - - 30.38 - - 0 - - 37.55 
I am doing things with my normal 
pace. 
- 11.93 12.11 - 0 0 - 23.22 20.27 
I feel worthless. 24.92 22.80 26.71 1.87 0 0 33.56 28.99 32.11 
I feel that I can't get anything done. 27.73 23.06 - 2.18 5.52 - 39.07 31.73 - 
I feel that I can’t make decisions. - - 24.56 - - 0 - - 30.99 
I can't concentrate. 27.12 22.85 26.60 2.10 3.58 1.13 35.70 33.52 33.68 
I feel hopeless. 24.40 22.65 26.30 2.14 2.98 0 35.17 29.20 40.09 
How's your day? 24.04 22.38 23.02 2.46 2.52 4.16 39.13 43.41 35.60 
How would you rate your overall 
physical health today? 
- 23.41 25.54 - 4.93 0 - 40.31 49.50 
Note. Overall SD is the SD for the rating provided by all participants for each item in the DDI. Minimum and maximum SDs are the 





 Among all models, MD severity was a significant predictor of the variabilities 
of more than half items in the DDI - “I feel sad”, “I enjoy what I am doing”, “I don't 
care about anything”, “I have no appetite during the day”, “I am restless”, “I feel 
worthless”, “I feel hopeless”, and “How's your day” (Table 3.2). Frequent 
fluctuations in MD symptoms thus reflected MD severity and H5 was partially 
supported. MD severity did not significantly predict the variability of all DDI items 
suggested MD is heterogeneous. Age did not significantly predict the variability of 
any DDI items and H6 was therefore supported (Table 3.3). Since gender, 
educational attainment, marital status, and employment status were not significant 
predictors of MD severity, H7, H8, H9, and H10 were rejected. The moderators 
related to the variability of MD symptoms similarly and thus supporting MD 
homogeneity but the matching demographics of the participants might be the cause. 
The standardized betas and p-values of age, gender, educational attainment, 
marital status, and employment status for each DDI item were shown in Tables 3.3–
3.7. Figures showing the patterns of the standardized betas of the moderators were 
listed in Appendix C, where matching patterns could be observed for most items in 
PHQ-9 score and but not for age, gender, educational attainment, marital status 

















Table 3.2 Standardized betas and p-values of PHQ-9 score from regression models 
testing the variabilities of the DDI items in Studies 1, 2, and 3 
DDI item 
β p 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
I feel happy. - - .05 - - .899 
I feel sad. .34 .19 .03 .010 .405 .951 
I feel irritable. .23 .19 .12 .133 .293 .637 
I enjoy what I am doing. .34 .09 .04 .008 .813 .899 
I don't care about 
anything. 
.35 .32 .37 .006 .088 .027 
I have no appetite during 
the day. 
.33 .31 .25 .014 .163 .255 
I worry about sleeping. .11 .07 .10 .640 .878 .790 
I didn't have enough sleep 
last night. 
.14 .15 -.07 .494 .461 .881 
I am restless. .28 .15 .06 .043 .332 .887 
I am tired. -.12 -.04 -.10 .619 .998 .812 
It is not effortful to do 
things. 
-.12 .03 - .629 .829 - 
I feel guilty. - - .13 - - .692 
I am doing things with my 
normal pace. 
- .41 .27 - .016 .183 
I feel worthless. .42 .28 .26 < .001 .142 .227 
I feel that I can't get 
anything done. 
.23 .19 - .133 .326 - 
I feel that I can’t make 
decisions. 
- - .27 - - .127 
I can't concentrate. .25 .24 .04 .091 .255 .939 
I feel hopeless. .39 .27 .17 .001 .142 .483 
How's your day? .30 .14 .05 .020 .812 .905 
How would you rate your 
overall physical health 
today? 





Table 3.3 Standardized betas and p-values of age from regression models testing the 
variabilities of the DDI items in Studies 1, 2, and 3 
DDI item 
β p 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
I feel happy. - - -.26 - - .277 
I feel sad. -.11 .03 -.23 .640 .951 .405 
I feel irritable. -.18 .02 .02 .332 .960 .960 
I enjoy what I am doing. -.23 -.04 -.34 .152 .943 .098 
I don't care about 
anything. 
-.17 .08 -.25 .328 .878 .255 
I have no appetite during 
the day. 
-.06 -.24 -.28 .828 .405 .252 
I worry about sleeping. -.07 .16 -.21 .822 .657 .405 
I didn't have enough sleep 
last night. 
-.07 .06 -.03 .825 .905 .943 
I am restless. -.16 .01 -.22 .417 .979 .405 
I am tired. -.07 .14 -.01 .822 .676 .990 
It is not effortful to do 
things. 
-.13 -.11 - .619 .816 - 
I feel guilty. - - -.26 - - .260 
I am doing things with my 
normal pace. 
- .04 -.30 - .943 .189 
I feel worthless. -.12 -.15 -.21 .571 .698 .405 
I feel that I can't get 
anything done. 
-.25 .00 - .127 1.000 - 
I feel that I can’t make 
decisions. 
- - -.26 - - .203 
I can't concentrate. -.24 .10 -.20 .147 .822 .467 
I feel hopeless. -.18 .03 -.41 .259 .960 .027 
How's your day? -.19 .10 -.24 .282 .816 .322 
How would you rate your 
overall physical health 
today? 





Table 3.4 Standardized betas and p-values of gender from regression models testing 
the variabilities of the DDI items in Studies 1, 2, and 3 
DDI item 
β p 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
I feel happy. - - -.27 - - .678 
I feel sad. -.22 -.47 -.18 .678 .373 .816 
I feel irritable. -.27 -.12 -.18 .578 .892 .817 
I enjoy what I am doing. -.07 -.57 -.22 .905 .255 .714 
I don't care about 
anything. 
-.05 -.27 -.16 .943 .714 .817 
I have no appetite during 
the day. 
-.02 -.18 -.10 .980 .822 .899 
I worry about sleeping. .27  .02 -.51 .624 .986 .255 
I didn't have enough sleep 
last night. 
.08 -.39 -.28 .899 .571 .676 
I am restless. .00 -.32 -.24 1.000 .655 .728 
I am tired. .24 -.87 -.24 .657 .020 .731 
It is not effortful to do 
things. 
-.10 -.56 - .892 .293 - 
I feel guilty. - - .04 - - .960 
I am doing things with my 
normal pace. 
- .21 .13 - .810 .878 
I feel worthless. .00 -.04 -.04 1.000 .960 .960 
I feel that I can't get 
anything done. 
-.16 -.66 - .800 .158 - 
I feel that I can’t make 
decisions. 
- - -.43 - - .255 
I can't concentrate. -.21 -.66 -.51 .696 .203 .255 
I feel hopeless. -.32 -.24 .10 .405 .788 .897 
How's your day? -.03 -.08 -.34 .960 .943 .527 
How would you rate your 
overall physical health 
today? 





Table 3.5 Standardized betas and p-values of educational attainment from 
regression models testing the variabilities of the DDI items in Studies 1, 2, and 3 
DDI item 
β p 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
I feel happy. - - -.03 - - .943 
I feel sad. .08 .03 .11 .764 .943 .787 
I feel irritable. .08 .10 -.25 .764 .816 .255 
I enjoy what I am doing. .01 .14 -.17 .964 .699 .461 
I don't care about 
anything. 
-.02 .11 .01 .945 .813 .986 
I have no appetite during 
the day. 
.04 .17 .24 .899 .640 .255 
I worry about sleeping. -.03 -.03 -.11 .943 .943 .751 
 I didn't have enough 
sleep last night. 
-.01 -.15 -.12 .960 .721 .714 
I am restless. .12 -.12 -.06 .578 .787 .884 
I am tired. -.08 -.15 -.19 .787 .640 .475 
It is not effortful to do 
things. 
.02 -.01 - .951 .990 - 
I feel guilty. - - .05 - - .892 
I am doing things with my 
normal pace. 
- -.02 -.01 - .966 .979 
I feel worthless. .00 .10 .22 .990 .822 .319 
I feel that I can't get 
anything done. 
-.11 -.07 - .619 .884 - 
I feel that I can’t make 
decisions. 
- - -.08 - - .812 
I can't concentrate. .02 -.08 -.19 .943 .873 .417 
I feel hopeless. .04 .02 .24 .884 .966 .253 
How's your day? .07 .00 -.08 .812 .990 .817 
How would you rate your 
overall physical health 
today? 





Table 3.6 Standardized betas and p-values of marital status from regression models 
testing the variabilities of the DDI items in Studies 1, 2, and 3 
DDI item 
β p 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
I feel happy. - - .19 - - .816 
I feel sad. -.01 -.09 .07 .990 .939 .943 
I feel irritable. .07 -.19 .13 .908 .822 .884 
I enjoy what I am doing. -.01 .01 .44 .986 .990 .331 
I don't care about 
anything. 
-.27 -.08 -.05 .445 .943 .951 
I have no appetite during 
the day. 
-.04 -.16 .03 .959 .881 .964 
I worry about sleeping. -.10 -.11 -.12 .878 .905 .884 
I didn't have enough sleep 
last night. 
.07 -.32 .04 .899 .699 .964 
I am restless. .01 -.29 .20 .990 .710 .810 
I am tired. .00 -.19 .28 .990 .817 .687 
It is not effortful to do 
things. 
-.14 -.12 - .813 .905 - 
I feel guilty. - - .01 - - .990 
I am doing things with my 
normal pace. 
- -.34 .06 - .657 .943 
I feel worthless. .06 -.36 -.13 .920 .657 .884 
I feel that I can't get 
anything done. 
-.12 -.28 - .816 .701 - 
I feel that I can’t make 
decisions. 
- - -.32 - - .497 
I can't concentrate. -.07 -.34 -.27 .897 .667 .676 
I feel hopeless. -.11 -.14 -.09 .822 .891 .899 
How's your day? .06 .20 -.19 .939 .822 .810 
How would you rate your 
overall physical health 
today? 












Table 3.7 Standardized betas and p-values of employment status from regression 
models testing the variabilities of the DDI items in Studies 1, 2, and 3 
DDI item 
β p 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
I feel happy. - - .26 - - .816 
I feel sad. -.11 -.20 .16 .878 .822 .894 
I feel irritable. -.17 -.05 -.18 .788 .960 .884 
I enjoy what I am doing. -.18 -.35 .49 .737 .640 .483 
I don't care about 
anything. 
-.10 -.41 .21 .881 .570 .825 
I have no appetite during 
the day. 
.04 -.08 .23 .955 .943 .822 
I worry about sleeping. -.25 -.01 .18 .653 .990 .884 
I didn't have enough sleep 
last night. 
.15 -.19 .53 .816 .850 .505 
I am restless. -.11 -.12 .15 .873 .899 .897 
I am tired. -.32 -.58 .17 .475 .252 .887 
It is not effortful to do 
things. 
-.15 -.10 - .816 .939 - 
I feel guilty. - - .70 - - .279 
I am doing things with my 
normal pace. 
- -.34 .34 - .660 .696 
I feel worthless. -.22 -.17 .57 .657 .878 .405 
I feel that I can't get 
anything done. 
-.14 -.32 - .816 .660 - 
I feel that I can’t make 
decisions. 
- - .70 - - .203 
I can't concentrate. -.05 -.27 .05 .943 .756 .960 
I feel hopeless. -.11 -.32 .33 .845 .699 .710 
How's your day? -.06 -.35 .57 .943 .657 .415 
How would you rate your 
overall physical health 
today? 
- -.19 .16 - .822 .887 
 
 The inter-correlations of the variabilities of the items were tested using the 
PCA; this was to see whether within-individual variability was a common property 
across depressive symptoms with those varying more in one also tending to vary 
more in others; if not, this would be consistent with the symptoms being 
heterogeneous. The results illustrated the variabilities of some DDI items were 
indeed highly correlated, with their loadings on the first principal component 




the total variance among the item variabilities (Table 3.8). The symptom variations 
exhibited similar patterns, which supported the view of a single cause underlying all 
MD symptoms. However, the range of loadings may imply great differences exist in 
the variances explained by the single underlying cause. 
 The sample consisted mainly of female undergraduate students. This may 
explain why none of the moderators were significant predictors of MD symptom 
variability. Two more studies were conducted to further test the hypotheses.  
 
Table 3.8 PCA loadings of the variabilities of the DDI items in Studies 1, 2, and 3 
DDI item Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
I feel happy. - - .77 
I feel sad. .83 .70 .69 
I feel irritable. .84 .72 .67 
I enjoy what I am doing. .83 .74 .73 
I don't care about anything. .76 .61 .66 
I have no appetite during the day. .58 .39 .52 
I worry about sleeping. .51 .43 .39 
I didn't have enough sleep last night. .64 .61 .41 
I am restless. .78 .72 .68 
I am tired. .47 .62 .62 
It is not effortful to do things. .53 .73 - 
I feel guilty. - - .70 
I am doing things with my normal pace. - .67 .59 
I feel worthless. .79 .69 .67 
I feel that I can't get anything done. .85 .84 - 
I feel that I can’t make decisions. - - .72 
I can't concentrate. .86 .85 .79 
I feel hopeless. .85 .80 .73 
How's your day? .75 .55 .72 
How would you rate your overall physical 
health today? 
- .45 .47 
Total variance explained 54% 45% 42% 
 
Study 2 
Symptom variabilities for each item in the DDI were represented as within 
individual, over time SDs of each item. The minimum and the maximum SDs among 
all participants and the group SDs were listed in Table 3.1. The differences between 




about anything”) to 29.98 (for the item “I feel that I didn’t have enough sleep last 
night”). 
The same regression model as used in Study 1 was used here. PHQ-9 score 
significantly predicted the variability of “I am doing things with my normal pace” 
(Table 3.2). H5 was thus only vaguely supported. This corresponded with Study 1, 
where MD severity only significantly predicted the variability of some DDI items and 
suggested MD heterogeneity. Since none of the moderators significantly predicted 
the variability of MD symptoms except gender, H6 was supported (Table 3.3) and 
H7 was marginally supported (Table 3.4). H8 – H10 were rejected (Tables 3.5–3.7). 
H7 was only marginally supported because one item – feeling tired – was 
significantly predicted by gender and greater variability in women than in men was 
found (β = -.87, p = .019). The similar patterns of insignificance across moderators 
and MD symptom variability could be interpreted as supporting MD symptom 
homogeneity but the same as in Study 1, the matching demographics of the 
participants might be a plausible explanation instead. The incongruent results with 
those in Study 1 were H5 and H7 were marginally supported. The number of 
participants in Study 2 was smaller than that in Study 1 and this might explain the 
fewer significant associations between MD severity and symptom variabilities. 
The PCA was employed to test the inter-correlations of the variability of the 
DDI items. The loadings spread over a broad range between .39 and .85 and the 
total variance explained by the first principal component was 45 percent, which was 
smaller than that in Study 1 (Table 3.8). The wider range of PCA loadings and the 
total variance explained by the first component might illustrate greater variabilities 
among the DDI symptoms and within-individual variability might be a less common 
characteristic among MD symptoms; of course, this may have resulted from the 
smaller sample size. Therefore, one more study was conducted to exam the findings 






The variabilities of the DDI items were SDs as shown in Table 3.1. The 
maximum and minimum SDs among participants were listed in Table 3.1 as well. 
The differences between the maximum and the minimum SDs in the overall SDs 
spanned across 22.06 (for the item “I feel happy”) and 30.62 (for the item “I didn't 
have enough sleep last night”). 
PHQ-9 score significantly predicted the variability of “I don’t care about 
anything”. H5 was only vaguely supported (Table 3.2). This showed varied pattern 
of associations between MD severity and symptom variability and suggested MD 
symptom heterogeneity. Chronological age was a significant predictor of the 
variability of “I feel hopeless” and H6 of chronological age had no effect on MD 
symptom variability was marginally rejected (Table 3.3). None of other moderators 
including sex, educational attainment, marital status, and employment status 
significantly predicted the variabilities of any DDI items and H7 – H10 were rejected 
(Tables 3.4–3.7). These similar insignificant patterns in the moderators supported 
homogeneity in MD symptoms but the homogeneity in participant demographics 
may contribute greatly to these patterns. The results were similar to those in 
Studies 1 and 2 except H6 was marginally rejected but it was supported in Studies 1 
and 2. H7 was rejected in Studies 1 and 3 but it was vaguely supported in Study 2. 
Inter-correlations of DDI item variabilities were tested using the PCA. The 
range of loadings was .39 – .79, which was smaller than Study 2 but greater than 
Study 1 (Table 3.8). The first principal component explained a total variance of 42%, 
which was the smallest in the three studies, but it still fell in a similar range and 
suggested similar inter-correlations in MD symptom variabilities.   
 
Replicability across Studies 1, 2 and 3 
To test the replicability of the results of the relationship between MD 
symptom variability and MD severity and other moderators replicated across the 
three studies, we compared the standardized betas linking DDI items to PHQ-9 




the similarities of the respective vectors of betas were estimated using Spearman 
rank-order correlation. Tables 3.2–3.7 (and the Appendix C) show the standardized 
betas and p values of these variables in the three studies.  
The correlation coefficients revealed that only MD severity and MD 
symptom variability replicated across the three studies. The results of PHQ-9 score 
demonstrated Studies 1 and 2 (r = .72) and Studies 2 and 3 (r = .73) were highly 
correlated and Studies 1 and 3 (r = .59) were moderately associated (Table 3.9). 
Most of the correlations between MD severity and other moderators including age, 
gender, educational attainment, marital status, and employment status were either 
small, moderate, or even negative. This was expected, given that the effects were 
generally small and thereby largely reflected noise; this means that the inconsistent 
correlations of betas across studies could also be seen as confirming lack of overall 
effects. Therefore, the results of other moderators were unreproducible. The 
Tucker’s congruence coefficients between PCA loadings of the three studies (φs 
= .99) demonstrated the factors in the three studies could be considered equal 
(Lorenzo-Seva & Berge, 2006), meaning symptom variabilities are highly inter-
correlated but the differences between symptoms in the degrees of reflecting a 
general variance factor were consistent (Table 3.9). On the on hand, this supported 
the view of MD symptoms are homogeneous (as their variabilities were inter-
correlated). On the other hand, this supports symptoms having their own etiology 













Table 3.9 Spearman’s rho of the standardized betas for PHQ-9 score, age, gender, 




Study 1 vs.     
Study 2 
Study 1 vs.     
Study 3 
Study 2 vs.     
Study 3 
PHQ-9 score .72 .59 .73 
Age .02 .20 .32 
Gender .19 -.42 .36 
Educational attainment .25 .19 .46 
Marital status -.31 .25 .13 
Employment status -.04 .13 -.30 
Note. r = Spearman’s rho. 
 
Meta-analysis 
 Finally, we sought to meta-analyses the findings across the three studies: 
individually, each of them may have been underpowered, but collectively they 
would yield more powerful and generalizable findings. The sample size of each 
study and the standardized betas and standard errors of PHQ-9 score, age, gender, 
educational attainment, marital status, and employment status from the regression 
models were used in the meta-analysis. The results of the variables diverged greatly. 
Nominally, PHQ-9 score had significant associations with the within-individual 
variabilities in 12 DDI items; after applying FDR to correct for multiple testing, five 
associations remained significant at the adjusted alpha = .0025 level; “I don’t care 
about anything”, “I have no appetite during the day”, “I am doing things at my 
normal pace”, “I feel worthless”, and “I feel hopeless” (Table 3.10). Some meta-
analytic effects were small or even negative, consistent with the symptoms 
differentially reflecting the degree of MD severity. Other moderator-candidates 
either only had significant effects on a few or none of the DDI items (Tables 3.11–








Table 3.10 Meta-analysis of standardized betas of PHQ-9 predicting DDI item 
variability in the three studies (N = 277) 
 DDI item β SE Z p 
I feel happy. .05 .12 .42 .897 
I feel sad. .23 .06 3.63 .011 
I feel irritable. .21 .06 3.38 .020 
I enjoy what I am doing. .19 .06 3.10 .035 
I don’t care about anything. .36 .06 5.91 < .001 
I have no appetite during the day. .30 .06 4.87 < .001 
I worry about sleeping. .09 .06 1.52 .461 
I didn’t have enough sleep last night. .10 .07 1.47 .483 
I am restless. .21 .06 3.33 .020 
I am tired. -.08 .06 -1.27 .584 
It is not effortful to do things. -.05 .08 -.58 .859 
I feel guilty. .13 .12 1.08 .672 
I am doing things at my normal pace. .35 .08 4.29 .001 
I feel worthless. .35 .06 5.63 < .001 
I feel that I can’t get anything done. .22 .07 3.09 .035 
I feel that I can’t make decisions. .27 .10 2.70 .097 
I can’t concentrate. .20 .06 3.19 .027 
I feel hopeless. .32 .06 5.47 < .001 
How’s your day? .18 .06 2.96 .047 
How would you rate your overall physical 
health today? 
.12 .08 1.41 .504 


















Table 3.11 Meta-analysis of standardized betas of age predicting DDI item 
variability in the three studies (N = 277) 
 DDI item β SE z p 
I feel happy. -.26 .13 -2.00 .255 
I feel sad. -.10 .07 -1.49 .475 
I feel irritable. -.08 .07 -1.09 .670 
I enjoy what I am doing. -.22 .06 -3.46 .016 
I don’t care about anything. -.15 .06 -2.26 .203 
I have no appetite during the day. -.17 .07 -2.40 .163 
I worry about sleeping. -.05 .07 -.78 .810 
I didn’t have enough sleep last night. -.03 .07 -.45 .892 
I am restless. -.13 .07 -1.88 .293 
I am tired. .00 .07 .05 .990 
It is not effortful to do things. -.12 .08 -1.49 .475 
I feel guilty. -.26 .13 -2.00 .255 
I am doing things at my normal pace. -.16 .09 -1.71 .373 
I feel worthless. -.15 .07 -2.25 .203 
I feel that I can’t get anything done. -.17 .08 -2.03 .255 
I feel that I can’t make decisions. -.26 .11 -2.36 .177 
I can’t concentrate. -.15 .07 -2.20 .225 
I feel hopeless. -.21 .06 -3.20 .027 
How’s your day? -.14 .07 -2.02 .255 
How would you rate your overall physical 
health today? 
-.10 .10 -1.07 .676 

















Table 3.12 Meta-analysis of standardized betas of gender predicting DDI item 
variability in the three studies (N = 277) 
 DDI item β SE z p 
I feel happy. -.27 .25 -1.08 .672 
I feel sad. -.27 .14 -2.00 .255 
I feel irritable. -.20 .14 -1.46 .483 
I enjoy what I am doing. -.24 .13 -1.81 .326 
I don’t care about anything. -.14 .13 -1.03 .693 
I have no appetite during the day. -.08 .14 -.62 .829 
I worry about sleeping. -.06 .14 -.42 .897 
I didn’t have enough sleep last night. -.15 .15 -1.00 .699 
I am restless. -.16 .14 -1.11 .660 
I am tired. -.24 .14 -1.74 .355 
It is not effortful to do things. -.27 .18 -1.53 .461 
I feel guilty. .04 .25 .16 .960 
I am doing things at my normal pace. .17 .18 .92 .728 
I feel worthless. -.02 .14 -.16 .960 
I feel that I can’t get anything done. -.35 .16 -2.18 .227 
I feel that I can’t make decisions. -.43 .21 -2.05 .255 
I can’t concentrate. -.41 .13 -3.03 .041 
I feel hopeless. -.17 .13 -1.28 .580 
How’s your day? -.13 .14 -.98 .701 
How would you rate your overall physical 
health today? 
-.39 .18 -2.14 .248 

















Table 3.13 Meta-analysis of standardized betas of educational attainment 
predicting DDI item variability in the three studies (N = 277) 
 DDI item β SE z p 
I feel happy. -.03 .12 -.25 .943 
I feel sad. .08 .07 1.17 .640 
I feel irritable. -.01 .06 -.15 .960 
I enjoy what I am doing. -.02 .06 -.35 .913 
I don’t care about anything. .02 .06 .25 .943 
I have no appetite during the day. .12 .06 1.89 .293 
I worry about sleeping. -.05 .06 -.82 .787 
I didn’t have enough sleep last night. -.07 .07 -1.00 .699 
I am restless. .02 .06 .29 .943 
I am tired. -.12 .06 -1.93 .279 
It is not effortful to do things. .01 .08 .13 .964 
I feel guilty. .05 .12 .42 .897 
I am doing things at my normal pace. -.01 .09 -.16 .960 
I feel worthless. .08 .06 1.28 .581 
I feel that I can’t get anything done. -.10 .08 -1.30 .578 
I feel that I can’t make decisions. -.08 .10 -.80 .796 
I can’t concentrate. -.06 .06 -.93 .728 
I feel hopeless. .10 .06 1.60 .417 
How’s your day? .01 .06 .20 .957 
How would you rate your overall physical health 
today? 
-.13 .09 -1.42 .504 

















Table 3.14 Meta-analysis of standardized betas of marital status predicting DDI item 
variability in the three studies (N = 277) 
 DDI item β SE z p 
I feel happy. .19 .26 .73 .816 
I feel sad. -.01 .13 -.06 .990 
I feel irritable. .03 .13 .24 .943 
I enjoy what I am doing. .12 .13 .93 .728 
I don’t care about anything. -.17 .12 -1.39 .519 
I have no appetite during the day. -.04 .13 -.32 .939 
I worry about sleeping. -.11 .14 -.80 .796 
I didn’t have enough sleep last night. -.01 .14 -.09 .980 
I am restless. .00 .13 -.02 .990 
I am tired. .02 .13 .17 .960 
It is not effortful to do things. -.13 .16 -.83 .787 
I feel guilty. .01 .26 .04 .990 
I am doing things at my normal pace. -.10 .19 -.51 .881 
I feel worthless. -.06 .13 -.48 .884 
I feel that I can’t get anything done. -.16 .15 -1.10 .667 
I feel that I can’t make decisions. -.32 .22 -1.45 .483 
I can’t concentrate. -.18 .13 -1.35 .553 
I feel hopeless. -.11 .13 -.86 .764 
How’s your day? .02 .13 .12 .966 
How would you rate your overall physical health 
today? 
-.20 .19 -1.04 .687 






















Table 3.15 Meta-analysis of standardized betas of employment status predicting DDI 
item variability in the three studies (N = 277) 
 DDI item β SE z p 
I feel happy. .26 .36 .72 .816 
I feel sad. -.09 .15 -.60 .845 
I feel irritable. -.14 .15 -.93 .728 
I enjoy what I am doing. -.10 .14 -.67 .822 
I don’t care about anything. -.11 .14 -.76 .812 
I have no appetite during the day. .04 .15 .30 .943 
I worry about sleeping. -.10 .15 -.67 .822 
I didn’t have enough sleep last night. .14 .16 .86 .766 
I am restless. -.07 .15 -.44 .894 
I am tired. -.32 .15 -2.11 .252 
It is not effortful to do things. -.13 .18 -.77 .810 
I feel guilty. .70 .35 2.00 .255 
I am doing things at my normal pace. -.04 .22 -.19 .960 
I feel worthless. -.06 .15 -.43 .897 
I feel that I can’t get anything done. -.20 .16 -1.20 .633 
I feel that I can’t make decisions. .70 .30 2.33 .183 
I can’t concentrate. -.08 .15 -.55 .873 
I feel hopeless. -.07 .15 -.49 .884 
How’s your day? -.01 .15 -.07 .986 
How would you rate your overall physical health 
today? 
-.04 .23 -.18 .960 
Note. β = standardized beta; SE = standard error; z = z score; p = p-value. 
 
Discussion 
Consistently significant as well as consistently insignificant results were 
found in the three studies. MD severity as represented by PHQ-9 score consistently 
significantly predicted variability of several MD symptoms while the predictability of 
other moderators including age, gender, educational attainment, marital status, and 
employment status on MD symptom variability was mostly insignificant.  
The hypothesis of high symptom variability reflected MD severity as 
measured by PHQ-9 score was thus marginally to partially supported across studies. 
However, the results revealed heterogeneity among MD symptoms because MD 
severity only significantly predicted the variability of some MD symptoms: 10 
symptoms in Study 1, one in Study 2, one in Study 3, and 12 in the meta-analysis. 




(2019). They reported noticeable within-person MD symptom variability in a 9-year 
follow-up study of MD patients. Since PHQ-9 score is the sum-total of all MD 
symptoms, one possible explanation for the varying relationships between MD 
symptoms and MD severity might be that participants’ ratings on the MD symptoms 
that were not significantly predicted by PHQ-9 score may contribute less to PHQ-9 
score. Correlating standardized betas of PHQ-9 scores and other moderators 
extracted from regression models across the three studies showed only the results 
of PHQ-9 score were moderately to highly correlated, inferring reproducibility 
(Table 3.9; Figures 1–6 in Appendix C). 
The inter-correlations of DDI item variabilities were explained by the first 
principal component by 54%, 45%, and 42% in the three studies. These somewhat 
variable but consistently comparatively high percentages implied certain level of 
homogeneity among the symptoms in their fluctuating behavior. Nonetheless, the 
PCA loadings of the DDI items spread a wide range may suggest that even though 
the first principal component explained a great amount of total variances, the 
amount of variance explained by it in each DDI item diverged enormously. Hence, 
the items were affected by the first principal component differently and MD 
symptoms were at least partly heterogeneous in their fluctuating behavior, 
consistent with some underlying heterogeneity in depression mechanisms. The 
correlations of the PCA loadings from the three studies revealed high inter-
correlations of the variability in MD symptoms, showing homogeneity in the 
fluctuations of MD symptom variability (Table 3.9). 
 The seemingly contradictory results of homogeneity and heterogeneity of 
MD symptoms may be caused by the frequency and duration of data collection in 
the three studies, the participants being mostly healthy adults, and/or the chosen 
measure of variability. Some studies reported symptom variability adopted a longer 
and less frequent period of data collection, such as once a week for eight weeks 
(Dawood & Pincus, 2017), once a month for three years (Karp et al., 2004), five 
times within nine years (van Eeden et al., 2019), and once a year for 12 years 




collection was 4-6 times per day for two weeks, which is relatively frequent and 
short compared to the aforementioned studies. Some changes and events might 
take longer to manifest and longer period of data collection would be required to 
capture these changes (D. E. Stull et al., 2009). Though using participants not 
diagnosed with mental disorders might invoke the discrepancy, van Eeden et al. 
(2019) employed university student participants but obtained supporting results for 
the associations between pathological narcissism and higher MD symptom 
variability and instability. The different measures of symptom variability used in 
these studies included fraction of variance unexplained (van Eeden et al., 2019), 
coefficient of variation of sum scores (standard deviation/mean × 100) (Karp et al., 
2004), intra-individual standard deviation (Dawood & Pincus, 2017), and hlme 
function in R (Melhem et al., 2019). In addition, different measures for MD used 
across studies may complicate the interpretation of the results in these studies. 
These disparities may explain the seemingly contradictory findings reported in this 
chapter but the finding may display the actual heterogeneous nature of MD 
symptoms –sometimes heterogeneous and sometimes homogeneous. 
 Some MD symptoms were found to be congruently less or more variable 
across the three studies as shown in the overall standard deviations (Table 3.1). 
Feeling sad had a low standard deviation. Feeling tired, worrying about sleeping, 
and feeling did not have enough sleep last night had relatively high standard 
deviations. High variability in sleep related symptoms was reported in Karp et al. 
(2004) and van Eeden et al. (2019). Different from the results in this chapter, 
suicidal ideation was the most stable among the MD symptom in these two studies. 
MD patients had suicidal ideation in the baseline survey continued to have suicidal 
ideation in follow-ups. The patients who did not have suicidal ideation initially also 
did not have suicidal ideation in the follow-ups. Karp et al. (2004) suggested high 
symptom variability might be a trait because no variability was found between 
different treatment groups. Karp et al. (2004)’s trait explanation may be extended 
to symptom level – each individual may innately express some symptoms (low 




variability). This would provide further support the MD symptom heterogeneity 
hypothesis.  
Significant results of linear models, replicability analysis and meta-analysis 
were mostly found between PHQ-9 score and MD symptom variabilities and the 
results of other moderators were predominately insignificant. These may be 
explained as homogeneity among MD symptoms. However, significant results were 
not found in all MD symptoms and even though the first principal components 
explained a great amount of the variances in PCA analyses, the wide range of PCA 
loadings may denote heterogeneity in MD symptoms. Overall, these results 
supported the view of MD symptoms are to some extent homogeneous, whereas 
there is also support for dis-uniformity among symptoms which may eventually 
conveying the heterogeneity of MD. 
Limitations 
The majority of the participants were university students, which limited the 
scope of the generalizability of the results for nearly all the moderators, especially 
age, marital status, employment status, and educational attainment. Most of the 
participants were in their early twenties so if they are diagnosed with MD, they 
must have the early-onset type of MD. However, the exact age of onset was not 
measured. Female dominance in the participants hindered the test on sex 
differences in MD. The participants were mainly comprised of single students, 
which made it hard to compare the influences of employment status, marital status, 
and educational attainment had on MD variability.  
Among the moderators discussed in this chapter, age and gender were also 
significant predictors for variability of one item in the DDI in Study 3 and in Study 2, 
respectively. Other moderators were not significant predictors for any items in the 
DDI. The limitations stated above may be the cause.  
In addition, the moderators measured in the studies could only reflect 
features that do not change over time. For instance, within-individual changes in 
socio-economic measures including financial strain, property, deprivation, and living 




went downward more than symptom improvement when these conditions advance 
(Lorant et al., 2007). This is because longitudinal studies only revealed moderate 
within-individual variations in socio-economic measures comparing to between-
individual changes in cross-sectional studies (Lorant et al., 2007). Including more 
detailed measurements of moderators that reflect changes of time may yield more 
robust results. 
Future directions 
Males are affected by behavioral disorders while females usually experience 
affective disorders. Several theories were proposed to explain the possible 
mechanism of the differences. However, a satisfying conclusion has yet to be met 
due to ample evidences from both sides (T. D. Hill & Needham, 2013). To tackle the 
problem of sex difference in MD, developing a separate set of diagnostic criteria 
may be needed to decrease the rate of underdiagnoses in males and enhance their 
wellbeing. 
The next chapter will look into the relationships between momentary ratings 
of MD symptoms, different measuring times of MD symptoms (e.g., morning, 














The nature operates according to 24-hour cycle daily and four seasons yearly. 
To adapt to this 24-hour rhythm, organisms ranging from single cell, plants, insects, 
animals, to humans also abide by the daily or seasonal cycles and have cyclic 
physiological changes, circadian rhythm. The controlling center of these cyclic 
changes is located in the suprachiasmatic nuclei (SCN) in the hypothalamus 
(Hastings, 1997; Moore & Eichler, 1972; Stephan & Zucker, 1972). These cyclic 
changes is regulated by oscillators located in both the brain and peripheral tissues 
(Dolatshad et al., 2006; King et al., 1997; Matsuo et al., 2003; Yamazaki et al., 2000). 
The SCN send neural signals and secret hormones such as cortisol and melatonin to 
modulate and sync cyclic physiological changes with the natural day-night cycle 
(Monteleone et al., 2011). This results in entrainment, synchrony between internal 
physiological changes with the external day-night cycle in the surrounding 
environments. In humans, the most palpable examples of circadian rhythm are 
sleep-wake cycle, body temperature, and feeding.  
Besides the natural day/night length changes, circadian rhythm is also 
modulated by jet lag, daylight saving time (DST), and shift work. People experience 
these when they travel across continents, live in countries practicing DST, or work in 
night shifts – outside of usual working hours of 7 a.m. to 6 p.m. Traveling to a 
different time zone creates misalignment between human internal circadian clock 
and the outer environment. But the effect of jet lag is moderated by the number of 
time zones one travelled across, age, and whether the time difference is backward 
of forward comparing to the departure city (Baron & Reid, 2014). Lengthening a 24-
hour day by one hour did not affect people’s sleep when they experience DST in the 




day during the spring DST, especially in the first week after the clock was adjusted 
backward (Kantermann et al., 2007; Lahti et al., 2006).  
What are influenced by circadian rhythm? 
Circadian rhythm is also associated with subjective well-being (Boivin et al., 
1997) and mood (Murray et al., 2002). Positive affect have been observed to 
fluctuate in accordance with circadian rhythm but this has not been reported in 
negative affect (Murray, 2007). The symptoms of many diseases or psychiatric 
disorders also exhibit a circadian rhythm (Smolensky et al., 2015).  
Some diurnal variations in MD symptoms have been reported but 
controversies remain. For example, some studies observed significant morning 
mood worsening in MD patients (Murray, 2007; von Knorring et al., 1977) while 
others reported insignificant results (Gordijn et al., 1994; Tölle & Goetze, 1987). 
People do not have MD usually experience worsening mood in the evening. Also, 
Kammerer, Taylor, and Glover (2006) noticed distinct mood patterns in pregnant 
women diagnosed with either one of the two different subtypes of MD – those 
suffering from melancholic depression showed morning mood worsening and those 
having atypical depression exhibited evening mood worsening. Patients with these 
two different subtypes of MD also exhibited opposite symptoms, cortisol levels, and 
inflammatory and metabolic dysregulation (Kammerer et al., 2006; Lamers et al., 
2013). Davidson and Turnbull (1986) also found morning mood worsening were 
among the mostly frequently reported symptoms in melancholic depression 
patients than in non-melancholic patients. But they reported opposite findings in 
the same paper, too. They explained the controversy results may be caused by MD 
symptoms had progressed in severity (Waldman, 1972). However, other studies 
have found no connections between diurnal mood variations and MD severity 
(Carpenter et al., 1986; Peeters et al., 2006). Therefore, whether mood variation, 





Besides mood, circadian variations have been observed in other MD 
symptoms such as core body temperature, cortisol level, melatonin level, sleep-
wake cycle, and motor activity (Monteleone et al., 2011; Vadnie & McClung, 2017).  
Desynchronization of circadian rhythm and health   
Circadian disturbances or misalignment is associated with poor physical and 
mental health. It also has being associated with physical diseases and psychiatric 
disorders including MD (Baron & Reid, 2014; Wirz-Justice, 2006, 2008). Treatments 
used to adjust circadian rhythm such as low-dose ketamine and sleep deprivation 
therapy both showed rapid effect in reducing depressive symptoms including 
suicidal ideation in a MD subgroup, which exhibited desynchronized circadian 
rhythms (B G Bunney & Bunney, 2012; B G Bunney et al., 2015). In a review of 17 
clinical trials, low-does ketamine intravenous injection swiftly decreased depressive 
symptoms in treatment-resistant MD and bipolar depressed patients (B G Bunney & 
Bunney, 2012). Ketamine might act as a glutamate N-methyl-D-Aspartate (NMDA) 
antagonist, which increases synaptic plasticity and resulting in a fast effect on 
depressive symptoms (Browne & Lucki, 2013; Gerhard et al., 2016; Kavalali & 
Monteggia, 2012). NMDA administration to the SCN has been shown to induce 
phase-shift in vitro (Shibata et al., 1994) and in vivo (Mintz et al., 1999). Neural cell 
culture studies also showed ketamine could regulate clock genes (Bellet et al., 2011). 
Misalignment of circadian rhythm may cause MD in some MD patients.  
Research on circadian typology also showed a link between evening 
chronotype and MD. In the three circadian typologies of morning, intermediate, and 
evening chronotypes, people with an evening chronotype were more likely to suffer 
from MD (Kantermann et al., 2012). Also, the association between MD and evening 
chronotype remained significant after controlling for confounders such as social 
demographics, physical health, and sleep factors including insomnia and average 
duration of sleep. Circadian typology is determined by individual’s bed time, wake 
time, and the times when people perform the best physically and mentally (Adan et 
al., 2012). People with morning chronotype like to start their days early, they reach 




to bed early as well. Those having evening chronotype tend to get up late, reach 
their best physical and mental performance at the end of a day, and go to bed late. 
Others who do not fit into the morning or evening chronotypes have an 
intermediate chronotype. The results on the association between anxiety and 
chronotype is inconsistent. Some studies found the association (Antypa et al., 2016; 
Lemoine et al., 2013) while others did not (Kantermann et al., 2012). A meta-
analysis analyzed the effect sizes of morningness or morningness-eveningness in 36 
papers covered several psychiatric disorders including MD, bipolar disorder, 
seasonal affective disorder (SAD), and multiple mood disorders. The authors also 
controlled for publication bias to reassure the effects and their results showed MD 
severity was only associated with an evening chronotype but was not related to a 
morning or an intermediate chronotype (Au & Reece, 2017). 
The discovery of the relationship between circadian rhythm and MD 
encouraged the development of new treatment approaches such as light therapy, 
new antidepressants, and wake therapy (Monteleone et al., 2011). The 
development of a new class of drugs targeting melatonin such as agomelatine was 
one of these new treatments (de Bodinat et al., 2010; Hickie & Rogers, 2011). 
Agomelatine has prominent antidepressant effects, possibly because it not only 
works on melatonin receptors to adjust circadian rhythm but also a serotonin 
antagonist, which prevents serotonin reabsorption by cells and helps to maintain a 
high concentration of serotonin in the space between cells. Increasing serotonin 
level has long been the target of MD medication and the frontline antidepressants 
were designed to tackle various types of serotonin receptors. Developing 
antidepressants targeting several mechanisms or symptoms may be a potentially 
fruitful approach in MD treatment (Millan, 2006).  
Among the circadian theories explaining MD, most of the theories either lack 
or have limited supporting empirical evidences (Germain & Kupfer, 2008). Only one 
of the theories – the phase-shift hypotheses of depression – has reassuring results, 
especially in treating people suffering from summer SAD or winter depression (Lam 




atypical MD symptoms during changing seasons particularly in winter but some 
people also had atypical MD symptoms in summer. However, SAD is different from 
atypical depression and MD (Westrin & Lam, 2007) so strictly speaking, none of the 
circadian theories of MD provided satisfactory explanations for MD. 
The literature on the relationships between circadian rhythm and MD 
symptoms has been controversial and the relationship has yet been well established. 
This chapter focuses on disentangling the relationships between circadian rhythm 
and MD symptoms by looking closely at the relationship between circadian rhythm 
and each MD symptom separately. In three studies, the momentary MD symptom 
ratings are firstly grouped into – morning, afternoon, and evening – according to 
the time participants gave these ratings and then these ratings were compared with 
each other within individual participants. We hypothesize MD symptoms would 
have varied patterns of circadian rhythm in terms of mean-level differences across 
the times of day (which would be consistent with MD not being an ontologically 
coherent entity) and these different diurnal patterns in MD symptoms should 
correspond with MD severity (e.g., morning mood worsening) (H11). Heterogeneity 
in MD symptom would find support if varied patterns were observed in the 
relationships between circadian rhythm and individual MD symptoms. 
 
Materials and Method 
 The participants, materials, and procedure in the three studies were the 
same as those described in Studies 1, 2, and 3 in Materials and Method in Chapters 
2 and 3. 
 
Results 
To analyze the relationship between MD severity and circadian rhythm as 
shown in momentary ratings of MD symptoms taken in mornings, afternoons, and 
evenings, three linear mixed-effect models were employed. The analyses were 
carried out using lme4 package (Version 1.1-17) in RStudio. The use of linear mixed-




participant (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008; Magezi, 2015). Rather than building 
the models hierarchically, the same three models were used to test each DDI items 
and the best-fit models among the three as well as the best-fit model for most of 
the DDI items were reported. The latter was used as a common model to compare 
the standardized betas between the DDI items. 
Since MD severity measured by using PHQ-9 score was the most significant 
predictor of MD symptom variability as reported in Chapter 3, PHQ-9 score was 
included in the three linear mixed-effect models as a moderator of the momentary 
MD symptom ratings. In one of the models, the relationship between circadian 
rhythm and MD severity were tested using the interactions between PHQ-9 score 
and the measuring times.  
Model 1 was the simplest model and it included fixed factors of PHQ-9 score, 
age, gender, educational attainment, marital status, employment status, and the 
time of answering the questionnaire, and a random intercept factor for participants. 
Model 2 consisted of fixed factors including PHQ-9 score, age, gender, educational 
attainment, marital status, employment status, and the time of answering the 
questionnaire and a random factor of the effect of time within each participant. In 
Model 3, fixed factors were age, gender, educational attainment, marital status, 
employment status, the time of response, PHQ-9 score, and the interaction 
between PHQ-9 score and the time of answering the questionnaire. Participant was 
the random intercept factor in this model. In the three models, the DVs were the 
momentary ratings of the Daily Depression Items (DDI). The DDI items that only 
recorded once a day including “I have no appetite during the day”, “I worry about 
sleeping”, “I feel that I didn’t have enough sleep last night”, “How’s your day”, and 
“How would you rate your overall physical health today” were excluded from the 
analyses. PHQ-9 score was included in the models because it was a significant 
predictor of variability in many items in the DDI as tested in Chapter 3 because PHQ-
9 might be a significant predictor of the momentary ratings of the DDI items, too. 
The level of measurement for the IVs was the same as those in Chapter 3, where 




divorced, and widowed in one level and in a relationship and married in another, 
and employment status had two levels of employed or self-employed, and full-time 
student and part-time employed, retired, and unemployed. All continuous variables 
including the DDI items, PHQ-9 score, age, and educational attainment were grand-
mean centered in the three models. The Akaike information criterion (AIC) was used 
to select the best model that predicted the momentary ratings of the DDI items, 
where the lowest AIC indicated a superior model. However, there were no variances 
between random effects in five items in the three studies so even though Model 2 
was the best-fit model according to the AIC, Model 1 was indeed the best-fit model 
for these items. These items were “I feel sad”, “It is not effortful to do things”, and 
“I feel that I can't get anything done” in Study 1, “I am tired” in Study 2, and “I feel 
irritable” in Study 3.  All p-values reported in this chapter were adjusted using false 
discovery rate (FDR) to correct for multiple comparison. The R codes of the models 
were listed in Appendix B. 
 
Study 1 
Model 1 was the best-fit for five DDI items and Model 2 was the best-fit for 
the other six DDI items. Model 2 did not converge when testing the relationships 
between the predictors and the momentary ratings of “I can’t concentrate” and this 
model was discarded. The best-fit model for this item was decided by comparing 
the AICs of Models 1 and 3. The coefficients for PHQ-9 scores in the linear mixed-
effect models were significant for all the DDI items. PHQ-9 score was a significant 
predictor for the momentary ratings of MD symptoms. Table 4.1 lists the best-fit 
model, standardized beta, intraclass correlation coefficient, and p-value for each 
DDI item.  
Only five items had significant standardized betas for the afternoon (Table 
4.2) and evening measuring times (Table 4.3) from the best-fit linear mixed-effect 
models. These items were four shared items – “I feel sad”, “I feel irritable”, “I enjoy 




afternoon measuring time and “I am tired” for the evening measuring time. 
Measuring time did not have huge influence over MD symptoms. 
To take a closer look at the diurnal changes in the six DDI items with 
significant standardized betas for the afternoon and evening measuring times, the 
means and standard deviations were compared (Table 4.4). Worsening mood in the 
morning as reported in some research was observed in this study. Participants felt 
sadder and were more irritable in the mornings than they did in the afternoons and 
evenings. The evening mood fluctuated the most between the three measuring 
times. In the mornings, participants had low interest or pleasure as seen in the 
means of enjoying the things one was doing and caring about things. These may be 
affected by poor morning mood. Enjoying what one was doing changed the most in 
the afternoons while caring about things fluctuated more in the evenings. Feeling 
restless was rated the highest in the evenings but it changed the most in the 
mornings. On average, people felt the most tired in the afternoons and feeling tired 
varied the greatest in the evenings. Different types of evening activities or different 
amount of energy being consumed during daytime may be possible causes. MD 
symptom heterogeneity could be observed in diurnal changes, too. These different 
diurnal patterns did not correspond with MD severity as measured using PHQ-9 
score, which is the sum of all MD symptoms. This supported MD symptom 
heterogeneity. 
Either Models 1 or 2 emerged to be the best-fit model of the DDI items 
might imply the items are heterogeneous. However, having the standardized betas 
of the DDI items from different models means we cannot compare them. Since 
Model 1 was the best-fit model for the majority of the DDI items, to compare the 
items, the standardized betas were extracted from Model 1 (Table 4.5 – 4.7).   
In summary, for all the DDI items, grand-mean centered PHQ-9 score 
significantly predicted the momentary ratings. Diurnal variations were 
inconsistently observed in a few items in the afternoon and evening measuring 
times as compared to the morning measuring time. Since Model 3, the multilevel 




the best-fit for all DDI items, the part of H11 regarding the coincidences between 
diurnal patterns in MD symptoms and MD severity cannot be verified. The mean 
and standard deviations of momentary ratings of these items did show variances 
between measuring times. Heterogeneity in MD symptoms were observed in some 
DDI items that were significantly affected by the afternoon and the evening 
measuring times, and the means and standard deviations of some DDI items. 






Table 4.1 Standardized betas and p-values of PHQ-9 score from the best-fit linear 
mixed-effect models in Studies 1, 2, and 3 
Study  Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
DDI item Model β ICC p Model β ICC p Model β ICC p 
I feel happy. - - - - - - - - 1 .48 .30 < .001 
I feel sad. 1 .43 .32 < .001 1 .20 .34 .019 1 .53 .34 < .001 
I feel irritable. 2 .40 .32 < .001 1 .14 .30 .072 1 .30 .39 .002 
I enjoy what I 
am doing. 
2 .39 .27 < .001 1 .13 .27 .089 2 .44 .24 < .001 
I don't care 
about 
anything. 
1 .23 .42 < .001 1 .24 .38 .004 1 .48 .57 < .001 




- - - - - - - - - - - - 
I worry about 
sleeping. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 




- - - - - - - - - - - - 
I am restless. 1 .35 .37 < .001 1 .22 .36 .013 2 .23 .36 .002 
I am tired. 2 .37 .31 < .001 1 .17 .30 .028 2 .21 .30 .002 
It is not 
effortful to do 
things. 
1 .25 .43 < .001 1 .15 .40 .110 - - - - 
I feel guilty. - - - - - - - - 1 .48 .44 < .001 
I am doing 
things with my 
normal pace. 
- -  - - 1 .24 .29 .002 2 .24 .39 .004 
I feel 
worthless. 
1 .54 .38 < .001 1 .34 .45 < .001 1 .65 .48 < .001 




1 .40 .35 < .001 1 .24 .27 < .001 - - - - 
I feel that I 
can’t make 
decisions. 
- - - - - - - - 1 .60 .45 < .001 
I can't 
concentrate. 
1 .42 .36 < .001 1 .28 .29 < .001 2 .54 .36 < .001 
I feel 
hopeless. 
1 .53 .38 < .001 1 .35 .40 < .001 1 .72 .42 < .001 
How's your 
day? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
How would 




- - - - - - - - - - - - 
Note. Model = the best-fit model for each DDI item; β = standardized beta of the 




Table 4.2 Standardized betas and p-values of afternoon measuring time from the 
best-fit linear mixed-effect models in Studies 1, 2, and 3 
Study Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
DDI item Model β p Model β p Model β p 
I feel happy. - - - - - - 1 -.05 .156 




< .001 1 .03 
.611 
1 -.02 .688 




.002 1 .01 
.777 
1 .00 .956 





.011 1 -.07 
.145 
2 -.02 .637 





< .001 1 .05 
.183 
1 -.03 .307 
I have no 
appetite during 
the day. 
- - - - - 
- 
- - - 
I worry about 
sleeping. 
- - - - - 
- 
- - - 
I feel that I don't 
have enough 
sleep last night. 
- - - - - 
- 
- - - 
I am restless. 1 .10 < .001 1 .03 .509 2 .05 .175 




.279 1 -.04 
.453 
2 .08 .048 
It is not effortful 




.803 1 .03 
.457 
- - - 
I feel guilty. - - - - - - 1 .04 .217 
I am doing things 
with my normal 
pace. 
 - - - 1 .05 
.252 
2 .01 .755 




.684 1 .07 
.030 
1 -.01 .706 






.065 1 .01 
.853 
- - - 
I feel that I can’t 
make decisions. 
- - - - - 
- 






.499 1 .06 
.183 
2 .05 .183 




.755 1 .03 
.556 
1 .01 .658 
How's your day? - - - - - - - - - 
How would you 
rate your overall 
physical health 
today? 
- - - - - 
- 
- - - 
Note. Model = the best-fit model for each DDI item; β = standardized beta of the 




Table 4.3 Standardized betas and p-values of evening measuring time from the best-
fit linear mixed-effect models in Studies 1, 2, and 3 
Study Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
DDI item Model β p Model β p Model β p 
I feel happy. - - - - - - 1 -.15 < .001 




< .001 1 .03 .597 1 -.03 .457 




< .001 1 .02 .748 1 -.10 .017 





< .001 1 -.08 .084 2 -.15 .002 





.025 1 .10 .009 1 .02 .640 
I have no 
appetite during 
the day. 
- - - - - - - - - 
I worry about 
sleeping. 
- - - - - - - - - 
I feel that I don't 
have enough 
sleep last night. 
- - - - - - - - - 
I am restless. 1 .04 .175 1 .02 .640 2 -.04 .488 
I am tired. 2 .24 < .001 1 .13 .002 2 .41 < .001 
It is not effortful 




.470 1 -.01 .777 - - - 
I feel guilty. - - - - - - 1 .01 .803 
I am doing 
things with my 
normal pace. 
 - - - 1 .02 .681 2 .02 .755 




.684 1 .04 .272 1 -.04 .183 
I feel that I can't 
get anything 
done. 
1 .02 .554 1 .05 .242 - - - 
I feel that I can’t 
make decisions. 
- - - - - - 1 .00 .970 
I can't 
concentrate. 
1 .02 .642 1 .07 .100 2 .05 .457 




.777 1 .04 .304 1 -.01 .755 
How's your day? - - - - - - - - - 
How would you 
rate your overall 
physical health 
today? 
- - - - - - - - - 
Note. Model = the best-fit model for each DDI item; β = standardized beta of the 





Table 4.4 Means and SDs of morning, afternoon, and evening measuring times for 
the six DDI items with a significant standardized beta of the afternoon and/or 
evening measuring time in linear mixed-effect models in Study 1 
DDI item 
Mean SD 
M A E M A E 
I feel sad. 35.23 32.67 32.05 21.60 21.79 22.62 
I feel irritable. 39.50 36.13 35.63 23.35 23.51 23.74 
I enjoy what I am 
doing. 
36.78 34.13 32.67 22.65 23.19 23.01 
I don't care about 
anything. 
30.44 28.21 28.56 22.26 21.52 22.51 
I am restless. 51.56 49.28 58.14 29.36 28.99 28.45 
I am tired. 38.06 40.36 39.07 25.28 26.90 26.98 

























Table 4.5 Standardized betas and p-values of PHQ-9 score from Model 1 in Studies 1, 
2, and 3 
Study Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
DDI item β p β p β p 
I feel happy. - - - - .48 < .001 
I feel sad. .43 < .001 .20 .019 .53 < .001 
I feel irritable. .40 < .001 .14 .072 .27 .002 
I enjoy what I am 
doing. 
.40 < .001 .13 .089 .41 < .001 
I don't care about 
anything. 
.23 < .001 .24 .004 .48 < .001 
I have no appetite 
during the day. 
- - - - - - 
I worry about 
sleeping. 
- - - - - - 
I feel that I don't 
have enough sleep 
last night. 
- - - - - - 
I am restless. .35 < .001 .22 .013 .22 .007 
I am tired. .34 < .001 .17 .028 .20 .004 
It is not effortful to 
do things. 
.25 < .001 .15 .110 - - 
I feel guilty. - - - - .48 < .001 
I am doing things 
with my normal 
pace. 
- - .24 .002 .25 .004 
I feel worthless. .54 < .001 .34 < .001 .65 < .001 
I feel that I can't 
get anything done. 
.40 < .001 .24 < .001 - - 
I feel that I can’t 
make decisions. 
- - - - .60 < .001 
I can't concentrate. .42 < .001 .28 < .001 .52 < .001 
I feel hopeless. .53 < .001 .35 < .001 .72 < .001 
How's your day? - - - - - - 
How would you 
rate your overall 
physical health 
today? 
- - - - - - 










Table 4.6 Standardized betas and p-values of afternoon measuring time from Model 
1 in Studies 1, 2, and 3 
Study Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
DDI item β p β p β p 
I feel happy. - - - - -.05 .156 
I feel sad. -.08 < .001 .03 .611 -.02 .688 
I feel irritable. -.11 < .001 .01 .777 .00 .956 
I enjoy what I am 
doing. 
-.08 .002 -.07 .145 -.02 .637 
I don't care about 
anything. 
-.08 < .001 .05 .183 -.03 .307 
I have no appetite 
during the day. 
- - - - - - 
I worry about 
sleeping. 
- - - - - - 
I feel that I don't 
have enough sleep 
last night. 
- - - - - - 
I am restless. .10 < .001 .03 .509 .05 .175 
I am tired. -.06 .048 -.04 .453 .08 .048 
It is not effortful to 
do things. 
-.01 .810 .03 .457 - - 
I feel guilty. - - - - .04 .217 
I am doing things 
with my normal 
pace. 
- - .05 .252 .01 .755 
I feel worthless. -.01 .687 .07 .030 -.01 .706 
I feel that I can't 
get anything done. 
-.05 .067 .01 .853 - - 
I feel that I can’t 
make decisions. 
- - - - .00 .912 
I can't concentrate. -.02 .499 .06 .183 .05 .183 
I feel hopeless. -.01 .761 .03 .556 .01 .658 
How's your day? - - - - - - 
How would you 
rate your overall 
physical health 
today? 
- - - - - - 









Table 4.7 Standardized betas and p-values of evening measuring time from Model 1 
in Studies 1, 2, and 3 
Study Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
DDI item β p β p β p 
I feel happy. - - - - -.15 < .001 
I feel sad. -.12 < .001 .03 .597 -.03 .457 
I feel irritable. -.15 < .001 .02 .748 -.10 .017 
I enjoy what I am 
doing. 
-.16 < .001 -.08 .084 -.16 < .001 
I don't care about 
anything. 
-.07 .025 .10 .009 .02 .640 
I have no appetite 
during the day. 
- - - - - - 
I worry about 
sleeping. 
- - - - - - 
I feel that I don't 
have enough sleep 
last night. 
- - - - - - 
I am restless. .04 .175 .02 .640 -.05 .307 
I am tired. .24 < .001 .13 .002 .44 < .001 
It is not effortful to 
do things. 
-.02 .470 -.01 .777 - - 
I feel guilty. - - - - .01 .803 
I am doing things 
with my normal 
pace. 
- - .02 .681 .02 .679 
I feel worthless. -.01 .684 .04 .272 -.04 .183 
I feel that I can't 
get anything done. 
.02 .554 .05 .242 - - 
I feel that I can’t 
make decisions. 
- - - - .00 .970 
I can't concentrate. .02 .642 .07 .100 .05 .207 
I feel hopeless. -.01 .777 .04 .304 -.01 .755 
How's your day? - - - - - - 
How would you 
rate your overall 
physical health 
today? 
- - - - - - 








Study 2  
As a replicate of Study 1, whether MD severity affects MD symptoms 
measured at different times was also tested here using linear mixed-effect models. 
The same three models used in Study 1 were used. Model 2 did not converge in 
three items – “I am restless”, “It is not effortful to do things”, and “I feel worthless” 
and these three models were removed. For these three items, model comparisons 
were conducted by comparing the AICs of Models 1 and 3.   
Except three items “I feel irritable”, “I enjoy what I am doing”, and “It is not 
effortful to do things”, the standardized betas of PHQ-9 score in linear mixed-effect 
models of all DDI items were significant (Table 4.1). Only one significant result was 
found in the standardized betas of the afternoon (Table 4.2) and the evening 
measuring times (Table 4.3). The item with significant result was “I feel worthless” 
in the afternoon measuring time and “I don’t care about anything” in the evening 
measuring time. MD symptoms did showed varied diurnal patterns in momentary 
ratings but it was only slightly influenced by diurnal rhythm. The same as in Study 1, 
Model 3 containing an interaction term of measuring time and MD severity was not 
the best-fit for any DDI items so the relationship between different diurnal MD 
symptom patterns and MD severity was not tested. 
One more study was used to verify the results of Studies 1 and 2.  
Study 3  
To further test the results of Studies 1 and 2, the same three multilevel 
models used in Studies 1 and 2 were employed. Model 2 of two DDI items “I feel sad” 
and “I feel that I can’t make decisions” did not converge and they were removed. 
The AICs of Models 1 and 3 were used to select the best model of the two items.   
Model 1 was the best-fit for seven DDI items while Model 2 was the best-fit 
for the other six items. PHQ-9 score was a significant predictor of the momentary 
ratings of DDI items in the linear mixed-effect models. The afternoon measuring 
time did not significantly predict any of the momentary ratings. The evening 
measuring time was a significant predictor of the momentary ratings for three DDI 





diurnal patterns as well as a considerable amount of MD symptom heterogeneity. 
Nevertheless, due to Model 3 not being the best-fit for any of the DDI items, the 
correspondence between diurnal patterns in MD symptoms and MD severity cannot 
be examined. 
 
Replicability across Studies 1, 2 and 3 
Replicability of the results in Studies 1, 2, and 3 were tested using the 
Spearman’s rank-order correlation and the standardized betas of PHQ-9 scores, the 
afternoon and the evening measuring times obtained from Model 1 of the three 
linear mixed-effect models. Table 4.5 shows the standardized betas of PHQ-9 score 
and the afternoon and the evening measuring times. The Spearman’s rhos were 
shown in Table 4.6. 
Between the three studies, the Spearman’s rhos of the PHQ-9 score and the 
evening measuring time were median and high. The correlations between Studies 1 
and 2 and between Studies 1 and 3 were above .50. Collectively, of course, these 
correlations were suggestive of a substantial degree of replication across the three 
independent groups of participants as it was very unlikely that three correlations 
of .50 and .60 and above would appear by chance even in a small sample of 
















Table 4.8 Standardized betas of PHQ-9 score and the afternoon and evening 
measuring times from Model 1 of the linear mixed-effect models in Studies 1, 2, 
and 3 









I feel happy. 
- - - - - - .48 -.05 
-
.15 




.20 .03 .03 .53 -.02 
-
.03 




.14 .01 .02 .27 .00 
-
.10 















.24 .05 .10 .48 -.03 .02 
I have no appetite 
during the day. 
- - - - - - - - - 
I worry about sleeping. - - - - - - - - - 
I feel that I don't have 
enough sleep last night. 
- - - - - - - - - 
I am restless. 
.35 .10 .04 .22 .03 .02 .22 .05 
-
.05 
I am tired. .34 -.06 .24 .17 -.04 .13 .20 .08 .44 








- - - 
I feel guilty. - - - - - - .48 .04 .01 
I am doing things with 
my normal pace. 
- - - .24 .05 .02 .25 .01 .02 




.34 .07 .04 .65 -.01 
-
.04 
I feel that I can't get 
anything done. 
.40 -.05 .02 .24 .01 .05 - - - 
I feel that I can’t make 
decisions. 
- - - - - - .60 .00 .00 
I can't concentrate. .42 -.02 .02 .28 .06 .07 .52 .05 .05 




.35 .03 .04 .72 .01 
-
.01 
How's your day? - - - - - - - - - 
How would you rate 
your overall physical 
health today? 
- - - - - - - - - 





Table 4.9 Spearman’s rhos the standardized betas for PHQ-9 score and the 
afternoon and evening measuring times from Model 1 in Studies 1, 2, and 3 
Variables 
r 
Study1 vs. Study 2 Study 1 vs. Study3 Study2 vs. Study 3 
PHQ-9 
score 
.56 .82 .64 
Afternoon .50 .53 -.05 
Evening .60 .67 .77 
Note. r = Spearman’s rho; p = p-value. 
 
Meta-analysis 
Meta-analysis was used to obtain robust results by examining the three 
studies collectively. Excluding the four DDI items only measured once a day, PHQ-9 
score significantly associated with the momentary ratings of other 15 DDI items. 
The significance levels were smaller than .001 after adjusting for multiple 
comparison using FDR. The effect sizes of PHQ-9 score spanned from .22 (“It is not 
effortful to do things”) to .60 (“I feel that I can’t make decisions”), showing an 
extensive level of heterogeneity in the momentary ratings of MD symptoms (Table 
4.7).  
The afternoon and evening measuring times were significantly related to the 
momentary ratings of five DDI items (afternoon measuring time: Table 4.8; evening 
measuring time: Table 4.9). Some of these items were the same but some were 
different. The overlapping items were “I feel sad”, “I feel irritable”, and “I enjoy 
what I am doing”. The different items were “I don’t care about anything” and “I am 
restless” for the afternoon measuring time and “I feel happy” and “I am tired” for 
the evening measuring time. The effect sizes for measuring times were a mixture of 
positive and negative values. This may imply heterogeneity in MD symptoms, too. 
However, the differences between the effect sizes in the afternoon measuring time 
were relatively small of .13 (-.06–.07) compared to these in PHQ-9 score (.38) and 
the evening measuring time (.41). Therefore, MD symptom heterogeneity was less 







Table 4.10 Meta-analysis of the standardized betas of PHQ-9 score from Model 1 in 
the three studies (N = 277) 
 DDI item β SE Z p 
I feel happy. .48 .06 7.63 < .001 
I feel sad. .41 .03 11.87 < .001 
I feel irritable. .30 .04 8.60 < .001 
I enjoy what I am doing. .34 .03 11.03 < .001 
I don’t care about anything. .29 .04 7.31 < .001 
I have no appetite during the day. - - - < .001 
I worry about sleeping. - - - < .001 
I didn’t have enough sleep last night. - - - < .001 
I am restless. .28 .04 7.42 < .001 
I am tired. .27 .03 8.41 < .001 
It is not effortful to do things. .22 .05 4.63 < .001 
I feel guilty. .48 .07 6.57 < .001 
I am doing things at my normal pace. .24 .05 4.73 < .001 
I feel worthless. .53 .04 15.03 < .001 
I feel that I can’t get anything done. .34 .04 8.54 < .001 
I feel that I can’t make decisions. .60 .07 8.57 < .001 
I can’t concentrate. .41 .03 12.01 < .001 
I feel hopeless. .55 .03 16.27 < .001 
How’s your day? - - - - 
How would you rate your overall physical health 
today? 
- - - - 























Table 4.11 Meta-analysis of the standardized betas of the afternoon measuring time 
from Model 1 in the three studies (N = 277) 
 DDI item β SE Z p 
I feel happy. -.05 .03 -1.69 .156 
I feel sad. -.04 .02 -2.49 .026 
I feel irritable. -.05 .02 -3.21 .002 
I enjoy what I am doing. -.06 .02 -3.57 < .001 
I don’t care about anything. -.03 .01 -2.33 .039 
I have no appetite during the day. - - - - 
I worry about sleeping. - - - - 
I didn’t have enough sleep last night. - - - - 
I am restless. .07 .02 4.17 < .001 
I am tired. -.02 .02 -.94 .470 
It is not effortful to do things. .00 .02 .27 .828 
I feel guilty. .04 .03 1.47 .217 
I am doing things at my normal pace. .03 .02 1.21 .324 
I feel worthless. .01 .01 .46 .739 
I feel that I can’t get anything done. -.03 .02 -1.67 .160 
I feel that I can’t make decisions. .00 .03 -.14 .912 
I can’t concentrate. .01 .02 .90 .488 
I feel hopeless. .01 .01 .41 .755 
How’s your day? - - - - 
How would you rate your overall physical health 
today? 
- - - - 


















Table 4.12 Meta-analysis of the standardized betas of the evening measuring time 
from Model 1 in the three studies (N = 277) 
 DDI item β SE Z p 
I feel happy. -.15 .04 -4.04 < .001 
I feel sad. -.06 .02 -3.25 .002 
I feel irritable. -.09 .02 -4.79 < .001 
I enjoy what I am doing. -.14 .02 -6.89 < .001 
I don’t care about anything. .00 .02 .22 .853 
I have no appetite during the day. - - - - 
I worry about sleeping. - - - - 
I didn’t have enough sleep last night. - - - - 
I am restless. .02 .02 .82 .536 
I am tired. .26 .02 13.21 < .001 
It is not effortful to do things. -.02 .02 -.97 .457 
I feel guilty. .01 .03 .30 .803 
I am doing things at my normal pace. .02 .03 .79 .552 
I feel worthless. -.01 .02 -.63 .642 
I feel that I can’t get anything done. .03 .02 1.45 .226 
I feel that I can’t make decisions. .00 .03 .04 .970 
I can’t concentrate. .04 .02 2.15 .058 
I feel hopeless. .00 .02 .12 .924 
How’s your day? - - - - 
How would you rate your overall physical health 
today? - - - - 
Note. β = standardized beta; SE = standard error; z = z score; p = p value.  
 
Discussion 
Across the three studies and meta-analysis, MD severity measured using 
PHQ-9 score was a significant predictor of the momentary ratings of most MD 
symptoms. Three DDI items in Study 2 were the only exceptions. The predicting 
power of the afternoon and evening measuring times were not as prominent. For 
the afternoon measuring time, only five DDI items in Study 1, one in Study 2, five in 
meta-analysis yielded significant results. There were five DDI items in Study 1, one 
in Study 2, three in Study 3, and five in meta-analysis significantly predicted by the 
evening measuring time. This showed divergent predictability of measuring time in 
MD symptoms, suggesting heterogeneity in MD symptoms. Fluctuating diurnal 
patterns were found in the momentary ratings of some MD symptoms but the 





tested because the multilevel model that tested the interaction between MD 
severity and measuring time did not emerge to be the best model for any of the DDI 
items in the three studies.  
The results of the three studies were highly reproducible as seen in PHQ-9 
score and the evening measuring time. Replicability test using standardized betas 
and Spearman’s rhos returned medium to high correlations for both PHQ-9 score 
and the evening measuring time in the three pairs of comparisons. Figures 4.1–4.3 
show the standardized betas of PHQ-9, the afternoon measuring time, and the 
evening measuring time extracted from Model 1 in the three studies and meta-
analysis, respectively. Similar patterns could be observed in some parts of the 
figures – between “I can't concentrate" and "I feel hopeless” in PHQ-9 score, 
between "I am restless", "I am tired", and "It is not effortful to do things" in the 
afternoon measuring time. The three comparable patterns in the evening 
measuring time were between “I feel sad”, “I feel irritable”, “I enjoy what I am 
doing”, and "I don't care about anything", between "I am restless” and "I am tired", 
and between "I can't concentrate" and "I feel hopeless". Not all MD symptoms 










Figure 4.1 Standardized betas of PHQ-9 score from Model 1 in Studies 1, 2 and 3  
Note. Each number on the x axis represents an item in the DDI. 1 = “I feel happy”; 2 
= “I feel sad”; 3 = “I feel irritable”; 4 = “I enjoy what I am doing”; 5 = "I don't care 
about anything"; 6 = “I have no appetite during the day”; 7 = “I worry about 
sleeping”; 8 = “I didn’t have enough sleep last night”; 9 = "I am restless"; 10 = "I am 
tired"; 11 = "It is not effortful to do things"; 12 = “I feel guilty”; 13 = “I am doing 
things at my normal pace”; 14 = "I feel worthless"; 15 = "I feel that I can't get 
anything done"; 16 = “I feel that I can’t make decisions”; 17 = "I can't concentrate"; 












Figure 4.2 Standardized betas of the afternoon measuring time from Model 1 in 
Studies 1, 2 and 3  
Note. Each number on the x axis represents an item in the DDI. 1 = “I feel happy”; 2 
= “I feel sad”; 3 = “I feel irritable”; 4 = “I enjoy what I am doing”; 5 = "I don't care 
about anything"; 6 = “I have no appetite during the day”; 7 = “I worry about 
sleeping”; 8 = “I didn’t have enough sleep last night”; 9 = "I am restless"; 10 = "I am 
tired"; 11 = "It is not effortful to do things"; 12 = “I feel guilty”; 13 = “I am doing 
things at my normal pace”; 14 = "I feel worthless"; 15 = "I feel that I can't get 
anything done"; 16 = “I feel that I can’t make decisions”; 17 = "I can't concentrate"; 









Figure 4.3 Standardized betas of the evening measuring time from Model 1 in 
Studies 1, 2 and 3  
Note. Each number on the x axis represents an item in the DDI. 1 = “I feel happy”; 2 
= “I feel sad”; 3 = “I feel irritable”; 4 = “I enjoy what I am doing”; 5 = "I don't care 
about anything"; 6 = “I have no appetite during the day”; 7 = “I worry about 
sleeping”; 8 = “I didn’t have enough sleep last night”; 9 = "I am restless"; 10 = "I am 
tired"; 11 = "It is not effortful to do things"; 12 = “I feel guilty”; 13 = “I am doing 
things at my normal pace”; 14 = "I feel worthless"; 15 = "I feel that I can't get 
anything done"; 16 = “I feel that I can’t make decisions”; 17 = "I can't concentrate"; 
18 = "I feel hopeless". 
 
 Comparing to the afternoon and evening measuring times, the meta-analysis 
of PHQ-9 score was the most uniform because the associations between PHQ-9 
score and all DDI items were significant while the two measuring times only 
significantly linked to a few DDI items. Heterogeneity in MD symptoms could be 
seen in the wide range of betas in PHQ-9 score and only some DDI items were 
significantly associated with the afternoon and evening measuring times.   
The momentary ratings of the DDI items significantly predicted by the 
measuring time were depressed mood, lost interest, fatigue, guilt or worthlessness, 
and psychomotor symptoms. Among these symptoms, the link between mood and 
circadian rhythm has been reported (Murray, 2007; Murray et al., 2002). However, 
slightly inconsistent with Murray's (2007) finding, where only positive affect was 





measuring time in Study 3 but negative affect was linked to both the afternoon and 
evening measuring times in Study 1. Meta-analysis showed similar results, where 
positive affect only related to the evening measuring time but the connections 
between negative affect and the afternoon and evening measuring time were 
observed.  
To sum up, MD severity significantly predicted the momentary ratings of MD 
symptoms with varying effect on the symptoms while circadian rhythm was only 
observed in some MD symptoms. MD symptom heterogeneity could be observed in 
circadian rhythm and between the momentary ratings of MD symptoms and 
disorder severity. 
Limitations and future directions 
 Previous literature has reported the association between evening 
chronotype and MD (Kantermann et al., 2012) and MD severity (Au & Reece, 2017). 
But chronotype was not assessed in the three studies and this had limited the scope 
of the applicability of the results. Sleep disturbance is another commonly reported 
MD symptom affected by circadian rhythm (Vadnie & McClung, 2017). But the 
relationship between the momentary ratings of sleep-related items in the DDI and 
circadian rhythm was not tested in the three studies because these items were only 
measured once a day. To dig into the depth of diurnal changes, including 
assessments of chronotypes, actigraphy monitors, salivary melatonin, and core 
body temperature would allow a more thorough examination of the influences of 
diurnal changes on MD symptoms (Robillard et al., 2018).  












 Several models were proposed to classify personality traits, among those, 
the most renowned are the Big Five and the Big Three. The Big Five personality 
traits compose of openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and 
neuroticism (Costa & McCrae, 1985) while the Big Three are negative emotionality, 
positive emotionality, and disinhibition (Watson & Clark, 1993). Overlaps between 
the two models have been reported – neuroticism resembles negative emotionality 
and extraversion coincides positive emotionality, whereas disinhibition in the Big 
Three inconsistently correlates with conscientiousness and agreeableness in the Big 
Five (Clark & Watson, 1999). In the current study, the Big Five model was used 
because most comparable evidences have been collected within this framework 
and the Big Five has been linked to a wide range of life outcomes (Ozer & Benet-
Martínez, 2005; Rammstedt et al., 2017; Roberts et al., 2007). 
Facets of personality 
The Big Five personality traits are often broken into numerous narrower (or 
“lower-order”) personality traits called facets (Costa & McCrae, 1995). It has been 
found that facets of the same Big Five traits have at least somewhat distinct 
etiologies because they are affected by distinct genetic and environmental factors 
(Jang et al., 2006). They also vary in their links with external variables (e.g., 
education, diet, or major depression [MD]) (René Mõttus, 2016). For example, 
depression under neuroticism and cheerfulness under extraversion predicted life 
satisfaction (Schimmack et al., 2004). Impulsiveness under neuroticism, 
straightforwardness under agreeableness, and self-discipline under 
conscientiousness are associated with higher rate of survival in an elderly sample 
(Weiss & Costa, 2005). Anxiety is linked to the four facets under extraversion and 





seeking while MD was only related to positive emotionality (Naragon-Gainey et al., 
2009). People with MD are also higher in the facet depression under neuroticism 
and lower in the facets positive emotion and assertiveness under extraversion 
(Rector et al., 2012). MD symptoms were associated with the following facets: angry 
hostility and depression under neuroticism, positive emotions under extraversion, 
and actions under openness (Chioqueta & Stiles, 2005). Depression and positive 
emotion or cheerfulness were the facets that consistently predicted MD across 
several studies.  
Normal and abnormal personality traits 
Historically and even currently within the medical psychiatric paradigm, 
pathological or abnormal personality is represented as an expert-agreed set of 
distinct disorders (DSM-IV, DSM-V) – the categorical model (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013a). However, this model of abnormal personality has several 
problems such as poor convergence between patients’ symptoms and the 
diagnostic categories (a large proportion of patients receive the “waste bin” 
diagnosis of personality disorder not otherwise specified) and low agreement 
among diagnosing doctors. To mitigate these problems, there has been a shift 
towards representing abnormal personality in the same framework as the 
personality models represent normal personality traits – the dimensional model 
(Hopwood et al., 2018; Krueger & Tackett, 2003; Trull & Durrett, 2005).  
“Normal and abnormal personality are not distinct from one another, and 
that personality is best represented on a continuum” (Blashfield et al., 2014, p. 38). 
Normal personality models such as the Big Five have been “explicitly or implicitly 
assumed to account for both normal and abnormal personality” or, at least, “were 
developed without explicit attention to any distinction between normal and 
abnormal personality” (Markon et al., 2005, p. 140). Markon et al. (2005) conducted 
a meta-analysis and an empirical study. They reported normal and abnormal 
personality traits shared a hierarchical structure, which mirrored an existing five-
factor model of personality traits. Nonetheless, other studies observed an 





Widiger & Costa, 2012). Widiger and Costa (2012) suggested a five-factor model 
while Gutierrez et al. (2014) found a seven-factor model . 
Personality disorders and MD  
Whether having a personality disorder is related to poor outcome in MD 
patients is still under debate. Although consensus has yet reached regarding the 
most prominent types of personality disorder among MD patients, it has been 
reported that people with MD have a higher probability of having personality 
disorders than those who do not have MD (Corruble, Ginestet, & Guelfi, 1996; 
Skodol et al., 1999; Wongpakaran, Wongpakaran, Boonyanaruthee, 
Pinyopornpanish, & Intaprasert, 2015). Some have reported that early-onset MD 
was associated with co-occurrence of personality disorder (Alpert et al., 1997; Fava 
et al., 1996; Ramklint & Ekselius, 2003) but Skodol et al. (1999) did not observe this 
connection. Shea, Widiger, and Klein (1992) suggested the studies on comorbidity 
of personality disorder and MD may share a hidden bias because most of the 
literature has reported that a high percentage of MD patients were also diagnosed 
with personality disorders. But only a relatively small number of studies found many 
patients with personality disorders had MD.  
Compared to those who only have MD, people who are diagnosed with both 
personality disorder and MD tend to a have poorer MD treatment outcome 
(Goddard, Wingrove, & Moran, 2015; Newton-Howes et al., 2013; Newton-Howes, 
Tyrer, & Johnson, 2006; Shea et al., 1992). However, contesting results of the 
psychosocial functioning of patients diagnosed with one personality disorder and 
MD remained unaffected by the diagnoses were reported, while decreased quality 
of life was found in those having two or more personality disorder and MD (Brieger, 
Ehrt, Bloeink, & Marneros, 2002). A randomized control trial showed MD patients 
with personality disorders did not have negative outcome in MD treatment (Kool et 
al., 2005). 
 





Personality traits relate differently to MD and the associations between trait 
neuroticism and MD has often been reported. Several studies found neuroticism 
has been repeatedly reported to be associated with the onset of MD (Kendler et al., 
2004), the recurrence of MD (Burcusa & Iacono, 2007), and the risk of lifetime MD 
(Xia et al., 2011). Noteboom, Beekman, Vogelzangs, and Penninx (2016) observed 
negative associations between new MD episodes and extraversion, agreeableness, 
and conscientiousness. But clinical conditions were more prominent and as a result, 
some of these associations disappeared after controlling for MD severity and life-
time prevalence of anxiety disorder. Only neuroticism remains a significant 
predictor of new MD episodes independent of the two disorder characteristics 
mentioned above. A study of first- and second-year undergraduate students found 
stress was the mediating factor between personality and MD (Kuznetsova, Knyazev, 
Dorosheva, Bocharov, & Savostyanov, 2016). The associations between MD and 
three personality traits – neuroticism, extraversion, and conscientiousness - were 
reported. Neuroticism predicted MD and those who had MD were relatively low in 
extraversion scores. A review article observed the associations between MD and 
neuroticism, extraversion, and conscientiousness (Klein et al., 2011). Chioqueta and 
Stiles (2005) reported MD symptoms were positively related to neuroticism and 
openness and negatively predicted by extraversion. 
“Concurrent associations” between personality traits in both the Big Five 
and the Big Three Models and mental disorders including MD, anxiety disorder, and 
substance use disorder were reported in a review of 66 meta-analyses covering 175 
cross-sectional studies (Kotov et al., 2010, p. 803). They found high level of 
neuroticism, low level of conscientiousness, and low extraversion were highly 
related to the three mental disorders. Disinhibition was related with some of the 
disorders – unipolar MD, dysthymic disorder, anxiety disorder, and substance use 
disorder. Agreeableness was only linked to substance use disorder. No associations 
between openness and the mental disorders were found. Different associations 
between personality traits and mental disorders may be explained by an 





have divergent levels of abstraction (Markon et al., 2005). The level of abstraction is 
used to describe objects in a hierarchy, where objects at the same level of hierarchy 
provide identical amount of details. Markon et al. (2005) suggested the level of 
abstraction of neuroticism might be different from the other traits. The divergent 
levels of abstraction may explain the correlations between personality traits and 
mental disorders. Kotov et al. (2010) further tested the correlations between the 
Big Five personality traits using data from Markon et al. (2005). They also controlled 
for neuroticism to remove the correlations between the personality traits and 
mental disorders explained by associations between neuroticism and other 
personality traits. Their results showed decreases in effect sizes of 
conscientiousness, disinhibition, and extraversion but the effects of openness 
remained the same. 
  Several possible mechanisms underlying the association between 
neuroticism and MD have been reported (Nagel, Jansen, et al., 2018; Nagel, 
Watanabe, et al., 2018; Shirata et al., 2018). The genetic correlations between 
facets under neuroticism showed they were genetically heterogeneous but a 
subsequent hierarchical clustering analysis found two genetically homogeneous 
clusters – depressed affect and worry (Nagel, Watanabe, et al., 2018). A meta-
analysis of genome-wide association studies of 449,484 people and 14,978,477 
SNPs identified some neuroticism-related genetic variants (124 new loci out of the 
136 identified loci) and enrichment of genes (gene expression or protein production) 
related to neuroticism in some brain regions, cell types, and pathways (Nagel, 
Jansen, et al., 2018). Considerable genetic correlations between neuroticism and 
MD and two facets under neuroticism – depressed affect and worry were reported, 
too.  
The role of epigenetic modifications in MD was highlighted in a review 
(Dalton et al., 2014). Epigenetic modifications alter DNA expression without 
changing the DNA sequence (A. D. Goldberg et al., 2007). Epigenetic mechanisms 
include DNA methylation, covalent chromatin modification, noncovalent chromatin 





some are reversible. Both animal and human studies have found that epigenetics 
may explain the influences of environmental factors such as early adverse life 
events on later MD episodes (Dalton et al., 2014). 
Models explaining the relationships between personality and MD 
 Several models were proposed to explain the association between 
personality and MD (Bagby et al., 2008; Klein et al., 2011). These models were 
constructed based on the causal relationship between personality and MD – they 
share a common cause, MD causally affects personality, personality has a causal 
influence on MD, and there was a continuum spanning from subclinical personality 
trait, subclinical MD symptoms, and MD. 
The studies 
Based on the literature, there are the associations between high neuroticism, 
low conscientiousness, or low extraversion and MD, this chapter will test the links 
between high neuroticism, low conscientiousness, or low extraversion and MD 
severity (H12). Since the facets of the Big Five were measured, we test another 
hypothesis to link the facets to MD – depression under neuroticism and 
cheerfulness under extraversion predict MD severity (H13). To explore the 
associations between personality and different aspects of MD measures, the 
relationships between personality traits and facets and momentary MD ratings and 
MD symptom variability were tested, too. In three studies, we used a retrospective 
MD questionnaire, Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ-9) to measure MD severity, 
and a momentary MD questionnaire, Daily Depression Items (DDI), to measure 
momentary MD ratings. MD severity, the momentary MD ratings, and the MD 
symptom variability were tested using the sums of the PHQ-9, the means of the DDI 
ratings, and the standard deviations of the DDI ratings, respectively. The 
relationships between personality traits and facets and the items in the PHQ-9 and 
the DDI are tested to observe the symptom dynamics: if the associations between 
different MD symptoms and personality characteristics are similar, this is consistent 
with MD being etiologically homogeneous, whereas mixed association patterns are 





Materials and Method 
The participants, materials, and procedure in the three studies were the 




 The 120-item International Personality Item Pool was employed to measure 
personality traits. However, items measuring the same traits or facets were not 
randomly interspersed in the questionnaires. The reversed-scoring items were 
adjusted before calculating the score for each traits and facets. 
Regression was used to analyze the relationships between personality traits, 
facets, and MD severity. The R code of the model could be found in Appendix B. The 
controlling variables were the demographic variables – age, gender, educational 
attainment, marital status, and employment status. Educational attainment was 
treated as a continuous variable because the options in this question follows a 
chronological order. The same as Chapters 2, 3, and 4, marital status and 
employment status were collapsed into two levels. In marital status, one level 
included those who were single, divorced, or widowed and the other level 
comprised people who were married or in a relationship. In employment status, 
employed or self-employed and full-time student were in one level and part-time 
employed, retired, and unemployed were in the other level. The sum of the 
retrospective MD questionnaire, the PHQ-9 was used as a measure of MD severity. 
The relationships between the PHQ-9 items and personality traits or facets were 
tested separately to see how each MD symptom related to personality traits. For 
each DDI item, the means and the standard deviations of the momentary ratings 
were calculated and they represented the momentary MD symptom ratings and 
variability of MD symptoms, respectively. In tables, the results were presented as 
items mapped across the three studies. Due to the restriction of page size, items 





In regression models, one of the personality traits or facets and all 
controlling variables were the independent variables. The dependent variable was 
one of the following – the sums of the PHQ-9, each PHQ-9 item, the mean 
momentary rating of each DDI item, or the standard deviation of the momentary 
ratings of each DDI item. The p-values were adjusted using false discovery rate (FDR) 
to take care of the issue of multiple comparison. The same analyses were used to 
analyze three different sets of data from the three studies. The results of the three 
studies were presented below. To observe whether there were consistent trends or 
patterns in the findings, replicability of the three studies were assessed, too. This 
was followed by a meta-analysis to provide more robust findings.  
 
Study 1 
The results supported the hypothesis of high neuroticism, low extraversion, 
and low conscientiousness significantly predicted MD severity (Table 5.1). Openness 
and agreeableness were not significant predictors of PHQ-9 scores. The hypothesis 
of depression (N3) under neuroticism and cheerfulness (E6) under extraversion 
predicted MD severity was supported as well. MD severity was also significantly and 
positively predicted by other facets including N1 anxiety, N4 self-consciousness, N5 
immoderation, and N6 vulnerability and significantly and negatively predicted by 
facets including E1 friendliness, E2 gregariousness, O4 adventurousness, O6 
liberalism, C1 self-efficacy, and C5 self-discipline negatively predicted MD severity. 
Even though agreeableness did not significantly predict MD severity, A1 trust 
significantly and negatively and A5 modesty significantly and positively predicted 
MD severity. Therefore, the associations between MD severity and personality were 
at least to some extent driven by facets rather than the Big Five traits.  
High neuroticism significantly predicted the scores of all PHQ-9 items. Low 
extraversion and low conscientiousness significantly predicted nearly all PHQ-9 
items. The facets N1 anxiety, N3 depression, and N6 vulnerability under neuroticism 





Some facets significantly predicted some of the PHQ-9 items. Openness and 
agreeableness did not significantly predicted any PHQ-9 items. 
 Overall, all of the mean momentary ratings of the DDI items were 
significantly predicted by high neuroticism and majority of the mean ratings were 
predicted by low extraversion and low conscientiousness (Table 5.2). No significant 
relationships between openness and agreeableness and the mean momentary 
ratings were found. The results of the facets showed slightly greater variances 
compared to those of the traits. Depression and cheerfulness significantly predicted 
nearly all of the mean momentary ratings. N1 anxiety significantly predicted the 
mean momentary ratings. Some facets significantly related to the mean momentary 
ratings of none or some DDI items.  
 The variabilities of most DDI items was significantly predicted by neuroticism 
and some by conscientiousness (Table 5.3). There were significant relationships 
between N3 depression and the variability of some DDI items but E6 cheerfulness 
was only significantly associated with the variability of two DDI items. Other facets 
including several in openness and agreeableness were found to be significantly 
related to the variability of DDI items, too. But the number of significant 
associations was smaller compared to those in the mean momentary DDI ratings.  
Neuroticism and conscientiousness and the facets depression and anxiety 
consistently and significantly predicted MD severity, momentary MD ratings, and 
MD symptom variability. Sparingly significant associations were observed in other 
traits and facets. The PHQ-9 and DDI items related differently with personality traits 
and facets may imply heterogeneity in MD symptoms. 










Table 5.1 Standardized betas of the Big Five personality traits and facets extract 
from the regression models testing the relationships between personality traits and 
facets and the PHQ-9 items in Study 1 
 PHQ-9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
N .70*** .54*** .60*** .57*** .54*** .42*** .63*** .55*** .46*** .45*** 
E -.41*** -.40*** -.43*** -.26* -.24* -.20 -.45*** -.24* -.23 -.42*** 
O .02 -.02 .02 -.02 .02 -.02 -.09 .13 .10 .06 
A .02 .02 .02 -.03 .13 .01 -.01 .02 -.04 -.03 
C -.37*** -.31** -.29* -.25 -.25* -.17 -.39*** -.38*** -.32** -.21 
N1 .58*** .36*** .49*** .54*** .44*** .31** .57*** .41*** .46*** .38*** 
N2 .26* .13 .21 .22 .18 .18 .21 .29* .22 .17 
N3 .65*** .56*** .62*** .45*** .44*** .37*** .59*** .54*** .45*** .48*** 
N4 .42*** .41*** .36*** .38*** .32*** .21 .38*** .32** .17 .29* 
N5 .37*** .31** .26* .36*** .35*** .33*** .31** .21 .16 .14 
N6 .52*** .36*** .46*** .36*** .45*** .31** .48*** .42*** .39*** .32** 
E1 -.40*** -.42*** -.39*** -.30** -.18 -.19 -.39*** -.28* -.28* -.35*** 
E2 -.39*** -.30** -.40*** -.31** -.26* -.18 -.42*** -.27* -.21 -.34*** 
E3 -.16 -.21 -.17 -.09 -.20 -.10 -.13 -.06 -.02 -.11 
E4 -.06 -.18 -.15 .07 .00 .15 -.15 .02 -.10 -.16 
E5 -.16 -.13 -.16 -.08 -.07 -.13 -.27* -.07 .02 -.25 
E6 -.49*** -.39*** -.46*** -.34*** -.25* -.32*** -.49*** -.31** -.34*** -.50*** 
O1 -.02 -.16 -.02 .02 -.06 -.07 -.08 .12 .07 .07 
O2 .06 .02 .06 .01 .06 .00 -.06 .09 .11 .19 
O3 .14 .17 .17 .10 .17 .07 .08 .07 .03 .06 
O4 -.25* -.24* -.29** -.23 -.20 -.10 -.25* -.06 -.05 -.30** 
O5 -.08 -.06 -.01 -.13 -.09 -.11 -.12 -.01 -.03 .02 
O6 .30** .32*** .23 .19 .25* .19 .18 .26* .22 .20 
A1 -.36*** -.28* -.35*** -.33*** -.23* -.21 -.32*** -.24* -.23 -.30** 
A2 -.08 -.13 -.08 -.07 .01 -.05 -.04 -.05 -.09 -.10 
A3 .05 .08 .12 -.05 .15 .00 .01 .03 -.03 .03 
A4 .03 .08 .00 .04 .11 .04 .03 -.05 -.04 .00 
A5 .28** .23 .26* .20 .24* .22 .27* .24* .11 .12 
A6 .11 .07 .11 .09 .17 .01 -.01 .12 .12 .15 
C1 -.36*** -.32*** -.30** -.18 -.21 -.25* -.40*** -.25* -.26* -.35*** 
C2 -.18 -.10 -.17 -.22 -.19 -.09 -.21 -.16 -.04 .03 
C3 -.22 -.13 -.15 -.17 -.09 -.14 -.15 -.24* -.29* -.23 
C4 -.17 -.21 -.16 -.03 -.02 -.08 -.16 -.19 -.19 -.23 
C5 -.42*** -.42*** -.30** -.25* -.34*** -.15 -.46*** -.34*** -.37*** -.27* 
C6 -.08 -.04 -.02 -.06 -.05 .04 -.10 -.22 -.12 .08 
Note. PHQ-9 = PHQ-9 total score; 1–9 = PHQ-9 items; 1 = little interest; 2 = feeling down; 3 = trouble 
sleeping; 4 = tired; 5 = altered appetite; 6 = feeling bad about self; 7 = concentration problem; 8 = 
psychomotor changes; 9 = suicidal ideation; N = neuroticism; E = extraversion; O = openness; A = 
agreeableness; C = conscientiousness; N1 = anxiety; N2 = anger; N3 = depression; N4 = self-
consciousness; N5 = immoderation; N6 = vulnerability; E1 = friendliness; E2 = gregariousness; E3 = 
assertiveness; E4 = activity level; E5 = excitement-seeking; E6 = cheerfulness; O1 = imagination; O2 = 
artistic interests; O3 = emotionality; O4 = adventurousness; O5 = intellect; O6 = liberalism; A1 = trust; 
A2 = morality; A3 = altruism; A4 = cooperation; A5 = modesty; A6 = sympathy; C1 = self-efficacy; C2 = 
orderliness; C3 = dutifulness; C4 = achievement-striving,; C5 = self-discipline; C6 = cautiousness. * p 





Table 5.2 Standardized betas of the Big Five personality traits and facets in 
regression models testing the relationships between personality traits and facets 
and the mean momentary ratings of the DDI items in Study 1 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
N .52*** .52*** .56*** .40*** .34*** .49*** .43*** .45*** 
E -.49*** -.46*** -.44*** -.42*** -.18 -.34*** -.20 -.23 
O .01 .04 .01 -.11 -.02 .01 .12 .13 
A -.12 -.03 -.09 -.13 -.07 -.09 .00 -.08 
C -.31** -.33*** -.31** -.30** -.18 -.25* -.32*** -.22 
N1 .45*** .46*** .49*** .27* .30** .48*** .40*** .45*** 
N2 .18 .17 .20 .11 .13 .18 .17 .21 
N3 .54*** .57*** .53*** .42*** .29** .39*** .35*** .38*** 
N4 .33*** .32*** .35*** .28** .20 .32*** .24* .27* 
N5 .17 .16 .21 .19 .16 .18 .31*** .06 
N6 .40*** .38*** .43*** .30** .28* .42*** .28** .44*** 
E1 -.49*** -.50*** -.49*** -.48*** -.25* -.37*** -.21 -.25* 
E2 -.45*** -.42*** -.40*** -.25* -.10 -.31*** -.22 -.24* 
E3 -.12 -.05 -.10 -.20 -.11 -.15 -.06 -.07 
E4 -.16 -.17 -.10 -.28* -.02 -.03 .04 .02 
E5 -.23 -.21 -.18 -.08 -.02 -.11 -.05 -.08 
E6 -.53*** -.53*** -.52*** -.44*** -.23* -.40*** -.29** -.32*** 
O1 .01 .05 .01 -.09 -.02 .13 .20 .22 
O2 .06 .06 .06 -.01 -.04 .00 .04 .06 
O3 -.04 .01 -.03 -.09 .11 .07 .09 .10 
O4 -.23 -.20 -.21 -.17 -.11 -.24* -.09 -.17 
O5 .05 .01 .01 -.14 -.11 -.09 .00 .04 
O6 .23 .26* .23 .18 .14 .20 .19 .23 
A1 -.36*** -.38*** -.36*** -.28* -.26* -.35*** -.24* -.21 
A2 -.15 -.11 -.16 -.18 -.10 -.11 -.04 -.14 
A3 -.06 .02 -.05 -.15 .01 -.06 .00 .03 
A4 -.01 .04 .01 -.02 .02 .08 .01 -.03 
A5 .16 .25* .18 .17 .08 .16 .18 .03 
A6 .02 .09 .05 -.01 .03 -.04 .08 .06 
C1 -.32*** -.30*** -.29** -.17 -.06 -.35*** -.21 -.14 
C2 -.13 -.15 -.14 -.18 -.10 -.05 -.24* -.10 
C3 -.19 -.15 -.15 -.08 -.13 -.14 -.06 -.16 
C4 -.16 -.19 -.14 -.32*** -.05 -.06 -.12 -.05 
C5 -.45*** -.44*** -.46*** -.33*** -.15 -.29* -.41*** -.32** 










 10 11 14 15 17 18 19 
N .51*** .24* .64*** .60*** .59*** .63*** .51*** 
E -.29** -.09 -.50*** -.36*** -.30*** -.48*** -.44*** 
O .08 .11 -.02 .12 .13 .01 .01 
A .04 .01 -.05 .00 -.03 -.07 -.06 
C -.31*** -.12 -.32*** -.43*** -.36*** -.31** -.30** 
N1 .44*** .25* .53*** .45*** .49*** .53*** .48*** 
N2 .15 .08 .22 .28* .29** .22 .14 
N3 .46*** .21 .66*** .52*** .47*** .64*** .51*** 
N4 .36*** .17 .38*** .43*** .41*** .38*** .29** 
N5 .24* .03 .22 .28* .26* .23 .22 
N6 .39*** .22 .53*** .44*** .44*** .50*** .38*** 
E1 -.30*** -.08 -.48*** -.40*** -.37*** -.50*** -.47*** 
E2 -.33*** -.14 -.44*** -.32*** -.29** -.41*** -.34*** 
E3 -.08 .06 -.18 -.18 -.12 -.10 -.05 
E4 -.02 .03 -.24* -.17 -.06 -.15 -.22 
E5 -.08 -.11 -.18 -.08 -.05 -.20 -.20 
E6 -.34*** -.09 -.53*** -.32*** -.31*** -.57*** -.52*** 
O1 .17 .11 .08 .16 .24* .05 -.02 
O2 -.01 .05 .03 .08 .05 .02 .05 
O3 .11 .14 .04 .05 .06 .05 .04 
O4 -.14 -.04 -.32*** -.15 -.10 -.27* -.23* 
O5 -.03 -.03 -.07 -.01 -.02 -.02 .04 
O6 .22 .18 .22 .31*** .24* .28* .23 
A1 -.22* -.05 -.28** -.21 -.31*** -.32*** -.31*** 
A2 -.06 -.08 -.15 -.13 -.12 -.18 -.17 
A3 .11 .06 -.04 .06 .00 -.04 .02 
A4 .00 -.04 -.01 -.03 -.01 -.01 .01 
A5 .24* .08 .22 .17 .21 .19 .16 
A6 .07 .04 .05 .15 .12 .11 .08 
C1 -.18 -.13 -.31*** -.25* -.20 -.30** -.29** 
C2 -.22* -.10 -.13 -.25* -.20 -.15 -.13 
C3 -.07 .01 -.12 -.11 -.10 -.15 -.15 
C4 -.11 .02 -.22 -.27* -.17 -.19 -.17 
C5 -.39*** -.21 -.44*** -.48*** -.40*** -.43*** -.43** 
C6 -.14 -.02 -.04 -.21 -.23* .00 .00 
Note. N = neuroticism; E = extraversion; O = openness; A = agreeableness; C = 
conscientiousness; N1 – C6 = the facets; 1–20 represent items in the DDI; 1 = I feel happy; 2 
= I feel sad; 3 = I feel irritable; 4 = I enjoy what I am doing; 5 = I don’t care about anything; 6 
= I have no appetite during the day; 7 = I worry about sleeping; 8 = I didn’t have enough 
sleep last night; 9 = I am rest less; 10 = I am tired; 11= It is not effortful to do things; 12 = I 
feel guilty; 13 = I am doing things at my normal pace; 14 = I feel worthless; 15 = I feel that I 
can’t get anything done; 16 = I feel that I can’t make decisions; 17 = I can’t concentrate; 18 
= I feel hopeless; 19 = How’s your day; 20 = How would you rate your overall physical health 
today. There were revisions of the DDI over the course of the three studies and items 1, 12, 





Table 5.3 Standardized betas of the Big Five personality traits and facets in 
regression models testing the relationships between personality traits and facets 
and the variabilities of the DDI items in Study 1 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
N .42*** .29* .38*** .45*** .42*** .24 .17 .37*** 
E -.10 .01 -.13 -.09 -.20 .03 .02 -.06 
O .14 .18 .10 .08 -.05 -.01 .14 .07 
A .11 .21 .14 .08 .09 .00 .12 .08 
C -.25* -.24* -.22 -.28* -.23 -.20 -.21 -.22 
N1 .39*** .28* .35*** .44*** .38*** .29* .21 .35*** 
N2 .22 .19 .14 .20 .10 .10 .02 .16 
N3 .29** .19 .28** .38*** .32** .05 .08 .22 
N4 .24* .13 .23* .19 .29** .09 .11 .25* 
N5 .28* .25* .30** .26* .28* .21 .16 .25* 
N6 .30** .15 .26* .34*** .34*** .26* .14 .28* 
E1 -.15 -.07 -.22* -.21 -.22 -.05 -.04 -.15 
E2 -.13 -.01 -.13 -.07 -.10 .05 .01 -.09 
E3 -.05 .00 -.05 .05 -.23 -.02 -.01 -.08 
E4 .03 .04 .07 .09 -.05 .12 .13 .15 
E5 .09 .15 .03 .07 .01 .09 .10 .05 
E6 -.17 -.05 -.21 -.26* -.23 -.06 -.08 -.11 
O1 .16 .17 .04 .09 .06 .05 .03 .13 
O2 .03 .06 .08 -.01 -.04 -.04 .05 .02 
O3 .20 .21 .13 .20 .22 .14 .25* .03 
O4 .01 .13 .01 -.04 -.23 .03 .06 .02 
O5 .02 -.06 .03 -.02 -.21 -.10 .01 -.05 
O6 .05 .11 .08 .09 .05 -.13 .12 .10 
A1 -.18 -.10 -.25* -.21 -.10 -.05 -.06 -.07 
A2 -.06 .03 -.01 -.08 -.08 -.09 -.01 -.02 
A3 .24* .34*** .20 .16 .12 .05 .16 .14 
A4 -.02 .01 .06 -.03 .03 .00 .00 -.02 
A5 .22 .25* .26* .24* .17 .03 .16 .11 
A6 .18 .22 .22 .20 .16 .06 .17 .14 
C1 -.20 -.11 -.20 -.19 -.28* -.19 -.18 -.15 
C2 -.09 -.09 -.07 -.10 -.01 -.04 -.05 -.10 
C3 -.07 -.04 -.02 -.11 -.05 -.08 -.19 -.06 
C4 -.10 -.08 -.07 -.17 -.17 -.02 .01 -.04 
C5 -.29* -.22 -.30** -.28* -.30* -.25* -.21 -.30** 








 10 11 14 15 17 18 19 
N .00 .06 .47*** .34*** .40*** .49*** .35*** 
E .17 .11 -.14 -.03 -.10 -.14 -.06 
O .14 .09 .10 .22 .09 .17 .12 
A .10 .13 .07 .11 .10 .09 .10 
C -.15 -.06 -.27* -.25* -.24* -.30** -.17 
N1 .03 .09 .45*** .31*** .37*** .45*** .38*** 
N2 .02 .05 .22 .15 .15 .18 .14 
N3 -.11 -.07 .34*** .27** .30** .41*** .25* 
N4 -.01 .03 .22 .15 .21 .25* .15 
N5 .11 .19 .31** .31*** .34*** .35*** .33*** 
N6 .00 .02 .37*** .19 .28* .36*** .21 
E1 .10 .02 -.16 -.11 -.15 -.22* -.13 
E2 .14 .14 -.13 -.05 -.13 -.09 -.04 
E3 .01 -.03 -.10 .01 -.07 -.02 -.01 
E4 .08 .07 -.04 .13 .07 .03 .04 
E5 .18 .20 .01 .06 .03 .02 .10 
E6 .17 .08 -.18 -.13 -.16 -.27* -.16 
O1 .10 .03 .11 .11 .08 .13 .11 
O2 .07 .01 .03 .12 .05 .06 -.02 
O3 .11 .15 .18 .23* .21 .22 .20 
O4 .20 .11 -.04 .05 -.11 -.03 .00 
O5 .02 .04 -.04 .09 -.02 .08 .00 
O6 -.06 -.05 .12 .18 .12 .15 .12 
A1 .07 .04 -.12 -.16 -.13 -.19 -.19 
A2 .04 .07 -.02 -.03 .03 -.05 -.02 
A3 .16 .24* .19 .24* .17 .20 .22 
A4 .00 .01 -.09 -.07 -.01 -.04 .00 
A5 .06 .00 .15 .14 .15 .19 .19 
A6 .03 .13 .16 .26* .16 .22 .15 
C1 -.03 .04 -.19 -.09 -.14 -.20 -.19 
C2 -.05 .02 -.11 -.10 -.10 -.19 -.05 
C3 -.10 -.09 -.05 -.12 -.06 -.06 .02 
C4 -.05 -.02 -.09 -.09 -.07 -.13 -.06 
C5 -.05 -.01 -.26* -.27* -.30** -.35*** -.25* 
C6 -.23 -.15 -.22 -.20 -.18 -.14 -.08 
Note. N = neuroticism; E = extraversion; O = openness; A = agreeableness; C = 
conscientiousness; N1 – C6 = the facets; 1–20 represent items in the DDI; 1 = I feel happy; 2 
= I feel sad; 3 = I feel irritable; 4 = I enjoy what I am doing; 5 = I don’t care about anything; 6 
= I have no appetite during the day; 7 = I worry about sleeping; 8 = I didn’t have enough 
sleep last night; 9 = I am rest less; 10 = I am tired; 11= It is not effortful to do things; 12 = I 
feel guilty; 13 = I am doing things at my normal pace; 14 = I feel worthless; 15 = I feel that I 
can’t get anything done; 16 = I feel that I can’t make decisions; 17 = I can’t concentrate; 18 
= I feel hopeless; 19 = How’s your day; 20 = How would you rate your overall physical health 
today. There were revisions of the DDI over the course of the three studies and items 1, 12, 






Only neuroticism but not extraversion and conscientiousness significantly 
predicted MD severity and H12 was partially supported (Table 5.4). The facets 
depression under neuroticism and cheerfulness under extraversion were both 
significantly linked to MD severity. H13 was supported. Two facets under 
neuroticism – N1 anxiety and N6 vulnerability – were significant predictors of MD 
severity, too. Neuroticism together with the facets anxiety, depression, vulnerability, 
and cheerfulness were significant predictors of the scores of several PHQ-9 items.  
 For the mean momentary MD ratings, only neuroticism and extraversion 
significantly predicted the mean momentary ratings of seven and two items in the 
DDI, respectively (Table 5.5). The following facets – N1 anxiety, N3 depression, N6 
vulnerability, and E6 cheerfulness - were significant predictors of the mean 
momentary ratings of some DDI items. The variabilities of a few MD symptoms 
were significantly predicted by extraversion and several facets (Table 5.6).  
 The results of Study 2 were not totally consistent with those in Study 1 
because H12 of MD severity were predicted by high neuroticism, low extraversion, 
and low conscientiousness was only partially supported in Study 2. The divergent 
and sometimes limited links between personality traits and facets and the items in 
the PHQ-9 and the DDI may indicate MD symptoms are heterogeneous. 















Table 5.4 Standardized betas of the Big Five personality traits and facets in 
regression models testing the relationships between personality traits and facets 
and the PHQ-9 items in Study 2 
 PHQ-9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
N .42** .36* .41** .38* .35* .16 .57*** .09 .07 .33 
E -.13 -.18 -.26 -.10 -.05 .05 -.27 .09 .01 -.20 
O .18 .06 .06 .16 .12 .29 .06 .17 .08 .09 
A .24 .21 .21 .17* .36 .10 .10 .13 .01 .22 
C -.03 .03 .10 -.11 -.04 -.04 -.21 -.09 .13 .08 
N1 .49*** .48*** .45*** .45*** .39** .16 .52*** .24 .19 .27 
N2 .20 .07 .12 .24 .19 .09 .39* .04 -.02 .14 
N3 .46*** .36* .49*** .37* .40** .16 .53*** .15 .16 .37* 
N4 .18 .12 .25 .11 .16 .02 .43*** -.09 -.09 .26 
N5 .01 .11 -.06 .06 -.04 .10 .07 -.07 -.16 .00 
N6 .47*** .40* .52*** .43* .37* .15 .45** .15 .27 .36 
E1 -.19 -.10 -.27 -.14 -.10 -.10 -.32 .02 .01 -.25 
E2 -.03 .03 -.01 -.09 .00 .01 -.10 .10 -.06 -.08 
E3 .06 -.04 .03 .03 .06 .14 -.04 .07 .16 -.04 
E4 .03 -.07 -.14 .14 .09 .19 -.06 .06 -.01 -.10 
E5 -.05 -.12 -.18 -.10 -.13 .17 -.12 .10 .06 -.05 
E6 -.35* -.42** -.49*** -.21 -.12 -.21 -.40** -.03 -.15 -.26 
O1 -.05 -.20 -.12 .01 -.04 .07 -.11 -.03 .03 .03 
O2 .22 .09 .07 .30 .12 .20 .10 .18 .14 .17 
O3 .12 .07 .08 .16 .07 .08 -.02 .13 .02 .18 
O4 -.02 -.05 -.11 -.16 .05 .29 -.16 .10 -.01 -.16 
O5 .20 .07 .23 .07 .04 .25 .19 .18 .11 .09 
O6 .19 .19 .11 .11 .10 .23 .20 .13 .02 .06 
A1 -.16 -.11 -.19 -.24 .00 -.14 -.16 -.06 -.09 .00 
A2 .12 .11 .21 .11 .22 .03 -.01 .01 .04 .05 
A3 .31 .21 .24 .33 .36* .25 .14 .23 -.01 .20 
A4 .31 .22 .30 .17 .39* .20 .14 .21 .13 .23 
A5 .33 .38* .24 .27 .41* .07 .21 .16 .10 .34 
A6 .19 .10 .22 .19 .27 .10 .13 .03 -.02 .17 
C1 -.19 -.15 -.10 -.22 -.19 -.03 -.13 .00 -.21 -.26 
C2 -.04 -.10 .02 .07 -.02 -.10 -.15 -.19 .07 .21 
C3 -.02 .02 .09 -.01 .06 .00 -.10 -.12 -.01 -.09 
C4 .12 .12 .17 .07 .10 .22 -.01 .05 -.01 .04 
C5 -.09 -.15 -.03 -.04 -.09 .05 -.26 -.12 .04 -.01 
C6 .00 .14 .11 -.18 -.03 -.08 -.16 -.01 .23 .11 
Note. PHQ-9 = PHQ-9 total score; 1–9 = items in the PHQ-9; N = neuroticism; E = 
extraversion; O = openness; A = agreeableness; C = conscientiousness; N1 – C6 = the 





Table 5.5 Standardized betas of the Big Five personality traits and facets in 
regression models testing the relationships between personality traits and facets 
and the mean momentary ratings of the DDI items in Study 2 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
N .35* .34* .16 .19 .03 .18 .36* .12 .38* 
E -.35* -.17 -.15 -.24 .01 -.04 -.09 -.04 -.04 
O .02 .01 .07 -.11 .26 .10 .05 .24 -.03 
A -.13 -.07 -.03 -.16 -.10 .02 .20 .04 .20 
C -.05 -.17 -.03 -.16 -.06 -.11 -.18 -.13 -.10 
N1 .50*** .44*** .43*** .30* .21 .17 .29 .31 .35* 
N2 .01 .16 -.14 .08 -.12 .04 .06 .04 .16 
N3 .34* .28 .08 .15 .01 .24 .47*** .11 .48*** 
N4 .13 .05 .07 .04 -.07 -.02 .21 -.08 .16 
N5 .19 .15 .15 .07 -.08 .12 .23 -.03 .20 
N6 .34 .39** .05 .19 .21 .22 .27 .17 .25 
E1 -.19 -.05 .02 -.10 .01 -.05 -.02 -.01 .09 
E2 -.21 -.01 -.08 .01 -.03 -.02 -.12 -.07 -.12 
E3 -.03 -.01 .07 -.22 .19 .04 -.06 .09 -.04 
E4 -.16 -.17 .04 -.25 .08 .13 .06 .04 .15 
E5 -.19 -.04 -.18 -.06 .07 -.04 -.05 .02 -.11 
E6 -.60*** -.42*** -.43*** -.33* -.30 -.20 -.13 -.23 -.09 
O1 -.15 -.09 -.05 -.09 -.06 -.03 -.05 .18 -.09 
O2 .04 .05 .01 .00 .26 .19 -.01 .14 -.05 
O3 .01 .05 .04 -.13 .02 -.11 .06 .20 .09 
O4 -.17 -.08 -.09 -.24 .21 .02 .07 .08 -.03 
O5 .11 .01 .05 -.09 .28 -.04 -.16 .05 -.28 
O6 .21 .10 .25 .13 .26 .15 .10 .27 .08 
A1 -.17 -.17 -.06 -.26 -.20 -.23 .07 -.10 .14 
A2 -.17 -.11 -.09 -.23 -.03 -.06 .20 .00 .12 
A3 -.10 .01 -.04 -.14 -.03 -.03 .13 .08 .17 
A4 -.22 -.18 -.11 -.18 .00 .10 .26 -.08 .18 
A5 -.02 .05 -.05 .08 -.07 .09 .28 -.01 .21 
A6 -.02 .01 .10 -.09 -.01 .06 -.05 .20 .06 
C1 -.14 -.16 -.04 -.26 .00 -.17 -.09 -.11 -.04 
C2 .00 -.02 -.09 -.02 -.10 .12 -.06 -.13 -.09 
C3 .09 .00 .12 -.07 .01 .04 .10 .05 .06 
C4 .01 -.06 .13 -.25 .15 .08 .12 -.03 .07 
C5 -.08 -.12 -.17 -.25 .07 .04 -.16 -.10 -.08 







 11 13 14 15 17 18 19 20 
N .36* -.05 .19 .45*** .45*** .24 .07 .25 
E -.32 .34 -.11 -.35* -.28 -.11 -.19 -.12 
O -.09 .23 .13 -.07 -.08 .19 .17 .12 
A -.04 .12 -.01 .02 .08 .01 -.17 -.01 
C -.03 .04 -.17 -.19 -.20 -.14 -.04 -.24 
N1 .35* -.02 .35* .44*** .41** .43*** .27 .22 
N2 .09 .17 .07 .20 .27 .06 -.22 .15 
N3 .32 -.11 .19 .45*** .44*** .21 .08 .32 
N4 .22 -.19 .06 .27 .25 .05 .10 .04 
N5 .21 .07 -.05 .18 .21 .02 .02 .09 
N6 .30 -.12 .23 .37* .33 .26 .03 .26 
E1 -.24 .24 -.09 -.15 -.14 -.04 -.09 -.09 
E2 -.25 .26 -.01 -.15 -.14 .03 -.17 .02 
E3 -.06 .13 .03 -.14 -.13 .06 .05 -.07 
E4 -.09 .19 -.04 -.21 -.17 -.03 .04 -.15 
E5 -.22 .26 -.04 -.20 -.14 -.07 -.19 .11 
E6 -.36* .26 -.29 -.53*** -.39* -.38** -.38** -.32 
O1 -.01 .28 -.03 -.07 .01 -.01 -.04 .06 
O2 .06 .20 .10 .01 .04 .18 .09 .18 
O3 -.09 .11 .09 .02 .01 .10 .04 -.05 
O4 -.21 .22 .01 -.27 -.26 -.01 .02 .16 
O5 -.18 .15 .15 -.07 -.21 .18 .15 .01 
O6 -.04 -.04 .17 .26 .21 .27 .28 .11 
A1 -.11 .02 -.13 -.17 -.11 -.20 -.16 -.26 
A2 -.14 -.07 -.12 .00 .04 -.07 -.09 -.07 
A3 -.07 .22 .02 .02 .08 .09 -.13 -.01 
A4 -.17 .09 -.01 -.13 -.16 -.03 -.09 -.11 
A5 .12 -.07 .08 .25 .27 .10 -.05 .32 
A6 .12 .21 .05 .04 .11 .14 -.05 -.01 
C1 -.26 .24 -.10 -.26 -.26 -.11 -.05 -.27 
C2 .15 -.16 -.20 -.22 -.16 -.14 -.11 -.15 
C3 .02 -.09 -.02 .02 -.05 -.02 .04 .11 
C4 -.05 .04 .00 -.07 -.15 .00 .00 .03 
C5 -.01 .10 -.13 -.34 -.32 -.17 -.04 -.14 
C6 -.04 .04 -.14 -.04 -.05 -.12 .00 -.24 
Note. N = neuroticism; E = extraversion; O = openness; A = agreeableness; C = conscientiousness; 
N1 – C6 = the facets; 1–20 represent items in the DDI; 1 = I feel happy; 2 = I feel sad; 3 = I feel 
irritable; 4 = I enjoy what I am doing; 5 = I don’t care about anything; 6 = I have no appetite during 
the day; 7 = I worry about sleeping; 8 = I didn’t have enough sleep last night; 9 = I am restless; 10 = I 
am tired; 11= It is not effortful to do things; 12 = I feel guilty; 13 = I am doing things at my normal 
pace; 14 = I feel worthless; 15 = I feel that I can’t get anything done; 16 = I feel that I can’t make 
decisions; 17 = I can’t concentrate; 18 = I feel hopeless; 19 = How’s your day; 20 = How would you 
rate your overall physical health today. There were revisions of the DDI over the course of the three 





Table 5.6 Standardized betas of the Big Five personality traits and facets in 
regression models testing the relationships between personality traits and facets 
and the variabilities of the DDI items in Study 2 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
N -.04 .06 -.09 -.05 -.14 -.15 .17 -.07 -.07 
E .07 .18 .13 .22 .13 .28 .28 .22 .35** 
O .21 .22 .14 .20 .32 .19 .21 .27 .05 
A .02 .00 .13 .14 -.01 -.05 .30 .19 .18 
C .05 -.05 .03 .06 -.08 -.19 .02 .04 .05 
N1 -.05 .03 -.11 .04 -.02 -.21 .04 -.05 -.13 
N2 -.05 .09 -.11 -.01 -.06 .17 .16 .04 .10 
N3 .08 .10 -.07 -.05 -.17 -.14 .20 -.01 -.01 
N4 -.14 -.13 .01 -.16 -.16 -.12 -.13 -.23 -.20 
N5 .00 .13 .05 .10 -.11 -.24 .43** -.04 .08 
N6 .00 .08 -.18 -.11 -.06 -.06 .04 .04 -.08 
E1 .04 .06 .09 .17 .02 .00 .19 .09 .30* 
E2 .06 .14 .12 .23 .12 .11 .37* .20 .36*** 
E3 .08 .05 .02 -.03 .03 .21 .01 .10 .10 
E4 -.01 .08 .05 .15 .05 .12 .19 .03 .14 
E5 .08 .33* .10 .24 .26 .29 .18 .34* .12 
E6 .03 .02 .13 .11 .02 .38** .14 .05 .29* 
O1 .12 .14 .16 .21 .16 .31* .18 .19 .03 
O2 .20 .25 .12 .25 .42** .28 .18 .19 .03 
O3 .12 .05 .01 -.05 .15 .00 -.02 .06 -.05 
O4 .18 .21 .14 .18 .20 .22 .27 .29 .19 
O5 .13 .15 .12 .08 .22 .06 .08 .17 .07 
O6 .01 .04 -.02 .10 .08 -.17 .02 .05 -.10 
A1 .11 .02 .20 .06 -.18 .07 .23 .00 .24 
A2 .07 -.03 .09 .09 .01 -.02 .16 .23 .10 
A3 .11 .14 .13 .18 .15 .03 .29 .21 .15 
A4 -.09 -.07 .07 .08 .06 -.16 .26 .04 .16 
A5 -.11 -.10 -.01 -.01 .01 -.04 .13 .12 .01 
A6 -.09 -.10 -.01 .06 .00 -.12 .10 .13 .05 
C1 .05 .10 .03 .01 -.04 .02 .04 -.01 .07 
C2 -.11 -.23 -.21 -.25 -.12 -.19 -.01 -.25 -.08 
C3 -.11 -.24 -.06 -.17 -.06 -.22 -.05 -.06 -.10 
C4 -.01 .09 .14 .00 .02 -.07 .06 .09 .05 
C5 .06 -.07 -.18 -.14 -.08 -.18 -.11 -.05 -.02 








 11 13 14 15 17 18 19 20 
N -.18 .15 .08 .04 .08 .03 -.22 .13 
E .33* .23 .11 .16 .27 .24 .19 .19 
O .07 .20 .20 .09 .10 .25 .37* .30 
A .08 .12 .08 .14 .13 .12 .24 .21 
C .00 .01 -.02 -.08 -.13 .02 .06 -.01 
N1 -.32 .10 -.08 -.16 -.08 -.03 -.07 .13 
N2 .05 .21 .18 .18 .26 .07 -.27 .14 
N3 -.13 .16 .17 .12 .11 .08 -.12 .15 
N4 -.15 -.08 -.03 -.03 -.02 -.10 -.22 -.01 
N5 -.01 .18 .00 .01 .03 .05 -.18 .02 
N6 -.18 .11 .12 .06 .07 .07 -.05 .15 
E1 .17 .14 -.10 .06 .11 .03 .15 .03 
E2 .32* .15 .21 .18 .27 .26 .09 .26 
E3 .03 .14 .11 -.03 .08 .17 .09 .08 
E4 .07 .13 -.08 .02 .10 .12 .11 .07 
E5 .26 .16 .25 .14 .17 .33 .11 .20 
E6 .40** .15 -.01 .23 .29 .01 .22 .08 
O1 .19 .25 .12 .23 .20 .17 .15 .35* 
O2 .13 .28 .19 .15 .22 .27 .26 .23 
O3 -.02 .10 -.11 -.06 -.03 -.05 .34* .09 
O4 .19 .13 .23 .08 .11 .18 .27 .13 
O5 .04 .13 .30 .01 .06 .25 .07 .06 
O6 -.19 -.05 .00 -.01 -.11 .13 .16 .16 
A1 .09 .01 -.04 .01 .04 -.05 .11 .00 
A2 .08 .13 .09 .21 .17 .12 .32 .20 
A3 .13 .24 .10 .20 .27 .24 .27 .15 
A4 .08 .11 .04 .10 .07 -.02 .18 .14 
A5 .02 .05 .13 .13 .07 .09 .11 .27 
A6 -.08 -.02 -.04 -.01 -.01 .11 .09 .17 
C1 .10 .10 .03 -.02 .06 .04 .04 -.04 
C2 -.16 -.17 -.27 -.24 -.31 -.30 -.12 -.06 
C3 -.28 -.14 -.12 -.16 -.28 -.18 .02 .01 
C4 -.06 .05 .03 -.03 -.01 .07 .06 .09 
C5 -.05 .05 .06 -.21 -.17 -.12 -.13 -.20 
C6 .17 .11 .10 .10 .06 .20 .15 .05 
Note. N = neuroticism; E = extraversion; O = openness; A = agreeableness; C = conscientiousness; 
N1 – C6 = the facets; 1–20 represent items in the DDI; 1 = I feel happy; 2 = I feel sad; 3 = I feel 
irritable; 4 = I enjoy what I am doing; 5 = I don’t care about anything; 6 = I have no appetite during 
the day; 7 = I worry about sleeping; 8 = I didn’t have enough sleep last night; 9 = I am restless; 10 = I 
am tired; 11= It is not effortful to do things; 12 = I feel guilty; 13 = I am doing things at my normal 
pace; 14 = I feel worthless; 15 = I feel that I can’t get anything done; 16 = I feel that I can’t make 
decisions; 17 = I can’t concentrate; 18 = I feel hopeless; 19 = How’s your day; 20 = How would you 
rate your overall physical health today. There were revisions of the DDI over the course of the three 






H12 and H13 were supported. MD severity was positively predicted by 
neuroticism and negative predicted by extraversion and conscientiousness (Table 
5.7). The facets depression under neuroticism and cheerfulness under extraversion 
significantly predicted MD severity, too. There were other facets that significantly 
predicted MD severity including N1 anxiety, N5 immoderation, N6 vulnerability, E1 
friendliness, C1 self-efficacy, C2 orderliness, C4 achievement-striving, C5 self-
discipline, and C6 cautiousness. A facet under agreeableness - A1 trust - significantly 
predicted MD severity. Several facets significantly predicted some PHQ-9 items. 
Among these facets, N1 anxiety, N3 depression, N5 immoderation, N6 vulnerability, 
E6 cheerfulness, C1 self-efficacy, C2 orderliness, C4 achievement-striving, and C5 
self-discipline were significant predictors of more than five PHQ-9 items. 
The mean momentary ratings of some items in the DDI were significantly 
predicted by high neuroticism, low extraversion, and low conscientiousness (Table 
5.8). All facets under neuroticism, extraversion, and conscientiousness significantly 
predicted the momentary ratings of some DDI items except N4 self-consciousness 
and E5 excitement-seeking. There were several facets under openness and 
agreeableness significantly predicted the momentary ratings of some DDI items. 
The variability of a few DDI items were significantly predicted by personality traits 
and facets (Table 5.9). 
High neuroticism was the only consistent personality trait that significantly 
predicted MD severity in the three studies. The results in Studies 1 and 3 suggested 
low extraversion and low conscientiousness significantly predicted MD severity but 
this was not supported by the results in Study 2. Consistent with Studies 1 and 2, 
significant associations were only observed between personality traits and facets 
and some items in the PHQ-9 and the DDI, thus supporting heterogeneity in MD 
symptoms.  
To further test the robustness of the results, replicability of the results and 





Table 5.7 Standardized betas of the Big Five personality traits and facets in 
regression models testing the relationships between personality traits and facets 
and the PHQ-9 items in Study 3 
 PHQ-9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
N .58*** .58*** .50*** .33* .55*** .39*** .51*** .34* .30 .37** 
E -.38*** -.45*** -.31* -.24 -.27 -.20 -.44*** -.28* -.13 -.16 
O -.01 -.11 .04 .04 -.05 -.03 -.03 .00 .01 .08 
A -.24 -.25 -.18 -.15 -.28 -.23 -.09 -.14 -.18 -.13 
C -.50*** -.40*** -.45*** -.25 -.41*** -.31* -.43*** -.47*** -.29* -.41*** 
N1 .46*** .37** .38** .28 .43*** .32* .43*** .28* .23 .35* 
N2 .11 .27 .18 .00 .20 .00 .08 -.01 .03 -.01 
N3 .65*** .55*** .60*** .41*** .55*** .38*** .64*** .40*** .36** .50*** 
N4 .16 .28 .08 .10 .14 .14 .17 .11 .03 -.01 
N5 .44*** .37** .34* .31* .46*** .44*** .28 .24 .25 .23 
N6 .55*** .56*** .50*** .26 .47*** .33* .47*** .37** .32* .46*** 
E1 -.34* -.38*** -.21 -.17 -.28 -.26 -.30* -.30* -.17 -.16 
E2 -.19 -.30* -.16 -.05 -.09 -.13 -.24 -.19 -.05 -.08 
E3 -.17 -.21 -.17 -.17 -.09 -.09 -.24 -.16 .00 .02 
E4 -.24 -.26 -.18 -.13 -.17 -.12 -.35** -.12 -.13 -.16 
E5 -.06 -.17 -.06 -.08 -.04 .02 -.17 -.01 .09 .11 
E6 -.55*** -.55*** -.50*** -.41*** -.45*** -.24 -.51*** -.36** -.25 -.39*** 
O1 .04 .09 .05 .05 .02 -.01 -.03 .03 -.04 .09 
O2 -.06 -.16 .00 -.07 -.14 .01 .03 -.06 -.08 .04 
O3 .08 -.02 .09 .12 .09 .06 -.06 .08 .15 .04 
O4 -.07 -.17 -.09 .04 -.09 -.06 -.09 -.01 .06 -.01 
O5 -.18 -.13 -.14 -.11 -.20 -.13 -.16 -.17 -.16 .00 
O6 .15 -.02 .26 .08 .10 .00 .21 .13 .11 .14 
A1 -.39*** -.36* -.25 -.29 -.38** -.26 -.29 -.29 -.28 -.26 
A2 -.27 -.22 -.25 -.22 -.27 -.12 -.20 -.17 -.19 -.24 
A3 -.22 -.25 -.20 -.04 -.20 -.15 -.18 -.19 -.10 -.16 
A4 .00 .01 .06 -.06 -.08 -.05 .10 .05 -.04 .03 
A5 .20 .18 .20 .11 .15 -.01 .32* .12 .08 .22 
A6 -.24 -.32* -.27 -.08 -.30* -.31* -.07 -.04 -.16 -.09 
C1 -.37** -.31* -.34* -.18 -.21 -.02 -.37** -.39*** -.33* -.41*** 
C2 -.44*** -.29 -.34* -.39*** -.44*** -.37*** -.36** -.38*** -.06 -.18 
C3 -.16 -.14 -.13 -.02 -.18 -.15 -.13 -.18 -.03 -.13 
C4 -.36*** -.34* -.30* -.09 -.24 -.22 -.34* -.35** -.30* -.36** 
C5 -.42*** -.38** -.41*** -.16 -.27 -.24 -.43*** -.42*** -.25 -.29* 
C6 -.31* -.22 -.30* -.13 -.29 -.20 -.19 -.23 -.23 -.34* 
Note. PHQ-9 = PHQ-9 total score; 1–9 = items in the PHQ-9; N = neuroticism; E = 
extraversion; O = openness; A = agreeableness; C = conscientiousness; N1 – C6 = the 





Table 5.8 Standardized betas of the Big Five personality traits and facets in 
regression models testing the relationships between personality traits and facets 
and the mean momentary ratings of the DDI items in Study 3 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
N .46*** .43*** .31 .50*** .38** .17 -.11 .19 .33* 
E -.36** -.29* -.21 -.28 -.45*** -.12 .07 -.06 -.20 
O .07 .12 -.08 -.05 -.08 -.01 -.18 .07 -.08 
A -.17 -.23 -.27 -.21 -.35** -.22 .00 -.04 -.20 
C -.48*** -.44*** -.33* -.45*** -.46*** -.18 .05 -.24 -.25 
N1 .30* .33* .18 .35* .12 .03 -.01 .07 .28 
N2 .22 .09 .35* .28 .15 .21 .06 -.01 .20 
N3 .56*** .58*** .26 .54*** .40*** .29* -.13 .24 .36** 
N4 .18 .12 .12 .17 .27 -.03 .00 .07 .10 
N5 .20 .23 .09 .25 .25 .12 -.25 .23 .12 
N6 .43*** .39** .28 .46*** .37** .08 -.10 .16 .31* 
E1 -.35* -.34** -.28 -.30* -.44*** -.13 .01 -.03 -.28 
E2 -.27 -.24 -.22 -.16 -.33* -.07 -.14 .05 -.15 
E3 -.13 -.10 -.11 -.16 -.29* .09 .17 -.19 -.03 
E4 -.20 -.11 .01 -.05 -.31* -.05 .05 -.08 -.02 
E5 .09 .16 .09 .12 .01 .04 .00 .16 .00 
E6 -.60*** -.53*** -.32* -.55*** -.44*** -.37** .19 -.14 -.32* 
O1 .12 .17 .05 .00 .16 -.07 -.15 .15 .00 
O2 .01 .03 -.16 -.09 -.20 -.07 -.05 -.01 -.11 
O3 -.04 -.01 .06 -.03 -.13 -.05 -.06 .08 -.08 
O4 -.02 .02 -.19 -.07 -.14 -.01 -.16 -.05 -.07 
O5 -.05 -.07 -.17 -.15 -.07 .07 -.04 -.16 -.14 
O6 .24 .31* .12 .18 .12 .14 -.21 .22 .11 
A1 -.28 -.33* -.27 -.37* -.37** -.22 -.05 -.04 -.40** 
A2 -.15 -.23 -.15 -.18 -.32* -.17 .12 -.11 -.11 
A3 -.18 -.22 -.17 -.17 -.34* -.16 .05 -.08 -.10 
A4 .03 -.03 -.16 -.01 -.10 -.15 -.02 .13 -.07 
A5 .13 .08 -.13 .15 .10 -.02 -.07 .11 .04 
A6 -.19 -.17 -.20 -.20 -.34** -.14 -.02 -.16 -.13 
C1 -.35* -.29* -.04 -.35* -.32* -.14 .13 -.24 -.02 
C2 -.32* -.27 -.39*** -.31* -.41*** -.13 .03 -.11 -.30* 
C3 -.29 -.27 -.27 -.16 -.32* -.08 .12 -.03 -.05 
C4 -.32* -.29* -.20 -.31* -.41*** -.13 -.06 -.14 -.10 
C5 -.35* -.28 -.19 -.32* -.37** -.09 .06 -.09 -.15 







 10 12 13 14 16 17 18 19 20 
N .31* .50*** .28 .52*** .56*** .55*** .54*** .49*** .30* 
E -.23 -.49*** -.29 -.41*** -.45*** -.43*** -.40*** -.38*** -.10 
O .02 -.15 .00 -.05 -.13 -.14 -.07 -.02 .09 
A -.08 -.14 -.11 -.21 -.20 -.30* -.21 -.19 -.09 
C -.20 -.37** -.14 -.48*** -.54*** -.60*** -.49*** -.42*** -.35** 
N1 .22 .26 .19 .29 .31* .34* .35** .30* .22 
N2 .18 .18 .18 .15 .20 .24 .16 .27 .11 
N3 .38** .56*** .28 .67*** .63*** .59*** .67*** .53*** .33* 
N4 .18 .27 .23 .18 .24 .24 .16 .24 .05 
N5 .12 .31* .05 .30* .40*** .34* .35* .26 .25 
N6 .17 .43*** .23 .50*** .50*** .51*** .51*** .39** .27 
E1 -.27 -.46*** -.18 -.42*** -.41*** -.45*** -.40*** -.35** .00 
E2 -.11 -.30* -.29 -.25 -.30* -.32* -.26 -.20 .00 
E3 -.19 -.29* -.05 -.28 -.31* -.27 -.20 -.19 .06 
E4 .01 -.25 -.15 -.17 -.18 -.15 -.16 -.19 -.25 
E5 .01 -.16 -.22 .03 -.04 .04 .00 -.03 .05 
E6 -.37** -.56*** -.31* -.58*** -.57*** -.57*** -.59*** -.60*** -.29* 
O1 .19 -.01 -.03 .04 -.02 .05 -.03 .05 -.05 
O2 -.03 -.11 -.01 -.06 -.07 -.08 -.06 -.04 .02 
O3 -.01 -.17 .05 -.12 -.04 -.05 -.09 -.09 .15 
O4 -.15 -.13 -.08 -.08 -.16 -.17 -.09 -.01 .17 
O5 -.11 -.28 -.07 -.19 -.32* -.36** -.20 -.11 -.06 
O6 .20 .15 .14 .23 .11 .09 .22 .15 .10 
A1 -.19 -.25 -.01 -.32* -.34* -.39** -.36* -.25 -.12 
A2 -.03 -.12 -.03 -.20 -.18 -.30* -.19 -.14 -.15 
A3 -.15 -.29* -.11 -.32* -.30* -.33* -.27 -.21 .05 
A4 .04 .12 .05 .05 .05 -.04 .04 -.02 -.01 
A5 .16 .23 -.17 .25 .28 .18 .25 .11 .04 
A6 -.13 -.24 -.18 -.27 -.27 -.30* -.27 -.24 -.13 
C1 -.17 -.29* -.08 -.42*** -.52*** -.52*** -.40*** -.33* -.27 
C2 -.11 -.37** -.09 -.34* -.31* -.39*** -.37** -.29 -.17 
C3 -.04 -.15 .11 -.15 -.15 -.26 -.16 -.25 -.12 
C4 -.13 -.22 -.21 -.37** -.44*** -.49*** -.35** -.27 -.19 
C5 -.14 -.41*** -.22 -.36** -.52*** -.54*** -.40*** -.36** -.36** 
C6 -.20 -.10 -.03 -.33* -.28 -.30* -.32* -.27 -.32* 
Note. N = neuroticism; E = extraversion; O = openness; A = agreeableness; C = conscientiousness; 
N1 – C6 = the facets; 1–20 represent items in the DDI; 1 = I feel happy; 2 = I feel sad; 3 = I feel 
irritable; 4 = I enjoy what I am doing; 5 = I don’t care about anything; 6 = I have no appetite during 
the day; 7 = I worry about sleeping; 8 = I didn’t have enough sleep last night; 9 = I am restless; 10 = I 
am tired; 11= It is not effortful to do things; 12 = I feel guilty; 13 = I am doing things at my normal 
pace; 14 = I feel worthless; 15 = I feel that I can’t get anything done; 16 = I feel that I can’t make 
decisions; 17 = I can’t concentrate; 18 = I feel hopeless; 19 = How’s your day; 20 = How would you 
rate your overall physical health today. There were revisions of the DDI over the course of the three 





Table 5.9 Standardized betas of the Big Five personality traits and facets in 
regression models testing the relationships between personality traits and facets 
and the variabilities of the DDI items in Study 3 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
N .10 .07 .27 .20 .25 -.02 -.09 .05 .12 .00 
E .03 .07 -.02 .06 -.09 .16 .05 .06 .01 .09 
O .08 .19 -.02 .06 .11 .09 .35** .08 .12 .09 
A .18 .12 .04 .09 -.14 .03 .11 .09 .01 .08 
C -.01 .01 -.09* -.02* -.25 .01 .10 .05 .01 .09 
N1 .29 .21 .31 .27 .18 .09 -.08 .08 .21 .13 
N2 .00 .06 .18 .12 .08 -.11 -.04 -.02 .04 -.07 
N3 .05 .09 .11 .04 .18 .03 -.04 -.07 -.01 -.12 
N4 .00 -.01 .17 .06 .13 -.11 -.04 .06 .04 .00 
N5 .03 -.11 .17 .21 .16 .07 -.10 .18 .14 -.01 
N6 .05 .03 .18 .12 .30* -.07 -.08 -.03 .09 .05 
E1 .06 -.03 -.07 .04 -.18 .13 .08 .11 -.07 .09 
E2 -.01 -.08 -.08 .00 -.16 .05 .09 .13 -.02 .03 
E3 .19 .31* .12 .10 .14 .31* .03 .01 .15 .14 
E4 -.02 .08 .05 .15 -.14 .12 .01 -.13 .01 -.06 
E5 -.08 .12 .01 -.07 .18 .07 .07 -.11 .03 .11 
E6 -.02 -.09 -.08 .01 -.17 -.02 -.11 .21 -.06 .06 
O1 .14 .19 .08 .06 .24 -.05 .26 .16 .25 .22 
O2 .20 .25 .01 .14 .09 .16 .19 .16 .14 .17 
O3 -.10 -.05 -.07 -.02 -.13 .06 .06 .10 -.20 -.09 
O4 -.07 .01 -.10 -.04 -.04 .05 .18 -.05 .06 .03 
O5 .13 .20 .04 .08 .22 .18 .30* .01 .19 .12 
O6 -.02 .08 -.03 -.02 .04 -.06 .30* -.12 -.02 -.15 
A1 .19 .00 .09 .06 -.11 -.08 .25 .06 .02 .23 
A2 .15 .16 .06 .04 -.25 .06 -.05 .16 -.03 .11 
A3 .17 .19 .03 .12 -.10 .09 .11 .11 .01 -.02 
A4 .13 .08 .05 .09 .01 .00 .04 .02 .02 -.01 
A5 .03 .03 -.04 .01 .07 -.05 -.04 -.06 -.07 -.08 
A6 .04 .05 -.04 .06 -.16 .11 .11 .08 .08 .03 
C1 .04 .04 .02 .02 -.12 .00 .07 .12 .15 .10 
C2 .05 .08 -.04 -.02 -.14 .06 .10 .08 .04 .21 
C3 .02 -.03 .14 .17 -.17 .02 -.12 -.08 .11 .13 
C4 -.06 .04 -.19 -.09 -.28* -.01 .15 .02 -.10 -.03 
C5 -.05 .09 -.12 -.04 -.16 -.03 .12 .01 -.05 .08 







  12 13 14 16 17 18 19 20 
N .15 .05 .11 .20 .12 .00 .01 -.07 
E .06 .04 .07 -.01 .00 .18 .11 .09 
O .12 .01 .19 .19 .05 .22 .03 -.01 
A .01 .01 .02 .14 -.03 .11 .02 -.01 
C .10 .03 .01 -.10 .03 .07 .11 .25 
N1 .19 .14 .16 .13 .16 .15 .18 -.05 
N2 .08 -.09 -.01 .04 .06 -.06 .01 .08 
N3 .08 .10 .15 .17 -.02 -.01 -.05 -.21 
N4 -.03 -.04 -.07 .11 .19 -.15 -.06 -.03 
N5 .22 .00 .13 .21 .02 .08 .02 -.01 
N6 .07 .08 .10 .18 .10 -.01 -.05 -.04 
E1 .06 .04 .08 -.05 -.17 .14 .09 .11 
E2 .06 -.06 -.05 -.05 -.12 .06 .02 .18 
E3 .24 .18 .20 .03 .17 .27* .26 .13 
E4 .01 .06 .09 .10 .12 .16 .07 -.02 
E5 -.07 .00 .06 .10 .09 .11 -.04 -.16 
E6 -.11 -.06 -.11 -.14 -.05 .00 .03 .07 
O1 .11 -.08 .12 .13 .20 .10 .00 -.06 
O2 .14 .09 .22 .20 .10 .23 .13 -.08 
O3 -.06 -.05 -.09 .00 -.12 -.04 -.11 .03 
O4 .07 .01 .08 .07 -.10 .05 -.05 -.03 
O5 .13 .04 .21 .17 .11 .29* .19 .10 
O6 .04 .05 .17 .13 .00 .21 -.02 .03 
A1 .04 .01 -.08 .08 -.03 .11 -.04 .16 
A2 -.02 -.01 -.04 .03 .05 .02 .10 -.08 
A3 .08 -.02 .05 .06 -.08 .17 .08 .05 
A4 .07 .09 .15 .15 .00 .17 .01 -.01 
A5 -.08 -.12 .06 .16 -.09 -.10 -.11 -.15 
A6 -.04* .09 -.04 .08 .03 .09 .03 -.01 
C1 .29 -.08 .03 -.14 .14 .21 .21 .25 
C2 -.07 .19 -.01 .07 .09 -.02 .11 .17 
C3 .02 .10 .11 .06 .04 .03 .10 .11 
C4 .18 -.09 .06 -.09 -.06 .08 .07 .19 
C5 .10 -.04 .07 -.13 .01 .13 .11 .13 
C6 -.05 .00 -.14 -.17 -.07 -.09 -.11 .20 
Note. N = neuroticism; E = extraversion; O = openness; A = agreeableness; C = conscientiousness; 
N1 – C6 = the facets; 1–20 represent items in the DDI; 1 = I feel happy; 2 = I feel sad; 3 = I feel 
irritable; 4 = I enjoy what I am doing; 5 = I don’t care about anything; 6 = I have no appetite during 
the day; 7 = I worry about sleeping; 8 = I didn’t have enough sleep last night; 9 = I am restless; 10 = I 
am tired; 11= It is not effortful to do things; 12 = I feel guilty; 13 = I am doing things at my normal 
pace; 14 = I feel worthless; 15 = I feel that I can’t get anything done; 16 = I feel that I can’t make 
decisions; 17 = I can’t concentrate; 18 = I feel hopeless; 19 = How’s your day; 20 = How would you 
rate your overall physical health today. There were revisions of the DDI over the course of the three 





Replicability across Studies 1, 2 and 3 
 Replicability was tested by correlating standardized betas extracted from 
regression models in the three studies. The association between extraversion and 
PHQ-9 score replicated nicely across the three studies as seen in the correlations 
ranged from medium to high. The correlation coefficients of the mean momentary 
DDI ratings and three personality traits – extraversion, agreeableness, and 
conscientiousness were medium to high so these associations replicated across the 
three studies, too (Table 5.10). The correlations between neuroticism and the PHQ-
9 score, the mean momentary ratings, and the variability of momentary ratings 
were all positive but some correlations were small while others were large. 
Therefore, they might not reproduce well. The other comparisons were rather 
















Table 5.10 Spearman’s rhos of the standardized betas of personality traits and PHQ-
9 score, mean momentary ratings, and standard deviations of momentary ratings 
from regression models in Studies 1, 2, and 3 
  r 
  
Study 1 vs.   
Study 2 
Study 1 vs.   
Study 3 
Study 2 vs.   
Study 3 
PHQ-9 score  N .74 .18 .53 
E .93 .58 .43 
O .24 .39 .07 
 A .53 -.53 -.29 
 C .20 .42 .11 
Mean momentary 
DDI ratings 
N .26 .78 .24 
E .31 .54 .53 
O .12 -.24 -.10 
A .49 .26 .55 
C .73 .52 .34 
SD of momentary 
DDI ratings 
N .23 .15 .17 
E .70 -.37 -.14 
O -.10 -.24 -.16 
A .10 .27 -.37 
C .05 .56 -.08 
Note. r = Spearman’s rho; p = p-value; N = neuroticism; E = extraversion; O = 
openness; A = agreeableness; C = conscientiousness. 
 
Meta-analysis 
The results from the three studies either partially (Study 2) or fully (Studies 1 
and 3) supported the hypotheses (H12 and H13). Meta-analysis of the three studies 
was conducted to test the existence of common effects across the three studies. 
Sample size of each study and standardized betas and standard errors of the 
personality traits and facets from the regression models were used in the meta-
analysis.  
Meta-analysis found that in all or most of the items in the PHQ-9, high 
neuroticism, low extraversion, and low conscientiousness influenced MD severity as 
indicated by increasing PHQ-9 scores. The effects were asymmetrical across items 
with ranges of .32–.58, -.15–-.41, and -.19–-.37, for neuroticism, extraversion, and 
conscientiousness, respectively. The spreading out of the betas in neuroticism (.26) 





For neuroticism and conscientiousness, the p-values of all PHQ-9 items were 
smaller than .01. As for extraversion, two items had a p-value greater than .05. 
These may indicate some level of MD symptom homogeneity because all or most of 
the PHQ-9 items had a significant alpha level. Openness and agreeableness had 
inconsistent and small effects on the PHQ-9 items because the betas were very 
close to zero and there were negative and positive values. Tables 5.11–5.15 show 
the meta-analysis results across the three studies for the PHQ-9 items and 
neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness, 
respectively. 
 
Table 5.11 Meta-analysis of neuroticism and the PHQ-9 items across the three 
studies (N = 277) 
PHQ-9 item β SE z p 
Little interest or pleasure in doing things .52 .06 9.22 < .001 
Feeling down, depressed, or hopeless .53 .06 9.54 <.001 
Trouble falling or staying asleep, or sleeping too 
much 
.46 .06 8.13 < .001 
Feeling tired or having little energy .50 .06 9.07 < .001 
Poor appetite or overeating .35 .06 5.97 < .001 
Feeling bad about yourself .58 .05 10.68 < .001 
Trouble concentrating on things .40 .06 6.91 < .001 
Psychomotor changes .32 .06 5.26 < .001 
Suicidal ideation .40 .06 6.49 < .001 






Table 5.12 Meta-analysis of extraversion and the PHQ-9 items across the three 
studies (N = 277) 
PHQ-9 item β SE z p 
Little interest or pleasure in doing things -.37 .06 -6.65 < .001 
Feeling down, depressed, or hopeless -.36 .06 -6.31 < .001 
Trouble falling or staying asleep, or sleeping too 
much 
-.22 .06 -3.55 < .001 
Feeling tired or having little energy -.20 .06 -3.34 .008 
Poor appetite or overeating -.15 .06 -2.48 .064 
Feeling bad about yourself -.41 .06 -7.37 < .001 
Trouble concentrating on things -.19 .06 -3.11 .014 
Psychomotor changes -.15 .06 -2.37 .081 
Suicidal ideation -.29 .06 -4.72 < .001 
Note. β = standardized beta; SE = standard error; z = z score; p = p-value. 
 
Table 5.13 Meta-analysis of openness and the PHQ-9 items across the three studies 
(N = 277) 
PHQ-9 item β SE z p 
Little interest or pleasure in doing things -.03 .06 -.53 .796 
Feeling down, depressed, or hopeless .03 .06 .55 .785 
Trouble falling or staying asleep, or sleeping too much .04 .07 .62 .754 
Feeling tired or having little energy .02 .06 .33 .879 
Poor appetite or overeating .05 .06 .75 .693 
Feeling bad about yourself -.04 .07 -.55 .785 
Trouble concentrating on things .10 .06 1.54 .317 
Psychomotor changes .06 .07 .98 .579 
Suicidal ideation .07 .07 1.10 .515 















Table 5.14 Meta-analysis of agreeableness and the PHQ-9 items across the three 
studies (N = 277) 
PHQ-9 item β SE z p 
Little interest or pleasure in doing things -.02 .06 -.35 .871 
Feeling down, depressed, or hopeless .00 .06 .00 1.000 
Trouble falling or staying asleep, or sleeping too much -.02 .06 -.37 .863 
Feeling tired or having little energy .06 .06 1.08 .529 
Poor appetite or overeating -.06 .06 -.94 .596 
Feeling bad about yourself -.01 .06 -.17 .948 
Trouble concentrating on things -.01 .06 -.09 .973 
Psychomotor changes -.07 .06 -1.18 .475 
Suicidal ideation -.01 .06 -.20 .932 
Note. β = standardized beta; SE = standard error; z = z score; p = p-value. 
 
Table 5.15 Meta-analysis of conscientiousness and the PHQ-9 items across the three 
studies (N = 277) 
PHQ-9 item β SE z p 
Little interest or pleasure in doing things -.28 .06 -4.63 < .001 
Feeling down, depressed, or hopeless -.26 .06 -4.45 < .001 
Trouble falling or staying asleep, or sleeping too much -.22 .06 -3.35 .008 
Feeling tired or having little energy -.25 .06 -4.12 < .001 
Poor appetite or overeating -.19 .06 -3.23 .008 
Feeling bad about yourself -.37 .06 -6.16 < .001 
Trouble concentrating on things -.35 .06 -5.90 < .001 
Psychomotor changes -.21 .06 -3.42 .008 
Suicidal ideation -.23 .06 -3.66 < .001 
Note. β = standardized beta; SE = standard error; z = z score; p = p-value. 
 
 Similar results were observed in the mean momentary ratings of the DDI 
items – high neuroticism, low extraversion, and low conscientiousness predicted 
higher mean momentary ratings. The ranges of the standardized betas for 
neuroticism, extraversion, and conscientiousness and the mean momentary ratings 
of the DDI items were .14–.56, -.03–-.49, and -.06–-.54, respectively. These revealed 
a considerable amount of between-item variances. While the mean momentary 
ratings of nearly all DDI items were significantly predicted by neuroticism, 
extraversion, and conscientiousness may imply MD symptom homogeneity. The 
ranges of the betas showed the differences between MD symptoms and may 





smaller than .05. Doing things with one’s normal pace was the only item with an 
insignificant alpha in neuroticism. This item was neither significant in extraversion 
nor conscientiousness. Similar to the meta-analysis results of the PHQ-9 items as 
described previously, openness and agreeableness had asymmetrical effects on the 
mean ratings of the DDI items and almost all p-values were insignificant except one 
DDI item in agreeableness. The meta-analysis results of the mean momentary 
ratings of each DDI item and the Big Five personality traits were listed in Tables 
5.16–5.20.   
 
Table 5.16 Meta-analysis of neuroticism and the mean momentary ratings of the 
DDI items across the three studies (N = 277) 





DDI item β SE z p 
I feel happy. .46 .11 4.18 < .001 
I feel sad. .46 .06 8.23 < .001 
I feel irritable. .42 .06 7.45 < .001 
I enjoy what I am doing. .46 .06 8.23 < .001 
I don’t care about anything. .33 .06 5.68 < .001 
I have no appetite during the day. .22 .06 3.55 < .001 
I worry about sleeping. .28 .06 4.71 < .001 
I didn’t have enough sleep last night. .36 .06 6.13 < .001 
I am restless. .34 .06 5.52 < .001 
I am tired. .43 .06 7.50 < .001 
It is not effortful to do things. .28 .07 3.93 < .001 
I feel guilty. .50 .10 5.00 < .001 
I am doing things at my normal pace. .14 .09 1.54 .319 
I feel worthless. .51 .05 10.08 < .001 
I feel that I can’t get anything done. .56 .06 9.43 < .001 
I feel that I can’t make decisions. .56 .10 5.60 < .001 
I can’t concentrate. .55 .05 10.81 < .001 
I feel hopeless. .53 .05 10.31 < .001 
How’s your day? .41 .06 7.40 < .001 
How would you rate your overall physical health 
today? 





Table 5.17 Meta-analysis of extraversion and the mean momentary ratings of the 
DDI items across the three studies (N = 277) 














DDI item β SE z p 
I feel happy. -.36 .11 -3.27 .008 
I feel sad. -.40 .06 -7.20 < .001 
I feel irritable. -.32 .06 -5.76 < .001 
I enjoy what I am doing. -.33 .06 -5.83 < .001 
I don’t care about anything. -.38 .05 -7.09 < .001 
I have no appetite during the day. -.12 .06 -1.94 .181 
I worry about sleeping. -.16 .06 -2.49 .064 
I didn’t have enough sleep last night. -.14 .06 -2.15 .123 
I am restless. -.18 .06 -2.90 .025 
I am tired. -.22 .06 -3.82 < .001 
It is not effortful to do things. -.16 .07 -2.42 .074 
I feel guilty. -.49 .09 -5.44 < .001 
I am doing things at my normal pace. -.03 .08 -.32 .883 
I feel worthless. -.38 .05 -6.96 < .001 
I feel that I can’t get anything done. -.36 .07 -5.36 < .001 
I feel that I can’t make decisions. -.45 .10 -4.50 < .001 
I can’t concentrate. -.34 .06 -6.06 < .001 
I feel hopeless. -.38 .06 -6.80 < .001 
How’s your day? -.37 .06 -6.65 < .001 
How would you rate your overall physical health 
today? 






Table 5.18 Meta-analysis of openness and the mean momentary ratings of the DDI 
items across the three studies (N = 277) 













DDI item β SE z p 
I feel happy. .00 .11 .00 1.000 
I feel sad. .04 .06 .59 .770 
I feel irritable. -.01 .06 -.10 .971 
I enjoy what I am doing. .02 .06 .40 .850 
I don’t care about anything. -.10 .06 -1.70 .258 
I have no appetite during the day. .12 .06 1.87 .202 
I worry about sleeping. .01 .06 .15 .955 
I didn’t have enough sleep last night. .07 .06 1.17 .477 
I am restless. .14 .06 2.26 .102 
I am tired. .02 .06 .25 .911 
It is not effortful to do things. -.06 .07 -.82 .658 
I feel guilty. .00 .11 .00 1.000 
I am doing things at my normal pace. .00 .09 .00 1.000 
I feel worthless. .04 .06 .66 .734 
I feel that I can’t get anything done. -.05 .07 -.64 .745 
I feel that I can’t make decisions. .00 .11 .00 1.000 
I can’t concentrate. -.03 .06 -.46 .824 
I feel hopeless. .07 .06 1.17 .480 
How’s your day? .08 .06 1.27 .433 
How would you rate your overall physical health 
today? 





Table 5.19 Meta-analysis of agreeableness and the mean momentary ratings of the 
DDI items across the three studies (N = 277) 













DDI item β SE z p 
I feel happy. -.17 .11 -1.55 .316 
I feel sad. -.16 .06 -2.55 .056 
I feel irritable. -.11 .06 -1.87 .199 
I enjoy what I am doing. -.11 .06 -1.84 .210 
I don’t care about anything. -.21 .06 -3.67 < .001 
I have no appetite during the day. -.12 .06 -1.99 .164 
I worry about sleeping. -.04 .06 -.60 .763 
I didn’t have enough sleep last night. .04 .06 .57 .778 
I am restless. -.09 .06 -1.52 .325 
I am tired. .04 .06 .77 .682 
It is not effortful to do things. .00 .07 -.05 .980 
I feel guilty. -.14 .11 -1.27 .431 
I am doing things at my normal pace. -.01 .09 -.14 .959 
I feel worthless. -.09 .06 -1.46 .348 
I feel that I can’t get anything done. .01 .07 .09 .972 
I feel that I can’t make decisions. -.20 .11 -1.82 .217 
I can’t concentrate. -.09 .06 -1.46 .348 
I feel hopeless. -.09 .06 -1.52 .322 
How’s your day? -.13 .06 -2.10 .134 
How would you rate your overall physical health 
today? 





Table 5.20 Meta-analysis of conscientiousness and the mean momentary ratings of 
the DDI items across the three studies (N = 277) 
Note. β = standardized beta; SE = standard error; z = z score; p = p-value. 
 
 The meta-analysis of the variabilities in the DDI items yielded slightly 
different results compared to the meta-analysis results of the PHQ-9 items and the 
mean momentary ratings of the DDI items. Most of the standardized betas had 
insignificant p-values – significant results for neuroticism, extraversion, and 
conscientiousness were found in 10, two, and two DDI items, respectively. Even 
though most items were affected by high neuroticism and low conscientiousness, 
the betas were relatively uneven with both negative and positive values. The effect 
of extraversion was relatively low in most of the DDI items. High openness and high 
agreeableness both contributed to a varied symptom profile.  
Heterogeneity in MD symptoms could be observed in the sporadic 
significance found in the links between personality traits and the PHQ-9 and the DDI 
items. In addition, the coverages of the betas were substantially broad, indicating 
DDI item β SE z p 
I feel happy. -.48 .10 -4.80 < .001 
I feel sad. -.29 .06 -5.01 < .001 
I feel irritable. -.28 .06 -4.83 < .001 
I enjoy what I am doing. -.29 .06 -4.99 < .001 
I don’t care about anything. -.31 .06 -5.51 < .001 
I have no appetite during the day. -.16 .06 -2.50 .060 
I worry about sleeping. -.13 .06 -2.16 .123 
I didn’t have enough sleep last night. -.26 .06 -4.30 < .001 
I am restless. -.21 .06 -3.41 .008 
I am tired. -.24 .06 -4.11 < .001 
It is not effortful to do things. -.09 .07 -1.23 .454 
I feel guilty. -.37 .10 -3.70 < .001 
I am doing things at my normal pace. -.06 .09 -.70 .716 
I feel worthless. -.33 .06 -5.80 < .001 
I feel that I can’t get anything done. -.36 .07 -5.35 < .001 
I feel that I can’t make decisions. -.54 .09 -6.00 < .001 
I can’t concentrate. -.41 .05 -7.72 < .001 
I feel hopeless. -.33 .06 -5.67 < .001 
How’s your day? -.28 .06 -4.78 < .001 
How would you rate your overall physical health 
today? 





MD symptom heterogeneity, too (neuroticism: -.03–.30; extraversion: -.02–.21; 
conscientiousness: -.19–.13). The meta-analysis results were shown in Tables 5.21–
5.25. Figures 5.1–5.5, 5.6–5.10, and 5.11–5.15 are the standardized betas of the Big 
Five personality traits and three sets of MD measures – the PHQ-9 items, the mean 
momentary ratings of the DDI items, and the standard deviations of the momentary 
ratings of the DDI items from the three studies and meta-analyses, respectively.  
 
Table 5.21 Meta-analysis of neuroticism and the variabilities of the DDI items across 
the three studies (N = 277) 
Note. β = standardized beta; SE = standard error; z = z score; p = p-value. 
  
DDI item β SE z p 
I feel happy. .10 .12 .83 .653 
I feel sad. .21 .06 3.33 .008 
I feel irritable. .22 .06 3.63 < .001 
I enjoy what I am doing. .21 .06 3.45 .008 
I don’t care about anything. .30 .06 5.10 < .001 
I have no appetite during the day. .17 .06 2.66 .044 
I worry about sleeping. .04 .06 .71 .711 
I didn’t have enough sleep last night. .13 .07 2.02 .156 
I am restless. .19 .06 3.03 .014 
I am tired. -.02 .06 -.36 .867 
It is not effortful to do things. -.03 .08 -.37 .864 
I feel guilty. .15 .12 1.25 .441 
I am doing things at my normal pace. .09 .08 1.09 .521 
I feel worthless. .30 .06 5.08 < .001 
I feel that I can’t get anything done. .23 .07 3.22 .008 
I feel that I can’t make decisions. .20 .10 2.00 .164 
I can’t concentrate. .26 .06 4.47 < .001 
I feel hopeless. .26 .06 4.54 < .001 
How’s your day? .10 .06 1.73 .247 
How would you rate your overall physical health 
today? 





Table 5.22 Meta-analysis of extraversion and the variabilities of the DDI items across 
the three studies (N = 277) 













DDI item β SE z p 
I feel happy. .03 .11 .27 .904 
I feel sad. -.01 .06 -.16 .950 
I feel irritable. .04 .06 .73 .704 
I enjoy what I am doing. .00 .06 -.06 .979 
I don’t care about anything. -.02 .06 -.34 .877 
I have no appetite during the day. -.01 .06 -.15 .956 
I worry about sleeping. .11 .06 1.82 .215 
I didn’t have enough sleep last night. .09 .06 1.46 .347 
I am restless. .03 .06 .52 .799 
I am tired. .21 .06 3.63 < .001 
It is not effortful to do things. .19 .07 2.63 .048 
I feel guilty. .06 .11 .55 .788 
I am doing things at my normal pace. .12 .08 1.42 .364 
I feel worthless. -.02 .06 -.31 .890 
I feel that I can’t get anything done. .04 .07 .53 .794 
I feel that I can’t make decisions. -.01 .10 -.10 .970 
I can’t concentrate. .02 .06 .39 .857 
I feel hopeless. .05 .06 .89 .623 
How’s your day? .05 .06 .90 .620 
How would you rate your overall physical health 
today? 





Table 5.23 Meta-analysis of openness and the variabilities of the DDI items across 
the three studies (N = 277) 














DDI item β SE z p 
I feel happy. .08 .11 .73 .704 
I feel sad. .17 .06 2.79 .031 
I feel irritable. .13 .06 2.06 .145 
I enjoy what I am doing. .09 .06 1.58 .300 
I don’t care about anything. .11 .06 1.82 .217 
I have no appetite during the day. .09 .06 1.37 .385 
I worry about sleeping. .18 .06 2.88 .025 
I didn’t have enough sleep last night. .14 .06 2.15 .125 
I am restless. .13 .06 2.12 .131 
I am tired. .10 .06 1.67 .271 
It is not effortful to do things. .08 .08 1.04 .547 
I feel guilty. .12 .11 1.09 .521 
I am doing things at my normal pace. .08 .09 .95 .589 
I feel worthless. .15 .06 2.39 .078 
I feel that I can’t get anything done. .17 .07 2.41 .074 
I feel that I can’t make decisions. .19 .10 1.90 .191 
I can’t concentrate. .08 .06 1.30 .420 
I feel hopeless. .20 .06 3.36 .008 
How’s your day? .16 .06 2.59 .052 
How would you rate your overall physical health 





Table 5.24 Meta-analysis of agreeableness and the variabilities of the DDI items 
across the three studies (N = 277) 














DDI item β SE z p 
I feel happy. .18 .11 1.64 .282 
I feel sad. .09 .06 1.44 .356 
I feel irritable. .11 .06 1.77 .233 
I enjoy what I am doing. .12 .06 2.06 .145 
I don’t care about anything. .02 .06 .40 .849 
I have no appetite during the day. .05 .06 .80 .670 
I worry about sleeping. .02 .06 .34 .878 
I didn’t have enough sleep last night. .15 .06 2.44 .067 
I am restless. .09 .06 1.44 .356 
I am tired. .12 .06 1.97 .169 
It is not effortful to do things. .11 .07 1.54 .319 
I feel guilty. .01 .11 .09 .972 
I am doing things at my normal pace. .06 .08 .67 .731 
I feel worthless. .06 .06 .90 .620 
I feel that I can’t get anything done. .12 .07 1.79 .227 
I feel that I can’t make decisions. .14 .10 1.40 .374 
I can’t concentrate. .07 .06 1.08 .529 
I feel hopeless. .10 .06 1.64 .281 
How’s your day? .11 .06 1.85 .209 
How would you rate your overall physical health 
today? 





Table 5.25 Meta-analysis of conscientiousness and the variabilities of the DDI items 
across the three studies (N = 277) 
Note. β = standardized beta; SE = standard error; z = z score; p = p-value. 
 
 
DDI item β SE z p 
I feel happy. -.01 .11 -.09 .972 
I feel sad. -.10 .06 -1.65 .278 
I feel irritable. -.15 .06 -2.43 .071 
I enjoy what I am doing. -.09 .06 -1.58 .302 
I don’t care about anything. -.19 .06 -3.17 .014 
I have no appetite during the day. -.12 .06 -1.98 .167 
I worry about sleeping. -.11 .06 -1.78 .229 
I didn’t have enough sleep last night. -.08 .06 -1.34 .400 
I am restless. -.09 .06 -1.46 .347 
I am tired. -.02 .06 -.29 .895 
It is not effortful to do things. -.04 .08 -.48 .819 
I feel guilty. .10 .11 .91 .613 
I am doing things at my normal pace. .02 .08 .26 .909 
I feel worthless. -.13 .06 -2.09 .139 
I feel that I can’t get anything done. -.19 .07 -2.62 .048 
I feel that I can’t make decisions. -.10 .10 -1.00 .568 
I can’t concentrate. -.13 .06 -2.14 .125 
I feel hopeless. -.12 .06 -1.89 .195 
How’s your day? -.03 .06 -.47 .820 






Figure 5.1 The standardized betas of neuroticism when regressing neuroticism on 
the PHQ-9 items in Studies 1, 2, and 3 and the meta-analysis 
 
 
Figure 5.2 The standardized betas of extraversion when regressing extraversion on 






Figure 5.3 The standardized betas of openness when regressing openness on the 
PHQ-9 items in Studies 1, 2, and 3 and the meta-analysis 
 
Figure 5.4 The standardized betas of agreeableness when regressing agreeableness 






Figure 5.5 The standardized betas of conscientiousness when regressing 
conscientiousness on the PHQ-9 items in Studies 1, 2, and 3 and the meta-
analysis 
 
Figure 5.6 The standardized betas of neuroticism when regressing neuroticism on 






Figure 5.7 The standardized betas of extraversion when regressing extraversion on 
the means of the DDI items in Studies 1, 2, and 3 and the meta-analysis 
 
Figure 5.8 The standardized betas of openness when regressing openness on the 






Figure 5.9 The standardized betas of agreeableness when regressing agreeableness 
on the means of the DDI items in Studies 1, 2, and 3 and the meta-analysis 
 
Figure 5.10 The standardized betas of conscientiousness when regressing 







Figure 5.11 The standardized betas of neuroticism when regressing neuroticism on 
the standard deviations of the DDI items in Studies 1, 2, and 3 and the meta-
analysis 
 
Figure 5.12 The standardized betas of extraversion when regressing extraversion on 







Figure 5.13 The standardized betas of openness when regressing openness on the 
standard deviations of the DDI items in Studies 1, 2, and 3 and the meta-analysis 
 
Figure 5.14 The standardized betas of agreeableness when regressing 
agreeableness on the standard deviations of the DDI items in Studies 1, 2, and 3 







Figure 5.15 The standardized betas of conscientiousness when regressing 
conscientiousness on the standard deviations of the DDI items in Studies 1, 2, and 
3 and the meta-analysis 
 
Discussion 
 The results from three studies and meta-analysis partially supported H12 – 
MD severity is associated with high neuroticism, although the links between MD 
severity and low extraversion and low conscientiousness were not observed in 
Study 2. H13 described the relationships between MD severity and depression 
under neuroticism and cheerfulness under extraversion was supported across the 
three studies. The results also showed the mean momentary ratings (the DDI) were 
equally reliable as the retrospective ratings (the PHQ-9) and the momentary data 
could provide more informative insight into the condition under investigation 
depending on the research questions and the subsequent analyses. 
Our finding of neuroticism as the only significant predictor of MD is 
consistent with the literature (Burcusa & Iacono, 2007; Kendler et al., 2004; 
Noteboom et al., 2016; Xia et al., 2011). The associations between PHQ-9 score and 





the variability of momentary MD ratings significantly correlated with neuroticism in 
Study 1 and meta-analysis, but the significant associations were only found in a few 
DDI items in Studies 2 and 3. The different predictability of personality traits may be 
explained by unbalanced personality hierarchy and different levels of abstraction in 
traits as mentioned in Markon et al. (2005). Heterogeneity in MD symptoms might 
be another possible explanation. More detailed observations into MD symptoms 
are heterogeneous could be found in the variances in p-values and the ranges of 
betas of items from either the associations between personality traits and facets 
and the PHQ-9 or DDI items in the meta-analysis. Only some items significantly 
correlated with the traits neuroticism, extraversion, and conscientiousness, and the 
facets depression and cheerfulness. The least number of significant links between 
the traits and the facets were found in the standard deviations of the DDI items. 
The standardized betas from the best-fit models in the three studies were not 
comparable because the betas were from different models. In meta-analysis, there 
were relatively wide ranges of standardized betas between the PHQ-9 items and 
neuroticism (.26) and extraversion (.28), between the means of the DDI items and 
neuroticism (.42), extraversion (.46), and conscientiousness (.48), between the 
standard deviations of the DDI items and neuroticism (.33) and conscientiousness 
(.32). Together, these may well support the claim of heterogeneity in MD symptoms.  
Limitations and future directions 
The three studies only tested the relationships between personality traits 
and facets and variability of MD symptoms. Future studies could look into how 
personality affect MD symptom stability. Stability covers both dispersion from the 
baseline and the chronological order of the changes and it might provide more 
insight into the timing when personality traits and facets start to influence MD 
symptoms. 
Two facets – N1 anxiety and N6 vulnerability – were significantly correlated 
with the majority or all PHQ-9 items and the mean momentary ratings of the DDI 
items in the three studies. These two facets may be potentially good targets to be 





MD. In addition, these two facets have been picked up by other researchers and 
their relationships with life outcome were reported (W. D. Hill et al., 2019). Two 
subcategories of neuroticism – anxiety/tension and worry/vulnerability were 
associated with positive life outcome compare to neuroticism, which was linked to 
poor life outcome. This contrasted with the positive associations between the two 
facets and depression. A plausible explanation might be that the general variances 
across all items measuring neuroticism were removed from the anxiety/tension and 
worry/vulnerability factors in W. D. Hill et al. (2019) and only the residual variances 
remained, while in this thesis the general variances were kept in the facets.  
The inconsistent findings of insignificant associations between MD severity 
and low extraversion and low conscientiousness in Study 2 might be caused by a 
smaller sample size (n = 75) compared to Study 1 (n = 127). However, the sample 
size of Study 2 is similar to that in Study 3 (n = 78) so sample size might not be a 
plausible explanation and the numbers of data points of Studies 2 and 3 were 3,955 
and 4,297, respectively, which was similar, too. The results might either reflect 
differences between groups of participants or these two traits might be unstable 
predictors of MD severity. 
Conclusion 
Personality trait neuroticism and facets depression and cheerfulness are 
linked to MD severity as reported in three studies and meta-analysis of the three 
studies. MD symptoms are heterogeneous.  
In next chapter, we will explore the relationship between within- and 
between-individual differences in MD symptoms on one hand and daily activity 















Daily activity level and MD 
 Benefits of physical activities to MD patients has been widely reported 
(Mammen & Faulkner, 2013; Saeb et al., 2015; Teychenne et al., 2008). Being 
physically active – regardless of activity frequency, duration or intensity– reduced 
the probability of having MD was reported in a review of 27 observational and 40 
intervention studies (Teychenne et al., 2008). This review included both cross-
sectional and longitudinal studies. However, cross-sectional studies cannot inform 
causal relationships among the variables. This limits the implications of the results. 
Mammen and Faulkner (2013) reviewed 30 longitudinal studies and assessed the 
quality of the methodologies used in these studies. They found physical activities 
had protective effect against MD. Reciprocal effect between physical activities and 
MD was observed, too. In another review of 24 studies, people with MD were found 
to spend less time on physical activities in general and on moderate to vigorous 
physical activities in particular, but they spent more time on sedentary behaviors 
than the normal controls (Schuch et al., 2017). A small study using sensors and 
mobile phone global positioning systems to collect movement-related data such as 
time spent at home, variability of locations, time spent at various locations, and 
time spent to travel between locations (Saeb et al., 2015). They found MD severity 
was associated with total distance of moving. The above reviews supported the 
upholding role of physical activity in reducing MD symptoms.  
Sedentary behavior and health 
Sedentary behavior is usually regarded as the opposite of physical activity. 
Even though the relationship between sedentary behavior and health has been 
inconclusive, sedentary behaviors is reported as a possible cause of health problems 
independent of physical activity (de Rezende et al., 2014; Katzmarzyk, 2010). In an 





types of sedentary behaviors were found to differ in health outcomes (de Rezende 
et al., 2014). They reported that in children and adolescents, sedentary behavior of 
TV viewing and screen-time was associated with obesity. In adults, sedentary 
behaviors of sitting time, time spending on watching TV and watching screens were 
related with all-cause mortality, cardiovascular disease, and metabolic syndromes. 
Moderate relationships were found between sedentary behavior and several types 
of cancer. Their results suggested more research into the relationship between 
sedentary behavior and health is needed because it has not been well established. 
Heart rate variability and MD 
Heart rate variability reflects the communication between the central 
nervous system and the peripheral nervous system – the regulatory signals from the 
central nervous system to the peripheral nervous system and the feedback from the 
peripheral nervous system to the central nervous system (Servant et al., 2009). It 
also indicates how hearts respond to physiological signals such as breathing and 
blood pressure (Mather & Thayer, 2018). In their study, Mather and Thayer (2018) 
suggested heart rate variability could enhance brain networks responsible for 
emotion regulation via modulating the timing of blood flow. In addition, heart rate 
variability has been linked to self-control in a review of 24 articles including 26 
studies (Zahn et al., 2016) and top-down self-regulatory mechanisms in a meta-
analysis of 126 studies (Holzman & Bridgett, 2017). Significant, albeit small effect 
sizes were reported in both reviews. Stronger associations were found in older 
compared to younger participants (Holzman & Bridgett, 2017). A meta-analysis of 
heart rate variability in adolescents, young adults, and older adults during social 
interactions demonstrated heart rate variability decreased during negative social 
interactions, and people with psychiatric disorders did not have cardiac autonomic 
flexibility – decreased flexibility when the participants were under stress and 
increased flexibility during positive social interactions (Shahrestani et al., 2015). 
People with psychiatric disorders including mood and anxiety disorders and alcohol 





MD relates to reduced heart rate variability (Brunoni et al., 2013; A. H. Kemp 
et al., 2010; Koenig et al., 2016; Nahshoni et al., 2004). An indicator of vagal activity, 
low resting state high frequency heart rate variability was reported in children and 
adolescent MD patients (Koenig et al., 2016). In normal controls, no associations 
between high frequency heart rate variability and MD symptom severity were 
identified. Declined heart rate variability were also found in adult MD patients in a 
Brazilian study (Brunoni et al., 2013), in both MD patients who received or who did 
not receive heart transplants (Nahshoni et al., 2004), and in MD patients with 
increased MD severity in a meta-analysis of 18 studies (A. H. Kemp et al., 2010).  
The presence of comorbidity and subclinical psychiatric disorders 
demonstrated the currently widely used nosology may not be the optimal 
framework to diagnose psychiatric disorders (Krueger & Eaton, 2015), thereby 
demonstrating the necessity of having alternative diagnostic tools such as 
transdiagnostic tools. High-frequency heart rate variability may be used a 
transdiagnostic factor in MD diagnosis, because it has been associated with several 
psychiatric disorders as suggested in a review (Beauchaine & Thayer, 2015). Other 
transdiagnostic factors include internalizing and externalizing spectra (Krueger & 
Markon, 2006, 2011) and maladaptive repetitive thought (Kaplan et al., 2018). In 
addition, heart rate variability seemed to be a stable indicator of MD because it 
remained the same after transcranial direct current stimulation treatment (Brunoni 
et al., 2013) and antidepressant treatment (Brunoni et al., 2013; A. H. Kemp et al., 
2010). The only exception was tricyclic antidepressant, which decreased heart rate 
variability (A. H. Kemp et al., 2010).  
Life expectancy in MD patients 
People with mental disorders on average lived 10 years shorter than those 
who did not have mental disorders as reported in a systematic review and meta-
analysis of 203 studies (Walker et al., 2015). The mortality rate in MD patients has 
been observed to be higher than the normal population in several reviews and 
meta-analysis (Chang et al., 2011; Cuijpers et al., 2014; Gilman et al., 2017; Walker 





schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, substance use disorder, and MD were found to 
have a shorter life expectancy compared to the normal population (Chang et al., 
2011). A meta-analysis of 293 studies compared the risk of mortality in MD before 
and after adjusting for publication bias and study quality (Cuijpers et al., 2014). 
After controlling for these two factors, the risk of mortality in MD was reduced but 
people with MD still had approximately 50% higher mortality rate than the normal 
controls. Cuijpers et al. (2014) also observed similar rate of mortality in community-
based participants with MD and other MD patients. In a study conducted in 
Denmark, compared to the general population, men with MD lived 14 years shorter 
and women with MD lived 10.1 years shorter (Laursen et al., 2016). Even though the 
influences of MD episodes on the risk of mortality diminished with time, its 
influence may last as long as 20 years after the latest MD episode (Gilman et al., 
2017).  
Causes of death in mental disorders 
Some studies examined the causes of death in people with mental 
disorders – whether it being natural (e.g., diseases) or unnatural (e.g., accidents or 
suicide). Deaths in people with substance abuse and eating disorders could be 
attributed to natural or unnatural causes (Harris & Barraclough, 1998). While 
unnatural causes were the primary reason of death among people with 
schizophrenia and MD. Most of those with intellectual instability and epilepsy died 
of natural causes. In a review, Walker et al. (2015) reported 67.3% of the cause of 
death in people with mental disorder was natural and 17.5% was unnatural. In a 
Swedish cohort study on MD and bipolar disorder, natural causes were the main 
causes of death (Ösby et al., 2001). Laursen et al. (2016) investigated the causes of 
death among MD patients in Denmark and found the primary cause of death was 
natural causes. 
Elevated rates of cardiovascular diseases in people with severe MD have 
been found in several studies of participants from various countries including the 
U.S. (Saint Onge et al., 2014), Singapore (Ho et al., 2016), and Sweden (Ösby et al., 





risk of mortality even after controlling for covariates including sociodemographic 
factors, health behaviors, and health conditions (Saint Onge et al., 2014). In 
particular, a diagnosis of MD may increase the probability of having cardiovascular 
disease in people who have and who do not have cardiovascular disease previously 
by 1.82 and 2.68 times, respectively. In the study of an elderly group of participants 
in Singapore, both MD and subthreshold depression were linked to risk of mortality 
(Ho et al., 2016). A small portion of the risk may due to unhealthy behaviors and the 
majority of it might due to other medical conditions and functional disability. As a 
result, after controlling for the two variables, the authors still did not find any 
associations between subthreshold depression and the risk of mortality and MD 
was still linked to cardiovascular disease and stroke. In the Swedish study, the three 
leading causes of death were cardiovascular disease, suicide, and cancer in both MD 
and bipolar disorder patients (Ösby et al., 2001). Suicide was the primary risk of 
mortality in young patients one year after their diagnoses. Low heart rate variability 
might implicate the link between MD and cardiovascular mortality via autonomic 
nerve dysfunction (Carney & Freedland, 2009; Gorman & Sloan, 2000). 
Autonomic imbalance might explain the mechanism underlying 
cardiovascular diseases as reported in a review (Thayer et al., 2010). Autonomic 
imbalance describes a hyperactive sympathetic system and a hypoactive 
parasympathetic system, and the potential consequences may be early ageing and 
diseases. This review analyzed studies on several risk factors of cardiovascular 
diseases including hypertension, diabetes, smoking, physical inactivity, overweight, 
age, family history, and work stress. Thayer et al. (2010) suggested heart rate 
variability may be used as an indicator of autonomic imbalance. However, their 
claim was challenged by Kluttig, Kuss, and Greiser (2010) for ignoring studies 
reporting the opposite or neutral findings. Thayer, Yamamoto, and Brosschot 
(2010a) later replied Kluttig et al. (2010) and stressed their review was not 
exhaustive and the presence of other risk factors may influence the results of the 
studies mentioned in Kluttig et al. (2010). This may be of concern especially when 





distinguishing the effects of different risk factors might be difficult. Despite many 
studies supported the link between heart rate variability and MD, there were still 
objections (Borrione et al., 2018). Different associations between heart rate 
variability and MD symptoms may be a possible explanation; therefore, Borrione et 
al. (2018) tested this and found three MD symptoms – feeling guilty, loss of interest 
or pleasure, and psychomotor retardation – were associated with heart rate 
variability. The disparities between studies might arise because of varying symptom 
coverages in commonly used MD assessments (Fried, 2017; Fried, van Borkulo, et al., 
2016). Studies reported associations between heart rate variability and MD 
symptoms might have adopted MD assessments including symptoms related to 
heart rate variability while studies did not find these associations might have used 
other MD assessments did not include these symptoms that correlated with heart 
rate variability. 
Heterogeneous expressions of MD symptoms may also result from within- or 
between-individual differences because variances were found in results obtained 
from analyses of between- and within-individual differences (A. J. Fisher et al., 2018; 
Hamaker, 2012; Kanning et al., 2013; Laukka et al., 2018). Discrepancies between 
within- and between-individual differences in activity level and affect has been 
reported in a review (Kanning et al., 2013). The results obtained from between-
individual analyses might diverge from those found in within-individual analyses 
(Hamaker, 2012). Deviances between within- and between-individual differences 
were found in the cognitive performance of older adults receiving tests of anxiety 
and depression (Laukka et al., 2018). The influences of within-individual differences 
on cognitive performance were huge for depression generally while between-
individual differences affected greatly for anxiety.  
The study 
This chapter explores the relationships between two MD measures – 
between- and within-individual differences in MD symptoms – and activity levels 
and heart rate variabilities. Instead of self-reports, activity sensors were used to 





reports with short recall periods may show greater accuracy than those with long 
recall periods (Short et al., 2009), they are still subject to the possible influences of 
memory decay or memory bias. In addition, self-reported activity levels are 
unstable and relatively inaccurate in relation to sensor-recorded data as reported in 
a review of 187 papers (Prince et al., 2008). Therefore, wearable activity sensors, 
which have greater accuracy than self-reported activity levels, were used in data 
collection. Heart rate variability was recorded along with physical activity level. 
Relationships between MD symptoms and daily activity level and between MD 
symptoms and heart rate variability were examined in one study.  
We hypothesize that depression would appear as an etiologically 
homogeneous entity with all MD symptoms relating to activity levels in the same 
way – lower activity level would coincide with higher ratings of MD symptoms – and 
that these associations would exist for within-individual MD symptoms 
(measurement occasions with higher activity would also show lower MD symptom 
scores) and for daily activity level (H14). Similar homogeneous relationships of 
lower hear rate variability and higher ratings of MD symptoms would be found in 
within-individual MD symptoms and heart rate variability (H15). 
 
Materials and Method 
 The same participant, materials, and procedure as described in Study 3 
(Chapters 2 to Chapter 5) were used. Three-dimensional movement acceleration 
was used to calculate activity levels because it could distinguish activity types, 
intensity, frequency, pattern, and duration of activity (Berlin et al., 2006; Shephard 
& Tudor-Locke, 2016). The acceleration measurement is generated every minute. 
The signals from the three axes are firstly bandpass filtered to remove the offset 
from gravity and irrelevant high frequency contents (movisens GmbH, 2019). The 
vector magnitude of the output signals is calculated using the following formulae:  
𝑚𝑎𝑖 =  √𝑎𝑥2𝑏𝑝 +  𝑎𝑦
2
𝑏𝑝
+  𝑎𝑧2𝑏𝑝  
The output values are calculated by averaging the means of all collected 





 Heart rate variability was measured using rMSSD, which is an indicator of 
vagus-mediated heart rate variability (DeGiorgio et al., 2010). It is the root mean 




 Multilevel models were used to test the hypotheses. All continuous variables 
were grand-mean centered. The average activity levels and heart rate variabilities 
30, 60, and 120 minutes before and after the momentary measurements of MD 
symptoms were the outcome variables in each multilevel model. The within- and 
between-individual MD symptom differences and the covariates – age, gender, 
educational attainment, marital status, and employment status were the fixed 
factors. Individual participant was the random intercept factor. The within-
individual differences in MD symptoms were calculated by standardizing the 
momentary MD symptom ratings. The standardized values have a mean of 0 and a 
standard deviation of 1. The between-individual differences were the means of the 
momentary MD symptoms ratings for each participant. The R code of the multilevel 
model was in Appendix B. The same as in Chapters 3–5, age and educational 
attainment were continuous and gender, marital status, and employment status 
were categorical. Marital status and employment status were collapsed into fewer 
levels to avoid issues such as collinearity or undermine power. Marital status was 
collapsed into two levels of single, divorced, and widowed and in a relationship and 
married. Employment status was collapsed into two levels of employed, self-
employed, and full-time student and part-time employed, retired, and unemployed. 
To tackle the problem of multiple comparison, all p-value were corrected using false 
discovery rate. 
Daily activity level 
 A total of 4,297 observations from 78 participants were collected and 
analyzed. Significant relationships between activity levels and MD symptoms were 





standardized betas were observed in within- than in between-individual differences 
in MD symptoms in activity levels measured before and after participants rated 
their momentary MD ratings. The standardized betas fluctuated more in between-
individual differences than in within-individual differences. There were fewer 
significant associations between MD symptoms and activity level for the activity 
levels measured after than before the momentary MD ratings were given. 
Significant between-individual differences in “I feel happy”, “I am doing thing at my 
normal pace”, and “I feel worthless” were found in the mean activity levels 
measured 30, 60, and 120 minutes before participants rated these MD symptoms. 
Also, significantly between-individual differences were observed in three DDI items 
and the mean activity levels either measured 30, 60, or 120 minutes before these 
three DDI items were rated. Significant within-individual differences in “I feel 
happy”, “I don’t care about anything”, and “I can’t concentrate” were found in the 
mean activity levels measured 30, 60, and 120 minutes after participants rated 
these DDI items. Within-individual differences in three DDI items were significantly 
related to the mean activity levels measured 30, 60, or 120 minutes before these 
DDI items. Tables 6.1–6.6 show the associations between within- and between-
individual differences in MD symptoms and the mean activity levels recorded 30, 60, 
and 120 minutes before and after participants rated MD symptoms.  
The sparse significant links between MD symptoms and activity levels 
showed heterogeneity in MD symptoms. The variances between MD symptoms 
were more prominent in activity levels measured 120 minutes before the 
momentary MD ratings for between-individual differences as observed in the 
ranges of standardized betas. The standardized betas of the items in the DDI were 
either negative or close to zero, implying associations between low activity level 
and both between- and within-individual differences in MD symptom ratings. 















Table 6.1 Associations between mean activity levels measured 30 minutes before 
rating MD symptoms and the within- and between-individual differences in MD 
symptoms in Study 3 
Note. β = standardized beta of the fixed effect; SE = standard error of the fixed 
effect; LCL = 2.5% confidence interval; UCL = 97.5% confidence interval; p = p-value; 
b = between-individual difference; w = within-individual difference. 
 
DDI item 
β SE LCI UCI p 
b w b w b w b w b w 
I feel happy. -.11 -.08 .03 .02 -.17 -.11 -.05 -.04 .020 < .001 
I feel sad. -.09 -.06 .04 .02 -.16 -.09 -.02 -.02 .121 .033 
I feel irritable. -.05 -.01 .03 .02 -.11 -.05 .02 .02 .473 .828 
I enjoy what I am 
doing. 
-.09 -.04 .04 .02 -.15 -.08 -.02 -.01 .121 .121 
I don’t care 
about anything. 
-.12 -.06 .04 .02 -.19 -.10 -.06 -.03 .020 < .001 
I have no 
appetite during 
the day. 
-.10 -.03 .04 .03 -.18 -.10 -.02 .03 .132 .668 
I worry about 
sleeping. 
.01 .02 .04 .03 -.08 -.05 .09 .08 .962 .912 
I didn’t have 
enough sleep last 
night. 
-.05 .02 .05 .03 -.14 -.05 .05 .08 .692 .884 
I am restless. -.05 -.02 .04 .02 -.13 -.06 .02 .01 .475 .509 
I am tired. -.06 -.04 .04 .02 -.12 -.07 .01 -.01 .394 .151 
I feel guilty. -.08 -.05 .04 .02 -.15 -.09 -.01 -.02 .169 .054 
I am doing things 
at my normal 
pace. 
-.11 .00 .04 .02 -.19 -.03 -.04 .04 .041 .990 
I feel worthless. -.11 -.02 .04 .02 -.18 -.06 -.04 .01 .047 .549 
I feel that I can’t 
make decisions. 
-.09 -.04 .04 .02 -.16 -.07 -.01 .00 .174 .223 
I can’t 
concentrate. 
-.06 -.06 .04 .02 -.13 -.10 .01 -.03 .348 < .001 
I feel hopeless. -.07 -.02 .04 .02 -.14 -.05 -.01 .02 .201 .606 
How’s your day? -.08 -.07 .04 .03 -.15 -.12 -.01 -.01 .201 .117 
How would you 
rate your overall 
physical health 
today? 





Table 6.2 Associations between mean activity levels measured 60 minutes before 
rating MD symptoms and the within- and between-individual differences in MD 
symptoms in Study 3 
Note. β = standardized beta of the fixed effect; SE = standard error of the fixed 
effect; LCL = 2.5% confidence interval; UCL = 97.5% confidence interval; p = p-value; 
b = between-individual difference; w = within-individual difference. 
 
DDI item 
β SE LCI UCI p 
b w b w b w b w b w 
I feel happy. -.11 -.06 .04 .02 -.18 -.09 -.05 -.02 .041 .033 
I feel sad. -.08 -.05 .04 .02 -.16 -.08 -.01 -.01 .223 .103 
I feel irritable. -.02 -.03 .04 .02 -.10 -.06 .05 .01 .861 .463 
I enjoy what I 
am doing. 
-.07 -.04 .04 .02 -.14 -.08 .01 -.01 .334 .121 
I don’t care 
about anything. 
-.11 -.07 .04 .02 -.19 -.11 -.04 -.04 .054 < .001 
I have no 
appetite during 
the day. 
-.11 -.03 .04 .03 -.19 -.10 -.03 .03 .117 .660 
I worry about 
sleeping. 
-.04 .01 .05 .04 -.13 -.06 .06 .08 .784 .960 
I didn’t have 
enough sleep 
last night. 
.00 .00 .05 .03 -.09 -.05 .09 .06 .974 .973 
I am restless. -.02 -.03 .04 .02 -.10 -.07 .07 .01 .918 .340 
I am tired. -.04 -.05 .04 .02 -.11 -.09 .04 -.02 .667 .047 
I feel guilty. -.07 -.06 .04 .02 -.14 -.09 .00 -.02 .325 .033 
I am doing 
things at my 
normal pace. 
-.16 .00 .04 .02 -.23 -.04 -.08 .03 < .001 .960 
I feel worthless. -.14 -.01 .04 .02 -.21 -.05 -.06 .03 .020 .901 
I feel that I can’t 
make decisions. 
-.11 -.04 .04 .02 -.19 -.08 -.03 -.01 .090 .132 
I can’t 
concentrate. 
-.06 -.06 .04 .02 -.13 -.09 .02 -.02 .423 .020 
I feel hopeless. -.07 -.03 .04 .02 -.14 -.07 .00 .01 .305 .345 
How’s your day? -.09 -.07 .04 .03 -.17 -.13 -.01 -.01 .199 .137 
How would you 
rate your overall 
physical health 
today? 





Table 6.3 Associations between mean activity levels measured 120 minutes before 
rating MD symptoms and the within- and between-individual differences in MD 
symptoms in Study 3 
Note. β = standardized beta of the fixed effect; SE = standard error of the fixed 
effect; LCL = 2.5% confidence interval; UCL = 97.5% confidence interval; p = p-value; 
b = between-individual difference; w = within-individual difference. 
 
DDI item 
β SE LCI UCI p 
b w b w b w b w b w 
I feel happy. -.14 -.06 .05 .02 -.22 -.10 -.05 -.03 .047 .020 
I feel sad. -.09 -.05 .05 .02 -.18 -.09 .01 -.01 .340 .082 
I feel irritable. -.02 -.04 .05 .02 -.11 -.08 .07 .00 .911 .181 
I enjoy what I 
am doing. 
-.07 -.06 .05 .02 -.16 -.10 .02 -.02 .463 .020 
I don’t care 
about anything. 
-.11 -.07 .05 .02 -.21 -.11 -.02 -.04 .155 < .001 
I have no 
appetite during 
the day. 
-.16 -.03 .05 .03 -.25 -.09 -.06 .03 .041 .667 
I worry about 
sleeping. 
-.09 .03 .06 .03 -.21 -.03 .03 .10 .473 .668 
I didn’t have 
enough sleep 
last night. 
.01 .01 .05 .03 -.07 -.04 .10 .06 .936 .912 
I am restless. -.01 -.04 .05 .02 -.11 -.07 .10 .00 .960 .266 
I am tired. -.06 -.03 .05 .02 -.15 -.07 .04 .01 .580 .348 
I feel guilty. -.06 -.06 .05 .02 -.15 -.09 .03 -.02 .548 .033 
I am doing 
things at my 
normal pace. 
-.23 -.01 .05 .02 -.32 -.05 -.14 .03 < .001 .904 
I feel worthless. -.20 -.01 .05 .02 -.29 -.04 -.11 .03 < .001 .922 
I feel that I can’t 
make decisions. 
-.19 -.04 .05 .02 -.28 -.08 -.09 .00 < .001 .208 
I can’t 
concentrate. 
-.07 -.05 .05 .02 -.16 -.09 .02 -.02 .441 .041 
I feel hopeless. -.07 -.03 .04 .02 -.15 -.06 .01 .01 .389 .463 
How’s your day? -.10 -.08 .05 .03 -.20 -.14 .00 -.01 .296 .121 
How would you 
rate your overall 
physical health 
today? 





Table 6.4 Associations between mean activity levels measured 30 minutes after 
rating MD symptoms and the within- and between-individual differences in MD 
symptoms in Study 3 
Note. β = standardized beta of the fixed effect; SE = standard error of the fixed 
effect; LCL = 2.5% confidence interval; UCL = 97.5% confidence interval; p = p-value; 
b = between-individual difference; w = within-individual difference. 
 
DDI item 
β SE LCI UCI p 
b w b w b w b w b w 
I feel happy. -.08 -.04 .03 .02 -.15 -.08 -.02 .00 .121 .201 
I feel sad. -.08 -.05 .04 .02 -.15 -.09 -.02 -.01 .151 .121 
I feel irritable. -.04 .01 .03 .02 -.10 -.03 .03 .05 .622 .918 
I enjoy what I 
am doing. 
-.07 .00 .03 .02 -.14 -.04 -.01 .03 .196 .960 
I don’t care 
about anything. 
-.10 -.01 .04 .02 -.17 -.05 -.03 .03 .074 .918 
I have no 
appetite during 
the day. 
.02 -.05 .04 .03 -.05 -.10 .09 .01 .884 .328 
I worry about 
sleeping. 
-.01 .00 .04 .03 -.08 -.06 .07 .05 .959 .974 
I didn’t have 
enough sleep 
last night. 
-.03 .00 .04 .03 -.11 -.06 .06 .07 .872 .960 
I am restless. -.05 .04 .04 .02 -.13 .00 .02 .08 .468 .201 
I am tired. -.03 -.06 .03 .02 -.09 -.09 .04 -.02 .764 .047 
I feel guilty. -.07 -.03 .04 .02 -.13 -.07 .00 .01 .294 .339 
I am doing 
things at my 
normal pace. 
-.06 .04 .04 .02 -.13 .00 .02 .08 .423 .214 
I feel worthless. -.09 -.03 .04 .02 -.16 -.07 -.02 .01 .142 .423 
I feel that I can’t 
make decisions. 
-.05 .01 .04 .02 -.13 -.03 .02 .05 .463 .912 
I can’t 
concentrate. 
-.02 -.01 .04 .02 -.10 -.05 .05 .02 .900 .785 
I feel hopeless. -.05 .00 .04 .02 -.13 -.04 .02 .03 .473 .959 
How’s your day? .02 -.02 .03 .02 -.04 -.06 .08 .02 .810 .722 
How would you 
rate your overall 
physical health 
today? 





Table 6.5 Associations between mean activity levels measured 60 minutes after 
rating MD symptoms and the within- and between-individual differences in MD 
symptoms in Study 3 
Note. β = standardized beta of the fixed effect; SE = standard error of the fixed 
effect; LCL = 2.5% confidence interval; UCL = 97.5% confidence interval; p = p-value; 




β SE LCI UCI p 
b w b w b w b w b w 
I feel happy. -.07 -.03 .04 .02 -.14 -.07 -.01 .01 .214 .463 
I feel sad. -.07 -.04 .04 .02 -.14 -.08 .00 .00 .311 .170 
I feel irritable. -.03 .02 .04 .02 -.10 -.02 .03 .06 .684 .680 
I enjoy what I 
am doing. 
-.07 .00 .04 .02 -.14 -.04 .00 .04 .328 .967 
I don’t care 
about anything. 
-.12 .00 .04 .02 -.19 -.04 -.05 .04 .041 .959 
I have no 
appetite during 
the day. 
.07 -.03 .04 .03 -.01 -.09 .15 .02 .336 .487 
I worry about 
sleeping. 
-.01 -.02 .04 .03 -.09 -.07 .07 .03 .959 .767 
I didn’t have 
enough sleep 
last night. 
.01 -.01 .05 .03 -.08 -.06 .10 .05 .960 .960 
I am restless. -.05 .07 .04 .02 -.13 .04 .03 .11 .556 < .001 
I am tired. -.03 -.07 .04 .02 -.10 -.11 .05 -.03 .828 < .001 
I feel guilty. -.06 -.02 .04 .02 -.14 -.06 .01 .02 .348 .660 
I am doing 
things at my 
normal pace. 
-.05 .03 .04 .02 -.13 -.01 .03 .07 .509 .346 
I feel worthless. -.09 -.02 .04 .02 -.17 -.07 -.01 .02 .196 .580 
I feel that I can’t 
make decisions. 
-.05 .01 .04 .02 -.13 -.03 .03 .05 .567 .900 
I can’t 
concentrate. 
-.01 .00 .04 .02 -.09 -.04 .08 .03 .960 .960 
I feel hopeless. -.05 -.01 .04 .02 -.13 -.05 .03 .03 .606 .912 
How’s your day? .04 -.03 .03 .02 -.02 -.07 .10 .01 .580 .473 
How would you 
rate your overall 
physical health 
today? 





Table 6.6 Associations between mean activity levels measured 120 minutes after 
rating MD symptoms and the within- and between-individual differences in MD 
symptoms in Study 3 
Note. β = standardized beta of the fixed effect; SE = standard error of the fixed 
effect; LCL = 2.5% confidence interval; UCL = 97.5% confidence interval; p = p-value; 




β SE LCI UCI p 
b w b w b w b w b w 
I feel happy. -.08 -.01 .04 .02 -.16 -.04 .00 .03 .328 .922 
I feel sad. -.08 -.03 .05 .02 -.17 -.06 .01 .01 .328 .493 
I feel irritable. -.06 .02 .04 .02 -.14 -.02 .02 .06 .468 .606 
I enjoy what I 
am doing. 
-.07 .01 .04 .02 -.16 -.03 .01 .04 .339 .947 
I don’t care 
about anything. 
-.14 -.01 .05 .02 -.22 -.05 -.05 .03 .054 .912 
I have no 
appetite during 
the day. 
.13 -.05 .05 .03 .03 -.11 .23 .01 .132 .386 
I worry about 
sleeping. 
.02 -.01 .06 .03 -.09 -.07 .13 .05 .918 .960 
I didn’t have 
enough sleep 
last night. 
.01 -.03 .05 .03 -.08 -.09 .11 .02 .959 .567 
I am restless. -.07 .08 .05 .02 -.17 .04 .02 .12 .423 < .001 
I am tired. -.02 -.10 .04 .02 -.10 -.14 .07 -.06 .918 < .001 
I feel guilty. -.08 -.02 .05 .02 -.17 -.05 .01 .02 .328 .784 
I am doing 
things at my 
normal pace. 
.00 .03 .05 .02 -.09 -.01 .10 .07 .974 .423 
I feel worthless. -.05 -.02 .05 .02 -.14 -.06 .05 .03 .680 .778 
I feel that I can’t 
make decisions. 
.01 .02 .05 .02 -.08 -.02 .11 .06 .934 .580 
I can’t 
concentrate. 
.01 .00 .05 .02 -.09 -.03 .10 .04 .960 .960 
I feel hopeless. -.05 -.01 .05 .02 -.15 -.04 .05 .03 .668 .922 
How’s your day? .03 -.04 .03 .02 -.03 -.08 .09 .00 .660 .264 
How would you 
rate your overall 
physical health 
today? 





Heart rate variability 
 There were 60 participants completed 3,111 measurements of heart rate 
variability. The results showed no significant between-individual differences. But 
the standardized betas changed more in between-individual differences compared 
to within-individual differences. Within-individual differences in heart rate 
variability measured before and after the momentary ratings were similar but the 
standardized betas of between-subject differences in heart rate variability 
measured before the momentary ratings were smaller than those measured after 
the momentary ratings. Heart rate variabilities measured 30, 60, and 120 minutes 
before and 60 minutes after participants rated their levels of concentration were 
significantly related to their ability to concentrate. Also, doing things on one’s own 
pace was related to heat rate variability measured 30 minutes before the 
participants rated their pace of doing things. The associations between within- and 
between-individual differences in MD symptoms and the mean heart rate variability 
recorded 30, 60, and 120 minutes before and after participants rated MD symptoms 
were shown in Tables 6.7–6.12. 
Much less significant associations between both within- and between-
individual differences in MD symptoms were observed in heart rate variability 
compared to activity levels. The standardized betas showed low heart rate 
variability coincided with high ratings in between-individual differences in MD 
symptoms while some positive betas in both within- and between-individual 
differences in MD symptoms revealed ambiguous results. Limited number of 
significant associations, too, demonstrated MD symptoms as represented by the 
DDI items are heterogeneous. In addition, the ranges of standardized betas of 
between-individual differences in MD symptoms for all activity levels were 






Table 6.7 Associations between mean heart rate variability measured 30 minutes 
before rating MD symptoms and the within- and between-individual differences in 
MD symptoms in Study 3 
Note. β = standardized beta of the fixed effect; SE = standard error of the fixed 
effect; LCL = 2.5% confidence interval; UCL = 97.5% confidence interval; p = p-value; 
b = between-individual difference; w = within-individual difference. 
 
DDI item 
β SE LCI UCI p 
b w b w b w b w b w 
I feel happy. -.16 .02 .12 .03 -.38 -.03 .06 .07 .475 .757 
I feel sad. -.08 .02 .12 .03 -.31 -.03 .14 .07 .828 .764 
I feel irritable. .16 .00 .11 .03 -.04 -.06 .37 .05 .456 .960 
I enjoy what I 
am doing. 
.01 .03 .12 .03 -.22 -.02 .24 .08 .974 .493 
I don’t care 
about anything. 
-.07 -.01 .13 .03 -.31 -.06 .17 .04 .884 .912 
I have no 
appetite during 
the day. 
.07 -.03 .20 .06 -.29 -.15 .43 .09 .918 .901 
I worry about 
sleeping. 
-.07 .00 .18 .07 -.39 -.14 .25 .13 .918 .979 
I didn’t have 
enough sleep 
last night. 
.01 -.03 .12 .05 -.22 -.12 .24 .07 .974 .900 
I am restless. .14 .04 .13 .03 -.10 -.01 .39 .09 .606 .336 
I am tired. .03 .00 .12 .03 -.20 -.06 .26 .05 .950 .960 
I feel guilty. -.06 .00 .12 .03 -.29 -.05 .17 .05 .911 .974 
I am doing 
things at my 
normal pace. 
-.11 .08 .12 .03 -.33 .03 .11 .13 .712 .047 
I feel worthless. -.02 -.04 .12 .03 -.25 -.10 .20 .01 .960 .382 
I feel that I can’t 
make decisions. 
-.09 .05 .12 .03 -.31 .00 .14 .10 .812 .200 
I can’t 
concentrate. 
-.05 .09 .12 .02 -.28 .04 .18 .14 .912 < .001 
I feel hopeless. -.07 -.03 .12 .03 -.29 -.09 .15 .02 .875 .518 
How’s your day? -.11 .00 .16 .07 -.40 -.13 .19 .14 .828 .974 
How would you 
rate your overall 
physical health 
today? 





Table 6.8 Associations between mean heart rate variability measured 60 minutes 
before rating MD symptoms and the within- and between-individual differences in 
MD symptoms in Study 3 
Note. β = standardized beta of the fixed effect; SE = standard error of the fixed 
effect; LCL = 2.5% confidence interval; UCL = 97.5% confidence interval; p = p-value; 
b = between-individual difference; w = within-individual difference. 
 
DDI item 
β SE LCI UCI p 
b w b w b w b w b w 
I feel happy. -.16 .00 .12 .03 -.39 -.05 .06 .05 .475 .973 
I feel sad. -.09 .01 .12 .03 -.32 -.04 .13 .07 .784 .884 
I feel irritable. .16 -.01 .12 .03 -.05 -.06 .37 .04 .473 .900 
I enjoy what I 
am doing. 
.01 .03 .13 .03 -.22 -.02 .25 .07 .967 .660 
I don’t care 
about anything. 
-.08 -.01 .13 .02 -.32 -.05 .16 .04 .872 .936 
I have no 
appetite during 
the day. 
.10 -.02 .21 .06 -.28 -.13 .48 .08 .911 .911 
I worry about 
sleeping. 
-.08 .01 .19 .06 -.43 -.12 .26 .13 .912 .960 
I didn’t have 
enough sleep 
last night. 
.05 .00 .12 .05 -.18 -.10 .28 .09 .912 .974 
I am restless. .13 .03 .13 .03 -.12 -.02 .38 .08 .667 .549 
I am tired. .03 -.01 .13 .03 -.21 -.06 .26 .04 .959 .912 
I feel guilty. -.06 .00 .13 .03 -.29 -.05 .18 .05 .911 .999 
I am doing 
things at my 
normal pace. 
-.12 .06 .12 .03 -.35 .01 .11 .11 .669 .165 
I feel worthless. -.03 -.04 .12 .03 -.26 -.10 .20 .01 .959 .348 
I feel that I can’t 
make decisions. 
-.08 .05 .13 .02 -.32 .00 .15 .09 .828 .305 
I can’t 
concentrate. 
-.05 .08 .13 .02 -.29 .03 .18 .13 .914 .020 
I feel hopeless. -.07 -.05 .12 .03 -.30 -.10 .16 .00 .872 .274 
How’s your day? -.08 -.03 .17 .06 -.40 -.15 .23 .09 .901 .901 
How would you 
rate your overall 
physical health 
today? 





Table 6.9 Associations between mean heart rate variability measured 120 minutes 
before rating MD symptoms and the within- and between-individual differences in 
MD symptoms in Study 3 
Note. β = standardized beta of the fixed effect; SE = standard error of the fixed 
effect; LCL = 2.5% confidence interval; UCL = 97.5% confidence interval; p = p-value; 
b = between-individual difference; w = within-individual difference. 
 
DDI item 
β SE LCI UCI p 
b w b w b w b w b w 
I feel happy. -.18 .00 .13 .02 -.41 -.05 .05 .04 .463 .960 
I feel sad. -.11 .00 .13 .02 -.35 -.04 .13 .05 .736 .960 
I feel irritable. .16 -.02 .12 .02 -.06 -.07 .38 .03 .485 .764 
I enjoy what I 
am doing. 
.02 .01 .13 .02 -.22 -.04 .26 .06 .960 .918 
I don’t care 
about anything. 
-.07 .00 .14 .02 -.33 -.05 .18 .04 .884 .960 
I have no 
appetite during 
the day. 
.14 -.02 .22 .05 -.25 -.11 .54 .07 .835 .912 
I worry about 
sleeping. 
-.08 .00 .21 .05 -.46 -.11 .29 .10 .918 .974 
I didn’t have 
enough sleep 
last night. 
.07 -.02 .13 .05 -.16 -.12 .31 .07 .884 .901 
I am restless. .13 .01 .14 .02 -.12 -.03 .39 .06 .671 .866 
I am tired. .03 -.01 .13 .02 -.21 -.06 .28 .04 .950 .901 
I feel guilty. -.06 .00 .13 .02 -.31 -.05 .18 .04 .901 .960 
I am doing 
things at my 
normal pace. 
-.13 .04 .13 .03 -.37 -.01 .10 .09 .636 .382 
I feel worthless. -.02 -.04 .13 .03 -.26 -.09 .22 .02 .960 .471 
I feel that I can’t 
make decisions. 
-.08 .06 .13 .02 -.32 .01 .16 .10 .846 .132 
I can’t 
concentrate. 
-.04 .07 .13 .02 -.29 .02 .20 .11 .922 .041 
I feel hopeless. -.06 -.05 .13 .02 -.30 -.10 .17 .00 .901 .196 
How’s your day? -.04 .00 .18 .05 -.38 -.11 .29 .10 .959 .979 
How would you 
rate your overall 
physical health 
today? 





Table 6.10 Associations between mean heart rate variability measured 30 minutes 
after rating MD symptoms and the within- and between-individual differences in 
MD symptoms in Study 3 
Note. β = standardized beta of the fixed effect; SE = standard error of the fixed 
effect; LCL = 2.5% confidence interval; UCL = 97.5% confidence interval; p = p-value; 
b = between-individual difference; w = within-individual difference. 
 
DDI item 
β SE LCI UCI p 
b w b w b w b w b w 
I feel happy. -.19 .02 .12 .03 -.41 -.04 .03 .07 .390 .861 
I feel sad. -.12 .01 .12 .03 -.35 -.04 .10 .06 .660 .918 
I feel irritable. .17 -.01 .11 .03 -.04 -.06 .39 .04 .423 .912 
I enjoy what I 
am doing. 
-.01 .02 .12 .03 -.24 -.03 .22 .07 .974 .731 
I don’t care 
about anything. 
-.09 -.01 .13 .03 -.32 -.06 .15 .04 .828 .922 
I have no 
appetite during 
the day. 
.06 -.06 .21 .06 -.32 -.18 .44 .05 .934 .636 
I worry about 
sleeping. 
-.11 -.02 .19 .06 -.45 -.15 .24 .10 .884 .918 
I didn’t have 
enough sleep 
last night. 
.02 -.05 .13 .06 -.22 -.17 .26 .07 .960 .755 
I am restless. .14 .04 .13 .03 -.10 -.01 .39 .09 .611 .423 
I am tired. .05 .01 .12 .03 -.19 -.04 .28 .06 .918 .911 
I feel guilty. -.06 -.02 .13 .03 -.29 -.07 .17 .03 .911 .784 
I am doing 
things at my 
normal pace. 
-.14 .04 .12 .03 -.36 -.01 .08 .10 .580 .382 
I feel worthless. -.02 -.05 .12 .03 -.25 -.10 .20 .01 .960 .333 
I feel that I can’t 
make decisions. 
-.06 .04 .12 .03 -.29 -.01 .17 .09 .901 .416 
I can’t 
concentrate. 
-.02 .06 .12 .02 -.25 .01 .21 .11 .960 .132 
I feel hopeless. -.06 -.05 .12 .03 -.28 -.10 .17 .00 .911 .298 
How’s your day? -.13 -.04 .17 .06 -.44 -.16 .18 .09 .782 .872 
How would you 
rate your overall 
physical health 
today? 





Table 6.11 Associations between mean heart rate variability measured 60 minutes 
after rating MD symptoms and the within- and between-individual differences in 
MD symptoms in Study 3 
Note. β = standardized beta of the fixed effect; SE = standard error of the fixed 
effect; LCL = 2.5% confidence interval; UCL = 97.5% confidence interval; p = p-value; 
b = between-individual difference; w = within-individual difference. 
 
DDI item 
β SE LCI UCI p 
b w b w b w b w b w 
I feel happy. -.22 .02 .12 .03 -.45 -.03 .01 .07 .328 .784 
I feel sad. -.14 .01 .13 .03 -.38 -.04 .09 .06 .580 .918 
I feel irritable. .16 .00 .12 .03 -.06 -.05 .38 .05 .473 .998 
I enjoy what I 
am doing. 
-.01 .02 .13 .03 -.25 -.03 .22 .07 .967 .684 
I don’t care 
about anything. 
-.11 .00 .13 .02 -.35 -.05 .14 .04 .766 .960 
I have no 
appetite during 
the day. 
.07 -.05 .21 .06 -.32 -.17 .46 .07 .918 .722 
I worry about 
sleeping. 
-.13 -.02 .20 .07 -.49 -.15 .22 .10 .835 .922 
I didn’t have 
enough sleep 
last night. 
.05 -.02 .13 .06 -.19 -.13 .29 .09 .912 .918 
I am restless. .12 .03 .14 .02 -.13 -.02 .37 .08 .719 .493 
I am tired. .04 .03 .13 .03 -.20 -.02 .28 .08 .924 .473 
I feel guilty. -.04 -.02 .13 .03 -.29 -.07 .19 .03 .918 .715 
I am doing 
things at my 
normal pace. 
-.17 .06 .12 .03 -.40 .01 .05 .11 .463 .178 
I feel worthless. -.04 -.04 .13 .03 -.27 -.09 .19 .02 .926 .471 
I feel that I can’t 
make decisions. 
-.09 .06 .13 .02 -.32 .01 .15 .11 .828 .121 
I can’t 
concentrate. 
-.04 .08 .13 .02 -.28 .03 .20 .13 .933 .020 
I feel hopeless. -.07 -.04 .13 .03 -.30 -.09 .17 .01 .900 .382 
How’s your day? -.13 -.02 .17 .06 -.45 -.14 .19 .11 .784 .922 
How would you 
rate your overall 
physical health 
today? 





Table 6.12 Associations between mean heart rate variability measured 120 minutes 
after rating MD symptoms and the within- and between-individual differences in 
MD symptoms in Study 3 
Note. β = standardized beta of the fixed effect; SE = standard error of the fixed 
effect; LCL = 2.5% confidence interval; UCL = 97.5% confidence interval; p = p-value; 
b = between-individual difference; w = within-individual difference. 
DDI item 
β SE LCI UCI p 
b w b w b w b w b w 
I feel happy. -.25 .01 .13 .02 -.50 -.04 .00 .05 .298 .947 
I feel sad. -.18 .00 .14 .02 -.43 -.05 .08 .05 .500 .974 
I feel irritable. .15 .00 .13 .02 -.09 -.05 .39 .05 .567 .990 
I enjoy what I 
am doing. 
-.02 .02 .14 .02 -.28 -.02 .23 .07 .960 .692 
I don’t care 
about anything. 
-.12 .00 .14 .02 -.39 -.05 .14 .04 .736 .974 
I have no 
appetite during 
the day. 
.08 -.06 .22 .06 -.33 -.18 .48 .07 .918 .692 
I worry about 
sleeping. 
-.13 -.02 .20 .07 -.50 -.16 .23 .11 .835 .918 
I didn’t have 
enough sleep 
last night. 
.03 .01 .14 .05 -.22 -.09 .28 .11 .960 .954 
I am restless. .11 .03 .15 .02 -.17 -.01 .39 .08 .800 .473 
I am tired. .01 .04 .14 .02 -.25 -.01 .28 .08 .973 .393 
I feel guilty. -.04 -.03 .14 .02 -.30 -.07 .22 .02 .936 .567 
I am doing 
things at my 
normal pace. 
-.22 .05 .13 .02 -.46 .00 .03 .09 .382 .268 
I feel worthless. -.06 -.03 .14 .03 -.31 -.08 .20 .02 .912 .473 
I feel that I can’t 
make decisions. 
-.11 .04 .14 .02 -.37 -.01 .15 .08 .764 .335 
I can’t 
concentrate. 
-.06 .06 .14 .02 -.32 .01 .20 .10 .912 .098 
I feel hopeless. -.08 -.04 .14 .02 -.34 -.09 .17 .01 .872 .382 
How’s your 
day? 
-.14 -.01 .18 .07 -.47 -.14 .19 .12 .782 .960 









Discussion     
Low physical activity levels were associated with both within- and between-
individual differences in different MD symptoms. Low heart rate variability was only 
found to relate to within-individual differences in two items in the DDI. 
Heterogeneity among MD symptoms could be observed in the overall scarce 
significant associations in both activity level and heart rate variability as well as in 
the ranges of standardized betas in some activity levels and heart rate variabilities.  
The links between both low activity level and low heart rate variability and 
MD severity were vaguely in agreement with previous studies (A. H. Kemp et al., 
2010; Saeb et al., 2015). Significant influences of activity levels were mostly 
observed prior to the momentary feelings were rated and many could be traced 
back to as far as 120 minutes. The influences of heart rate were smaller in scale 
compared to activity levels and they exclusively happened before the MD 
symptoms measures. Significant within-individual differences were only found in 
two DDI items in heart rate variability – unable to concentrate and doing things with 
one’s normal pace. Even though the symptoms were different from the literature, it 
corresponded with the literature that only a few MD symptoms were significantly 
related to heart rate variability and this might explain the inconsistent findings in 
the link between MD and heart rate variability (Borrione et al., 2018). Reduced 
activity level and heart rate variability may be used as a warning sign or precaution 
for the possibly upcoming MD symptoms. 
Different patterns in within- and between-individual differences across MD 
symptoms in both activity level and heart rate activity were observed. However, the 
patterns of standardized betas of the same symptom in between- or within- subject 
differences and in activity level or heart rate variability measured before or after 
the momentary ratings were mostly similar. Only significant within-individual 
differences were seen in heart rate variability. These were consistent with previous 
research on varied results in within- and between-individual differences and within-
individual differences were more sizeable than between-individual differences in 





results found in between- and within-individual differences might denote there 
might be greater than formerly expected heterogeneity in MD symptoms. The 
divergent results may raise a potential problem in using between-individual design 
to study MD and further use the results in wider application such as policy and 
clinical diagnose and treatments. 
Among the DDI items significantly related to activity level, positive mood 
was the only item that had significant associations in within- and between-
individual differences. This confirmed the previous finding on the relationship 
between positive mood and activity level (Bossmann et al., 2013). While positive 
affect was significantly predicted by activity level, negative affect was not. The 
divergent results in positive and negative affects indicated albeit positive affect was 
different from negative affect, it was not the opposite of negative affect. This was in 
line with the literature (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1999; Danhauer et al., 2013; Watson, 
Clark, & Carey, 1988; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Only positive affect was 
associated with activity level might also imply increasing activity level had no effect 
on negative affect. Therefore, if having negative affect was the primary symptoms 
in MD patients, other approaches would be required to diminish negative affect.  
Limitations and future directions 
There was less heart rate variability data than the activity level data. No 
heart rate variability data were collected in 18 female participants. The positions of 
the devices may be a possible cause. Some participants felt uncomfortable wearing 
the activity sensor. This may result from the long hours participants were required 
to wear the sensor in a sampling day and the length of the study being 14 days. 
Using devices that are easier and more comfortable to wear for a prolonged period 
may be more ideal for future studies. However, considering the variety of devices 
on offer in the market, researchers may want to include other issues such as 
sensitivity, precision, data computing time, and power efficiency in evaluation 
(Kirchner et al., 2018).  
Within-individual differences do provide new perspective because within-





J. Fisher et al., 2018; Hamaker, 2012; P. C. M. Molenaar, 2004). The within-
individual variances might be four times larger than between-individual variances (A. 
J. Fisher et al., 2018). Future studies could include this in the study design, and this 
may yield unforeseen results to further our knowledge of MD. Future studies could 
investigate the precise time frame of the influences of activity level and heart rate 
variability starting to affect MD symptoms. These changes could be used as an 
alarm to notify MD patients and hopefully to prevent MD symptoms or episodes 
from kicking in. 
Next chapter will discuss whether network theory could be used to explain 












Depression: a unitary entity or a cluster of interconnected constituents 
The classification system of mental disorders described the disorders using 
symptoms, which formed the diagnostic criteria. This unitary model (“one diagnosis, 
one disease process”) was the mainstream view of psychiatric disorders and greatly 
influenced relevant academic and pharmacological research in psychiatry. However, 
there are also views about whether such an entity is discrete or categorical – a 
person either has depression or not – or continuously distributed across all 
individuals from very-low levels (characteristic of a non-pathological state) to very-
high (attracting clinical attention). Both views would fit in what Kendler, Zachar, and 
Craver (2011) referred to as essentialist kinds: each disorder has a specific set of 
etiological factors that are qualitatively invariant across people. Essentialist kinds 
may well explain infectious diseases. But they are ill-suited in depicting biological 
phenomena, chronic diseases, and psychiatric disorders because multiple 
environmental, genetic, metabolic, behavioral factors are involved. These may 
interact with each other and contribute variously to the observed disease, disorder, 
or biological phenomena. Moreover, essentialist kinds cannot fully capture the 
heterogeneous feature of psychiatric disorders. For example, this can be observed 
in the literature where some studies showed the same (Bhar et al., 2008) while 
some studies reported different patterns (Fournier et al., 2013) of changes in 
different depressive symptoms in patients who were under clinical treatments; 
differential variations of patterns among the symptoms is a central question of this 
thesis.  
Also, Reiger et al. (2013) field tested the reliability (agreement between 
diagnosis) of several psychiatric disorder diagnoses listed in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-V (DSM-V) in 11 medical centers in the U.S. 





fall into a range of very good (kappa = .6–.79), good (kappa = .4–.59), questionable 
(kappa = .2–.39), and unacceptable (kappa < .2). The DSM-V diagnosis of major 
depression (MD) fell into a questionable range in this field trial – in adults, the 
diagnostic reliability was good, questionable, and unacceptable in one, two, and 
one medical centers, respectively; in children, the diagnostic reliability was 
questionable in two medical centers. Their results demonstrated the pressing need 
to review the classification and diagnostic criteria of psychiatric disorders. 
Relevantly for this research, this reliability may explain etiological heterogeneity in 
psychiatric disorders because different doctors or diagnostic instruments may focus 
on different symptoms and thereby either detect or did not detect the disorder in 
their patients. 
Network theory 
 Kendler et al. (2011) proposed an alternative conceptualization of 
psychiatric disorders that they termed mechanistic property clusters (MPC). This 
concept was firstly mentioned in Kendler (2008) as a mechanistic approach, where 
he described psychiatric disorders were caused by multi-level causal loops and 
interactions. In the MPC view, there is no single underlying entity that causes the 
coalescence of groups of symptoms (disorders). Instead, symptoms coalescence and 
are sustained via mutually reinforcing associations among themselves. The MPC 
conceptualization of disorders may better deal with phenomena that the 
essentialist view struggles to account for. These include ubiquitous co-morbidity 
(co-existence of multiple disorders) and clinical heterogeneity (patients thought to 
have the same disorder varying in specific symptoms) (Borsboom & Cramer, 2013; 
Borsboom et al., 2011; Cramer et al., 2010). The former is because the symptoms 
may reinforce each other across putative disorders: the symptoms thought to be 
caused by different disorders according to the traditional view may overlap or they 
are causally connected. The latter is because the patterns of causal associations 
among symptoms may differ across individuals (contributing to heterogeneous sets 
of symptoms). A similar idea of symptoms forming a causal network, where the 





earlier psychiatric symptoms, was advocated by Borsboom (2008) and summarized 
as the network theory (Borsboom, 2017). In the network theory, psychiatry 
symptoms are presumed to have causal relationships between each other 
(Borsboom, 2017). These interconnected symptoms form a network of symptoms 
and they collectively represent a psychiatric disorder. It has been applied in 
explaining several mental disorders including MD (Cramer et al., 2016; Fried, 
Epskamp, et al., 2016). 
The network theory could explain the structure, comorbidity, and dynamics 
of mental disorders. Borsboom (2017) adopted an interventionist theory of 
causation to explain the causal relationships between symptoms (Woodward, 2005). 
This theory describes when a causal relationship exists between two symptoms, the 
expression of one symptom would be altered by interventions or treatments of 
another symptom. Each symptom is illustrated by a node in a network (Borsboom, 
2017). Connections between nodes are nodes, which depict direct causal 
relationships among symptoms. Causation may be unidirectional or bidirectional. 
Strong causal relationships between the nodes in a network generate feedback 
loops and maintain the existing causal relationships. Networks could be influenced 
by both internal and external factors – changes in nodes within the network and 
factors outside of the network (excluding the nodes). These may include all 
psychological and biological causes in an individual and causes from the 
environments surrounding the individual. Depending on the strength of connections 
between particular nodes, network structures may be synchronized when the 
connections are strong (the activation of one symptom is very likely to activate 
most other symptoms in the network) or clustered when the connections are weak 
(one activated symptom only activates certain symptoms and other symptoms 
remain inactive).  
Comorbidity between psychiatric disorders could be explained by the 
network theory, too. Comorbidity arises when two or more networks share bridge 
symptoms – symptoms that connect separate networks. The level of connectivity 





could be readily applied to explain the dynamics of psychopathology. In strongly 
connected networks, transition from an inactivated state to an activated state may 
result in hysteresis – a self-sustaining activated state even after the triggers are 
removed (Cramer, 2013; Cramer et al., 2016). When weakly connected networks 
are activated, the activated state is less likely to last and the network would return 
to the inactivated state. “Mental disorders then arise when groups of tightly 
coupled symptoms actively maintain each other, leading to a cluster of 
psychopathology symptoms that becomes self-sustaining” (Borsboom, 2017, p. 7). A 
simulation study on MD reported the amount of stress had to be removed from a 
system is more than the amount of stress required to induce state transition initially 
(Cramer et al., 2016). Applying network theory to study how disorders arise in 
healthy people, it could indicate early signs of possible transition into a disordered 
state (Fried et al., 2017). 
An important property of any network is the centrality of its nodes. 
Centrality of symptoms shows the relative importance of symptoms (Opsahl, 
Agneessens, & Skvoretz, 2010; Sciarra, Chiarotti, Laio, & Ridolfi, 2018) within a 
network, which could be used in identifying key symptoms in treatment plans. But 
there are different centrality measures and they reveal different aspects of the 
topography of nodes in a network. Centrality measures including instrength (how 
much a node could be predicted by other nodes in the network), outstrength (how 
much a node could predict other nodes), betweenness (the shortest path of a node 
between two other nodes), and closeness (the shortest path to all other nodes in a 
network) (A. J. Fisher et al., 2017; Fornito et al., 2016; Opsahl et al., 2010). 
Although the network theory provides a new lens into psychiatric disorders, 
it is not without limitations and there had been some debates. The most critical 
question is: how to empirically test this, in comparison to depression-as-unitary-
entity view? Three independent networks – temporal, contemporaneous, and 
between-subjects networks – were used to test the relationships between MD 
symptoms and the structure of MD (Epskamp, Waldorp, et al., 2018). Temporal 





time point predicts the values of the same (self- loop) or the other variables in the 
network assessed at the subsequent time point. These temporal relationships might 
explain the causal relationships between variables because one of the premises of 
causality is causes proceed effects; the autoregressive paths capture the changes in 
the variables themselves, including variance due to their underlying but time-
varying common cause, whereas the cross-lagged paths capture potentially causal 
associations between variables, conditional on autoregressive paths. Vector auto-
regression (VAR) is widely used to study causality and forecasting in economics 
(Coad, 2010; Jangili, 2011; Stock & Watson, 2001; Taghavi, 2001). An edge in 
temporal networks is obtained by controlling for all other variables in the previous 
sampling time in a regression model (Epskamp, Waldorp, et al., 2018). VAR has been 
used in nursing studies on the causality between several vital signs and 
cardiorespiratory instability, too (Bose et al., 2017). In a small sample of time-series 
data, VAR was reported as a suitable tool to study causality between MD and 
physical activity (Rosmalen et al., 2012). Temporal networks could catch the time-
lagged relationships between some variables. There are also possibilities where 
temporal associations might not infer causality such as “a unidimensional auto-
correlated factor model would lead to every variable predicting every other variable 
over time” (Epskamp, van Borkulo, et al., 2018, p. 417). In addition, successfully 
constructing temporal networks is limited by sufficient statistical power of data and 
the lag interval recorded – data recorded every few hours cannot advise temporal 
relationships occurred over a few seconds.  
However, the associations between other variables may happen 
instantaneously and these associations could not be captured by temporal networks 
but they may be explained by contemporaneous networks. Contemporaneous 
networks could inform the structure of a network but they do not provide 
information on the relationships between variables in networks (A. J. Fisher et al., 
2017). Contemporaneous networks describe partial directed correlations between 





effects of other variables at the same time (Epskamp, van Borkulo, et al., 2018; 
Epskamp, Waldorp, et al., 2018; Wild et al., 2010). 
Both temporal and contemporaneous networks are within-subjects 
networks in that they describe co-variation within individuals. The more frequent 
the assessment the better the estimation of these two networks and the estimation 
of between-subjects networks improves with the number of participants. For 
example, an association in the former means that when an individual was more 
worried than his/her usual at time one he/she would feel more tired than his/her 
usual at time two, controlling for all other autoregressive and cross-lagged 
associations. An association in the latter, in contrast, could mean that while an 
individual is more tired than his/her usual he/she would concurrently have more 
concentration problems, regardless of his/her levels of tiredness, concentration 
problems and all other symptoms at the previous time-point. The differences 
between subjects could be observed in between-subject networks, which could 
show, for example, that the more worried people are generally, the less tired they 
feel, even if there is a positive association between these symptoms within 
individuals over time. 
Moreover, Forbes, Wright, Markon, and Krueger (2017) argued the networks 
were unstable due to measurement errors. As a result, the results may need to be 
examined with standards higher than the normal ones to reach sound conclusions. 
Along the same line of argument, Steinley, Hoffman, Brusco, and Sher (2017) tested 
the network theory and found most of the results were not different from the 
results obtained by chance. The issue on multiple testing was highlighted, too. They 
then argued the network results were highly nonreplicable and eying on the recent 
replication crisis movement in science including Psychology, those who want to 
apply the relevant findings should be more cautious (V. E. Johnson et al., 2017). 
Later, Borsboom et al. (2017) reanalyzed the data Forbes et al. (2017) used and 
claimed the networks were more replicable than these authors claimed. Forbes, 
Wright, Markon, and Krueger (2017) also reanalyzed the data and tested 





concluded the replicability of network analysis are limited in within and between 
subjects. There are other statistical issues of network theory including lacking 
appropriate methods in handing ordinal data and potential flaws in the current 
method in treating missing data (Epskamp, 2017). 
The above arguments regarding the pitfalls and limitations of network 
theory showed the network theory is still in its early stage of development and 
these are common and healthy processes in the development of new theories. Also, 
the theory is drawing more attentions in the field. This chapter sought to address 
the two issues mentioned above – essentialist view vs. network theory and the 
stability of networks by conducting three time-series studies and analyzing the 
lagged relationships between MD symptoms, the level of connectivity of MD 
symptoms, and the replicability across the studies. A potential issue of multiple 
comparison was addressed by using false discovery rate to adjust all p-values. 
Moreover, significance level of .001 rather than the conventional .05 was employed 
to get solid conclusions. 
The studies 
One way to test these competing views of the nature of MD is to collect 
time-series data of depression symptoms and study the associations among the 
symptoms over time. Levels of depression symptoms vary over time – hours, days, 
weeks, or months. This may be caused by changes in an underlying latent entity 
(MD) (a prediction derived from the essentialist view) or by the up or down 
regulations between the symptoms (a prediction from the MPC view and the 
network theory). These two explanations are not mutually exclusive and they may 
coexist (Epskamp, Rhemtulla, & Borsboom, 2017). If the former is the case, 
associations between symptoms across time should reduce to non-significant levels 
once general changes (captured by autoregressive path among the symptoms) in 
their shared variance are controlled for. However, if there are associations among 
symptoms over time – e.g., fatigue at time one correlates with concentration 
difficulties at time two over and above the general (shared) fluctuations in 





holds, there is no reason to expect cross-lagged associations among symptoms once 
the autoregressive trajectories of these symptoms are controlled for (H16). But no 
matter which explanation the results support, it does not dismiss the other 
explanation. Contemporaneous network and between-subject network are used to 
explore the associations not captured by temporal network and the structure of MD. 
Two centrality measure – instrength and outstrength – are used to test the 
predictabilities of MD symptoms in the three networks (A. J. Fisher et al., 2017). 
There being systematic variability among symptoms in their centrality, especially in 
temporal networks, would be consistent with the network view because there is no 
reason for one symptom to be more central than others according to the entity-
view: this view sees all symptoms merely as indicators or the single underlying 
processes. Other than testing the networks in the three studies separately, the 
stability of the networks is tested by analyzing the replicability of the networks. If 
the networks do replicate, this shows they are stable and H16 gains substantial 
support.    
 
Materials and Method 
 The participant, material, and procedures used here were the same as those 
described in materials and method in Studies 1, 2, and 3 in Chapters 2–6.  
 
Results 
All analyses were conducted in RStudio version 1.1.463. The Gaussian 
Graphic Model (GGM) was used to conduct network analysis in RStudio as 
implemented in the R package mlVAR, version 0.4.1 (Epskamp, Waldorp, et al., 
2018). Univariate multilevel regression models, which calculate within-subject 
variances, were used in temporal and contemporaneous networks to estimate 
parameters for each individual. To simplify the models, correlated random effects 
excluding those appeared in the same models were used in both temporal and 
contemporaneous networks, meaning that within-subject (co-)variances were 





subjects networks use the estimations of sample-means of each participant on all 
variables. In the three studies, variables only measured once a day were removed 
from analysis because the two-step multilevel VAR only calculates measurements at 
time t and their subsequent measurements at time t+1. These variables were 
reduced to NAs as per listwise deletion. Therefore, associations between variables 
measured on different days were not analyzed (e.g., over-night cross-lagged or 
autoregressive paths). The effect sizes of the networks are standardized betas from 
multi-level models for the temporal networks, partial correlation coefficients among 
the residuals of the variables from multi-level models for the contemporaneous 
networks, and partial correlation coefficients between intercepts from the multi-
level models for the between-subject networks. All temporal connections including 
the significant and non-significant ones between symptoms in Studies 1, 2, and 3 
were shown in Figures 7.1–7.3, respectively. Blue arrows illustrate positive 
connections while red arrows denote negative connections. To address the issue of 
multiple comparison, all p-values were corrected using false discovery rate. The 
centrality of the temporal networks was analyzed by using matrices of betas while 
partial correlation coefficients were used to calculate the centrality of the 
contemporaneous and between-subject networks. 
To test the stability of the networks, the replicability of the three studies 
was also tested by comparing the effect sizes of the networks (e.g., standardized 
betas) with Spearman’s rank-order correlation. If the temporal networks were 
stable across three studies, the support for either the essentialist or the network 
view would be even more robust. Meta-analysis of the networks was also 
conducted to see whether there were shared patterns across studies. The DDI items 
only used in one of the studies were removed from meta-analysis. 
 
Study 1 
The time-series data of 6,392 data points collected from 127 participants 
were analyzed. The DDI items only measured once a day were removed from 





sleeping”, “I feel that I didn’t have enough sleep last night”, and “How’s your day”. 
Almost all symptoms measured at time t significantly predicted the ratings of the 
same symptom at time t+1 with one exception of feeling irritable (β = .09, p = .011). 
Scattered significant temporal associations were observed between the DDI items 
(Figure 7.1; Table 7.1). As for temporal, cross-lagged associations, greater 
concentration at t was associated with feeling able to get things done at t+1 (β = .10, 
p < .001). Participants who felt more worthless at time t felt less hopeful at time t-1 
(β = .13, p < .001). These few significant temporal associations provided some 
support for the network theory; but only 12 of the 121 possible associations were 
significant, so the evidence was weak.  
The importance of MD symptoms in the temporal network could be seen in 
centrality measures. The outstrength ranking revealed feeling sad and worthless 
were the symptoms that predicted the most symptoms while the instrength ranking 
showed feeling hopeless and unable to concentrate were the symptoms that mostly 
affected by other symptoms (Table 7.2). In the temporal network, some symptoms 
connected with more symptoms than others and the symptoms have high level of 
connectivity might be more important than others. This supported the network 
theory and challenged the essentialist view because according to the essentialist 






Figure 7.1 Temporal network in Study 1 
 
Table 7.1 Standardized betas, standard errors, and p-values of the temporal network 
in Study 1 
From To β SE p 
Sad Sad .14 .03 < .001 
Sad Irritable .05 .03 .225 
Sad Enjoy .09 .03 .037 
Sad Care .00 .03 .972 
Sad Restless -.01 .03 .780 
Sad Tired .03 .03 .534 
Sad Effort .00 .02 .926 
Sad Worthless .06 .03 .052 
Sad Done .00 .03 .974 
Sad Concentrate .01 .03 .789 
Sad Hopeless .02 .03 .616 
Irritable Sad .05 .03 .179 





From To β SE p 
Irritable Enjoy .03 .03 .386 
Irritable Care -.01 .02 .833 
Irritable Restless .01 .03 .923 
Irritable Tired -.03 .03 .544 
Irritable Effort .01 .02 .837 
Irritable Worthless -.01 .02 .890 
Irritable Done .00 .03 .951 
Irritable Concentrate -.01 .03 .881 
Irritable Hopeless .02 .02 .531 
Enjoy Sad .09 .03 .006 
Enjoy Irritable .06 .02 .025 
Enjoy Enjoy .13 .03 < .001 
Enjoy Care .06 .02 .070 
Enjoy Restless .00 .02 1.000 
Enjoy Tired .00 .02 .973 
Enjoy Effort .01 .02 .782 
Enjoy Worthless .03 .02 .477 
Enjoy Done -.02 .03 .602 
Enjoy Concentrate .03 .02 .363 
Enjoy Hopeless .01 .03 .824 
Care Sad .04 .02 .157 
Care Irritable .02 .02 .653 
Care Enjoy .01 .02 .739 
Care Care .17 .03 < .001 
Care Restless .00 .02 .934 
Care Tired -.02 .02 .516 
Care Effort -.01 .02 .802 
Care Worthless .00 .02 .974 
Care Done .01 .02 .731 
Care Concentrate -.01 .02 .780 
Care Hopeless .01 .02 .742 
Restless Sad .01 .02 .874 
Restless Irritable -.01 .02 .837 
Restless Enjoy .02 .02 .422 
Restless Care .01 .02 .819 
Restless Restless .12 .02 < .001 
Restless Tired .03 .02 .291 
Restless Effort .02 .02 .449 
Restless Worthless .01 .02 .715 
Restless Done .00 .02 .949 
Restless Concentrate .03 .02 .290 
Restless Hopeless .01 .02 .780 
Tired Sad .01 .02 .723 





From To β SE p 
Tired Enjoy .00 .02 1.000 
Tired Care .01 .02 .731 
Tired Restless .00 .02 .998 
Tired Tired .24 .02 < .001 
Tired Effort .02 .02 .581 
Tired Worthless -.02 .02 .402 
Tired Done .01 .02 .679 
Tired Concentrate .00 .02 .970 
Tired Hopeless .00 .02 .926 
Effort Sad -.01 .02 .679 
Effort Irritable -.01 .02 .744 
Effort Enjoy .02 .02 .547 
Effort Care -.04 .02 .091 
Effort Restless .04 .02 .116 
Effort Tired .03 .02 .379 
Effort Effort .16 .02 < .001 
Effort Worthless -.02 .02 .498 
Effort Done .01 .02 .692 
Effort Concentrate .04 .02 .134 
Effort Hopeless .01 .02 .669 
Worthless Sad .01 .03 .919 
Worthless Irritable .01 .03 .926 
Worthless Enjoy .01 .03 .793 
Worthless Care .04 .03 .272 
Worthless Restless .01 .03 .784 
Worthless Tired .04 .03 .404 
Worthless Effort .00 .03 .974 
Worthless Worthless .12 .03 < .001 
Worthless Done .01 .02 .733 
Worthless Concentrate .03 .02 .398 
Worthless Hopeless .08 .03 .011 
Done Sad -.02 .02 .535 
Done Irritable .02 .02 .471 
Done Enjoy .03 .02 .454 
Done Care .03 .02 .215 
Done Restless -.03 .02 .338 
Done Tired -.01 .02 .808 
Done Effort .02 .02 .593 
Done Worthless .01 .02 .784 
Done Done .21 .02 < .001 
Done Concentrate .07 .02 .006 
Done Hopeless .05 .02 .076 
Concentrate Sad .02 .02 .689 





From To β SE p 
Concentrate Enjoy .02 .02 .642 
Concentrate Care .01 .02 .782 
Concentrate Restless .05 .02 .091 
Concentrate Tired .05 .02 .070 
Concentrate Effort .05 .02 .029 
Concentrate Worthless .02 .02 .517 
Concentrate Done .10 .02 < .001 
Concentrate Concentrate .15 .02 < .001 
Concentrate Hopeless .02 .02 .640 
Hopeless Sad .07 .03 .070 
Hopeless Irritable .07 .03 .041 
Hopeless Enjoy .06 .03 .146 
Hopeless Care .02 .03 .731 
Hopeless Restless .08 .03 .011 
Hopeless Tired -.02 .03 .699 
Hopeless Effort .07 .02 .016 
Hopeless Worthless .13 .03 < .001 
Hopeless Done .01 .03 .767 
Hopeless Concentrate .02 .02 .556 
Hopeless Hopeless .16 .03 < .001 
Note. β = standardized beta; SE = standard error; p = p-value. 
 
Table 7.2 Outstrength and instrength of the symptoms in the temporal network in 
Study 1 
Outstrength Instrength 
DDI item z DDI Item z 
Sad .32 Hopeless .54 
Worthless .30 Concentrate .37 
Enjoy .29 Enjoy .31 
Irritable .29 Done .29 
Tired .25 Sad .29 
Concentrate .25 Effort .24 
Restless .24 Worthless .23 
Care .23 Irritable .17 
Hopeless .23 Care .14 
Effort .21 Restless .14 
Done .19 Tired .08 







Feeling hopeless was the most influential symptom in the contemporaneous 
network. It significantly (p < .001) associated with eight symptoms – feeling sad (pr 
= .15), feeling irritable (pr = .09), not enjoying what one was doing (pr = .10), not 
caring what one was doing (pr = .05), feeling restless (pr = .07), feeling worthless (pr 
= .25), unable to get things done (pr = .11), and unable to concentrate (pr = .11) 
(Table D.1 in Appendix D). Doing things effortfully was the second most influential 
symptom and it significantly related to five symptoms. Feeling sad, feeling irritable, 
not enjoying what one was doing significantly related to four symptom and they 
were the third most influential symptoms. Feeling restless and feeling tired were 
the least influential symptoms. The number of significant contemporaneous 
associations indicated the structure of MD is rather versatile and some symptoms 
related to others concurrently. For centrality, feeling irritable and enjoying what 
one was doing were the symptoms connected with the most symptoms in 
instrength and outstrength (Table 7.3). Although these findings per se did not 
support or reject the essentialist view or the network theory, it weakened the claim 
of the essentialist view, where the relationships between symptoms are not 
addressed. 
 
Table 7.3 Outstrength and instrength of the symptoms in the contemporaneous and 
between-subjects network in Study 1 
Contemporaneous network Between-subjects network 
Outstrength and Instrength Outstrength and Instrength 
DDI item z DDI Item z 
Irritable 1.05 Sad 1.92 
Enjoy 1.01 Concentrate 1.80 
Sad .96 Hopeless 1.75 
Hopeless .95 Done 1.61 
Concentrate .86 Enjoy 1.51 
Done .80 Worthless 1.43 
Worthless .66 Irritable 1.25 
Effort .64 Tired 1.18 
Care .56 Restless 1.12 
Tired .55 Care 1.05 
Restless .47 Effort .76 





In the between-subject network, feeling sad, not enjoying what one was 
doing, and unable to concentrate were significantly related to two symptoms (Table 
D.2 in Appendix D). Four symptoms significantly associated with one symptom – 
feeling irritable, feeling worthless, unable to get things done, and feeling hopeless. 
There were four symptoms did not significantly correlate with any symptoms – 
caring about nothing, feeling restless, feeling tired, and doing things effortfully. The 
symptoms that predicted the most symptoms and were predicted by most 
symptoms were feeling sad and unable to concentrate (Table 7.3).  
Different associations observed in the three networks revealed the 
complicated structure of MD and the intertwined relationships between MD 
symptoms. To test the results of Study 1, two more studies were conducted.  
 
Study 2 
A total number of 3,955 data points from 78 participants were collected. The 
following items were removed from analysis because they were only measured 
once per day “I have no appetite during the day”, “I worry about sleeping”, “I feel 
that I didn’t have enough sleep last night”, “How’s your day” and “How would you 
rate your overall physical health today”. Except feeling sad (β = .12, p = .006) and 
not enjoying what one was doing (β = .11, p = .006), feeling more of a symptom 
significantly predicted the subsequent enhanced feeling of the same symptom 
(Figure 7.2; Table 7.4). Feeling less hopeful at time t was predicted by feeling more 
worthless at time t-1 (β = .12, p < .001). Reduced concentration at time t was linked 
to feeling unable to get things do at time t+1 (β = .16, p < .001). The number of 
significant associations among MD symptoms was similar to that in Study 1 and 
among the 144 possible associations, 12 were significant but 10 of these were auto-
correlations. The network theory was vaguely supported. 
Outstrength and instrength were analyzed to test the importance of MD 
symptoms in the temporal network. Feeling sad and unable to get things done 
predicted the most symptoms while unable to concentrate and feeling worthless 





level of importance in the temporal network as indicated by centrality attenuated 
the essentialist view because based on the essentialist view, symptoms would not 
have different levels of centrality. 
 
Figure 7.2 Temporal network in Study 2 
 
Table 7.4 Standardized betas, standard errors, and p-values of the temporal network 
in Study 2 
From To β SE p 
Sad Sad .12 .03 .006 
Sad Irritable .04 .03 .327 
Sad Enjoy .01 .03 .926 
Sad Care .08 .04 .107 
Sad Restless .01 .03 .902 
Sad Tired .00 .03 .987 
Sad Effortless -.05 .03 .298 
Sad Pace -.03 .03 .638 





From To β SE p 
Sad Done .04 .03 .340 
Sad Concentrate .04 .03 .333 
Sad Hopeless .02 .02 .546 
Irritable Sad .07 .03 .076 
Irritable Irritable .11 .03 < .001 
Irritable Enjoy -.01 .03 .891 
Irritable Care .01 .03 .886 
Irritable Restless .03 .03 .465 
Irritable Tired .06 .03 .115 
Irritable Effortless .04 .03 .324 
Irritable Pace -.04 .03 .431 
Irritable Worthless .03 .02 .417 
Irritable Done -.02 .03 .730 
Irritable Concentrate -.02 .03 .732 
Irritable Hopeless .03 .03 .416 
Enjoy Sad .05 .03 .240 
Enjoy Irritable .00 .03 1.000 
Enjoy Enjoy .11 .04 .006 
Enjoy Care -.04 .03 .311 
Enjoy Restless -.02 .02 .549 
Enjoy Tired -.08 .03 .006 
Enjoy Effortless .02 .03 .698 
Enjoy Pace .02 .03 .768 
Enjoy Worthless -.01 .03 .858 
Enjoy Done -.05 .03 .211 
Enjoy Concentrate -.03 .03 .506 
Enjoy Hopeless .01 .02 .777 
Care Sad -.01 .03 .854 
Care Irritable -.02 .03 .675 
Care Enjoy -.03 .03 .590 
Care Care .14 .03 < .001 
Care Restless -.05 .03 .363 
Care Tired -.03 .03 .518 
Care Effortless -.02 .03 .692 
Care Pace -.03 .03 .455 
Care Worthless -.01 .02 .733 
Care Done .04 .03 .363 
Care Concentrate .04 .03 .272 
Care Hopeless .03 .02 .518 
Restless Sad -.02 .02 .707 
Restless Irritable .01 .02 .890 
Restless Enjoy -.01 .03 .768 
Restless Care -.01 .02 .768 





From To β SE p 
Restless Tired .02 .02 .717 
Restless Effortless .02 .02 .506 
Restless Pace .04 .02 .272 
Restless Worthless .01 .02 .666 
Restless Done -.04 .02 .202 
Restless Concentrate .01 .03 .806 
Restless Hopeless .02 .02 .547 
Tired Sad .03 .02 .460 
Tired Irritable .02 .02 .513 
Tired Enjoy .03 .02 .341 
Tired Care -.02 .02 .517 
Tired Restless -.02 .02 .642 
Tired Tired .22 .03 < .001 
Tired Effortless .01 .02 .840 
Tired Pace -.01 .02 .865 
Tired Worthless .00 .02 .932 
Tired Done .02 .02 .533 
Tired Concentrate .02 .03 .648 
Tired Hopeless .01 .02 .746 
Effortless Sad -.05 .03 .134 
Effortless Irritable .02 .03 .604 
Effortless Enjoy .04 .03 .313 
Effortless Care .03 .02 .426 
Effortless Restless .06 .03 .116 
Effortless Tired .06 .03 .085 
Effortless Effortless .13 .03 < .001 
Effortless Pace -.03 .03 .604 
Effortless Worthless .04 .02 .280 
Effortless Done .07 .03 .059 
Effortless Concentrate .05 .03 .179 
Effortless Hopeless .04 .03 .321 
Pace Sad .01 .03 .764 
Pace Irritable .00 .02 .997 
Pace Enjoy .00 .03 .928 
Pace Care -.05 .02 .094 
Pace Restless .00 .02 .932 
Pace Tired .01 .02 .768 
Pace Effortless .02 .02 .698 
Pace Pace .16 .02 < .001 
Pace Worthless .00 .02 .942 
Pace Done -.01 .02 .879 
Pace Concentrate .01 .02 .837 
Pace Hopeless .01 .02 .713 





From To β SE p 
Worthless Irritable .05 .04 .376 
Worthless Enjoy .03 .04 .648 
Worthless Care .07 .03 .126 
Worthless Restless .12 .04 .020 
Worthless Tired .02 .04 .714 
Worthless Effortless .01 .04 .875 
Worthless Pace .01 .03 .854 
Worthless Worthless .16 .04 < .001 
Worthless Done .04 .03 .421 
Worthless Concentrate .04 .03 .443 
Worthless Hopeless .12 .03 < .001 
Done Sad .04 .02 .192 
Done Irritable .04 .03 .240 
Done Enjoy .06 .03 .115 
Done Care .04 .03 .297 
Done Restless .05 .03 .292 
Done Tired -.01 .03 .840 
Done Effortless .04 .03 .340 
Done Pace -.02 .04 .707 
Done Worthless .01 .03 .768 
Done Done .15 .03 < .001 
Done Concentrate .07 .03 .085 
Done Hopeless .02 .02 .590 
Concentrate Sad .06 .03 .134 
Concentrate Irritable .09 .03 .016 
Concentrate Enjoy .08 .03 .037 
Concentrate Care .04 .02 .226 
Concentrate Restless .04 .03 .343 
Concentrate Tired .09 .03 .006 
Concentrate Effortless .05 .03 .257 
Concentrate Pace .07 .03 .079 
Concentrate Worthless .01 .02 .805 
Concentrate Done .16 .04 < .001 
Concentrate Concentrate .18 .03 < .001 
Concentrate Hopeless .03 .03 .488 
Hopeless Sad .02 .03 .688 
Hopeless Irritable .01 .04 .910 
Hopeless Enjoy .07 .03 .126 
Hopeless Care .01 .03 .921 
Hopeless Restless .02 .04 .733 
Hopeless Tired .00 .03 .998 
Hopeless Effortless .01 .03 .820 
Hopeless Pace .07 .03 .124 





From To β SE p 
Hopeless Done .06 .03 .205 
Hopeless Concentrate .01 .03 .926 
Hopeless Hopeless .12 .03 < .001 
Note. β = standardized beta; SE = standard error; p = p-value. 
 
Table 7.5 Outstrength and instrength of the nodes in the temporal network in Study 
2 
Outstrength Instrength 
DDI item z DDI Item z 
Done .54 Concentrate .73 
Sad .43 Worthless .58 
Restless .42 Effortless .48 
Care .39 Done .40 
Tired .38 Hopeless .37 
Enjoy .37 Irritable .35 
Pace .36 Enjoy .32 
Hopeless .35 Sad .31 
Concentrate .33 Care .30 
Irritable .32 Restless .21 
Effortless .29 Tired .19 
Worthless .22 Pace .12 
Note. z = z-score 
 
In the contemporaneous network, feeling sad, feeling irritable, and unable 
to get things done were the most influential symptoms and they had significant 
connections with four symptoms (Table D.3 in Appendix D). Not enjoying what one 
was doing, feeling tired, doing things effortfully, and feeling worthless were the 
second most influential symptoms and they were significantly connected with three 
symptoms. Feeling restless, unable to concentrate, and feeling hopeless were 
significantly associated with two symptoms. The least influential symptoms were 
caring about nothing and not doing things with one’s normal pace and they only 
significantly related to one symptom. Consistent with the contemporaneous 
network in Study 1, some contemporaneous connections were found, which 
showed the structure of MD was complex and unstable. Feeling sad and irritable 
were the top two symptoms affecting and being influenced by the most symptoms 





which tempered the essentialist view because it does not address the relationships 
between MD symptoms. 
 
Table 7.6 Outstrength and instrength of the nodes in the contemporaneous and 
between-subjects networks in Study 2 
Contemporaneous network Between-subjects network 
Outstrength and Instrength Outstrength and Instrength 
DDI item z DDI Item z 
Sad 1.02 Done 2.72 
Irritable .99 Concentrate 2.39 
Done .98 Restless 2.16 
Enjoy .94 Effortless 2.03 
Concentrate .88 Sad 1.75 
Hopeless .85 Hopeless 1.56 
Worthless .78 Care 1.53 
Tired .65 Worthless 1.47 
Effortless .63 Irritable 1.41 
Restless .62 Enjoy 1.28 
Care .55 Pace 1.06 
Pace .42 Tired 1.03 
Note. z = z-score 
 
In the between-subject network, feeling sad remained the most influential 
symptom and it significantly related to three symptoms – feeling irritable (pr = .31), 
not enjoying what one was doing (pr = .44), and doing things effortfully (pr = .40) 
(Table D.4 in Appendix D). Feeling restless, doing things effortfully, and unable to 
concentrate significantly correlated with two symptoms. Not enjoying what one was 
doing, feeling worthless, unable to get things done, and feeling hopeless all 
significantly related to one symptom. The four symptoms that did not relate to any 
symptoms were feeling irritable, caring nothing, feeling tired, and not doing thing 
with one’s normal pace. Unable to get things done and unable to concentrate were 
the most connected nodes in the between-subject network (Table 7.6). The 
structure of MD was complex, and the symptoms connected differently with other 
symptoms as seen in the contemporaneous and between-subject networks. One 







There were 5,561 data points obtained from 78 participants. The items 
including “I have no appetite during the day”, “I worry about sleeping”, “I didn’t 
have enough sleep last night”, “How’s your day” and “How would you rate your 
overall physical health today” were eliminated from mlVAR analysis because they 
were only measured once a day. There were only 13 significant lagged relationships 
out of the 169 possible temporal associations and the support for the network 
theory was rather fragile. Each symptom significantly predicted its’ own subsequent 
symptom ratings (Figure 7.3; Table 7.7). None of the symptoms significantly 
predicted other symptoms.  
The analysis of symptom centrality revealed some symptoms were more 
important than others. Feeling sad and irritable predicted the most symptoms and 
feeling guilty and sad were predicted by the most symptoms (Table 7.8). This again 







Figure 7.3 Temporal network in Study 3 
 
Table 7.7 Standardized betas, standard errors, and p-values of the temporal network 
in Study 3 
From To β SE p 
Happy Happy .21 .04 < .001 
Happy Sad .11 .04 .006 
Happy Irritable .01 .04 .926 
Happy Enjoy .08 .04 .185 
Happy Care -.01 .03 .848 
Happy Restless .01 .04 .884 
Happy Tired .00 .04 .977 
Happy Guilty .02 .03 .645 
Happy Pace -.01 .04 .926 
Happy Worthless .02 .03 .645 
Happy Decision .03 .03 .500 
Happy Concentrate .02 .03 .692 





From To β SE p 
Sad Happy .10 .05 .121 
Sad Sad .20 .04 < .001 
Sad Irritable .07 .04 .194 
Sad Enjoy .03 .04 .602 
Sad Care .00 .03 .995 
Sad Restless -.11 .04 .011 
Sad Tired -.03 .04 .601 
Sad Guilty .03 .03 .524 
Sad Pace -.08 .05 .213 
Sad Worthless .03 .02 .338 
Sad Decision .04 .03 .396 
Sad Concentrate .03 .03 .611 
Sad Hopeless .07 .03 .070 
Irritable Happy .05 .03 .167 
Irritable Sad .07 .03 .088 
Irritable Irritable .15 .04 < .001 
Irritable Enjoy -.02 .03 .669 
Irritable Care .03 .02 .318 
Irritable Restless .10 .03 .006 
Irritable Tired -.01 .03 .908 
Irritable Guilty .01 .02 .820 
Irritable Pace .01 .03 .915 
Irritable Worthless -.02 .02 .689 
Irritable Decision .02 .03 .730 
Irritable Concentrate .05 .03 .223 
Irritable Hopeless -.01 .02 .719 
Enjoy Happy .03 .03 .645 
Enjoy Sad -.04 .02 .255 
Enjoy Irritable -.01 .04 .894 
Enjoy Enjoy .16 .03 < .001 
Enjoy Care -.01 .02 .848 
Enjoy Restless .02 .03 .684 
Enjoy Tired .01 .03 .907 
Enjoy Guilty .03 .02 .427 
Enjoy Pace .02 .03 .752 
Enjoy Worthless .01 .02 .745 
Enjoy Decision .01 .03 .873 
Enjoy Concentrate -.01 .03 .801 
Enjoy Hopeless .01 .02 .749 
Care Happy .03 .05 .768 
Care Sad .02 .03 .731 
Care Irritable .06 .04 .315 
Care Enjoy .00 .04 .957 





From To β SE p 
Care Restless -.03 .03 .598 
Care Tired .00 .03 .943 
Care Guilty -.01 .04 .849 
Care Pace .00 .05 .974 
Care Worthless -.01 .03 .858 
Care Decision .01 .03 .814 
Care Concentrate -.02 .03 .731 
Care Hopeless .01 .02 .873 
Restless Happy .00 .03 .928 
Restless Sad .00 .02 .926 
Restless Irritable .02 .03 .634 
Restless Enjoy .06 .04 .220 
Restless Care .01 .02 .919 
Restless Restless .12 .03 < .001 
Restless Tired .00 .03 .947 
Restless Guilty -.06 .02 .029 
Restless Pace .03 .03 .517 
Restless Worthless .01 .02 .826 
Restless Decision -.01 .02 .792 
Restless Concentrate .02 .03 .753 
Restless Hopeless -.01 .02 .684 
Tired Happy -.01 .02 .770 
Tired Sad .00 .02 .908 
Tired Irritable .05 .02 .146 
Tired Enjoy .01 .02 .919 
Tired Care .01 .02 .721 
Tired Restless .02 .02 .554 
Tired Tired .37 .03 < .001 
Tired Guilty .00 .02 .977 
Tired Pace .03 .03 .571 
Tired Worthless -.02 .02 .603 
Tired Decision .02 .02 .638 
Tired Concentrate .03 .02 .345 
Tired Hopeless .00 .02 .974 
Guilty Happy .10 .03 .011 
Guilty Sad .10 .03 .011 
Guilty Irritable .07 .03 .146 
Guilty Enjoy .07 .03 .142 
Guilty Care -.01 .03 .777 
Guilty Restless .06 .04 .261 
Guilty Tired .00 .04 .957 
Guilty Guilty .29 .04 < .001 
Guilty Pace .03 .04 .708 





From To β SE p 
Guilty Decision .06 .03 .107 
Guilty Concentrate .03 .03 .567 
Guilty Hopeless .07 .03 .025 
Pace Happy -.03 .03 .417 
Pace Sad -.02 .02 .663 
Pace Irritable -.05 .03 .318 
Pace Enjoy .04 .03 .421 
Pace Care -.01 .02 .837 
Pace Restless .00 .02 .947 
Pace Tired -.01 .03 .826 
Pace Guilty .00 .02 .926 
Pace Pace .14 .03 < .001 
Pace Worthless .00 .02 .919 
Pace Decision -.01 .03 .764 
Pace Concentrate .02 .03 .635 
Pace Hopeless .01 .02 .699 
Worthless Happy -.02 .04 .796 
Worthless Sad -.03 .04 .718 
Worthless Irritable .06 .05 .437 
Worthless Enjoy .06 .05 .538 
Worthless Care .05 .06 .622 
Worthless Restless .02 .05 .784 
Worthless Tired .05 .05 .538 
Worthless Guilty .07 .04 .301 
Worthless Pace .08 .05 .190 
Worthless Worthless .17 .05 < .001 
Worthless Decision .01 .04 .947 
Worthless Concentrate .06 .04 .313 
Worthless Hopeless -.01 .04 .934 
Decision Happy .01 .04 .837 
Decision Sad .05 .03 .334 
Decision Irritable -.08 .05 .263 
Decision Enjoy .00 .04 1.000 
Decision Care .00 .03 .972 
Decision Restless -.01 .05 .936 
Decision Tired -.03 .04 .634 
Decision Guilty .00 .03 .980 
Decision Pace -.01 .05 .915 
Decision Worthless .00 .03 1.000 
Decision Decision .14 .04 < .001 
Decision Concentrate .05 .03 .321 
Decision Hopeless .01 .03 .851 
Concentrate Happy .04 .03 .341 





From To β SE p 
Concentrate Irritable .06 .03 .116 
Concentrate Enjoy .00 .03 .957 
Concentrate Care .03 .03 .536 
Concentrate Restless .05 .03 .276 
Concentrate Tired .05 .03 .292 
Concentrate Guilty .00 .02 .956 
Concentrate Pace .04 .03 .420 
Concentrate Worthless .01 .03 .868 
Concentrate Decision .05 .02 .116 
Concentrate Concentrate .17 .04 < .001 
Concentrate Hopeless .05 .02 .134 
Hopeless Happy .02 .04 .763 
Hopeless Sad .07 .03 .121 
Hopeless Irritable .02 .04 .797 
Hopeless Enjoy .01 .04 .891 
Hopeless Care .08 .04 .175 
Hopeless Restless .04 .05 .622 
Hopeless Tired .03 .04 .659 
Hopeless Guilty .02 .03 .715 
Hopeless Pace .09 .05 .237 
Hopeless Worthless .05 .03 .336 
Hopeless Decision -.04 .04 .536 
Hopeless Concentrate .01 .05 .932 
Hopeless Hopeless .19 .04 < .001 






Table 7.8 Outstrength and instrength of the nodes in the temporal network in Study 
3 
Outstrength Instrength 
DDI item z DDI Item z 
Sad .57 Guilty .68 
Irritable .55 Sad .62 
Restless .49 Worthless .50 
Happy .44 Hopeless .47 
Pace .41 Concentrate .44 
Enjoy .38 Irritable .39 
Concentrate .35 Happy .34 
Decision .30 Decision .25 
Hopeless .28 Restless .24 
Guilty .26 Care .21 
Care .25 Pace .21 
Worthless .24 Enjoy .20 
Tired .23 Tired .19 
Note. z = z-score 
 
In the contemporaneous network, unable to concentrate significantly 
related to four symptoms – not enjoying what one was doing (pr = .13), not doing 
things with one’s normal pace (pr = .11), unable to make decisions (pr = .18), and 
feeling hopeless (pr = .09) (Table D.5 in Appendix D). Feeling happy and feeling 
irritable significantly associated with three symptoms. Not enjoying what one was 
doing, feeling restless, feeling guilty, feeling worthless, unable to make decisions, 
and feeling hopeless related to two symptoms. Feeling sad and caring about nothing 
only correlated with one symptom. None of the symptoms were related to feeling 
tired and not doing things with one’s normal pace. For centrality analysis, feeling 
happy and unable to enjoying what one was doing were the best connected DDI 










Table 7.9 Outstrength and instrength of the nodes in the contemporaneous and 
between-subjects networks in Study 3 
Contemporaneous network Between-subjects network 
Outstrength and Instrength Outstrength and Instrength 
DDI item z DDI Item z 
Happy 1.12 Worthless 2.23 
Enjoy .90 Happy 2.14 
Concentrate .89 Hopeless 2.08 
Sad .80 Decision 2.01 
Worthless .80 Irritable 1.87 
Irritable .79 Concentrate 1.71 
Hopeless .77 Restless 1.57 
Decision .75 Enjoy 1.55 
Guilty .63 Guilty 1.52 
Restless .61 Sad 1.47 
Care .56 Tired 1.37 
Tired .48 Pace .85 
Pace .38 Care .79 
Note. z = z-score 
 
 In the between-subject network, feeling happy, feeling irritable, feeling 
worthless, and unable to concentrate were related to two symptoms (Table D.6 in 
Appendix D). The symptoms only related to one symptom were feeling sad, not 
enjoying what one was doing, feeling restless, feeling guilty, unable to make 
decisions, and feeling hopeless. The three symptoms did not associate with any 
symptoms were caring nothing, feeling tired, and not doing things with one’s own 
pace. The centrality analysis showed the best-connected symptoms were feeling 
worthless and feeling happy (Table 7.9). The networks in Study 3 informed the 
structure of MD is complicated. 
Replicability across Studies 1, 2 and 3 
Replicability of the networks and centrality was tested by comparing 
corresponding effect sizes from the three studies using the Spearman’s rank-order 
correlation. To test the replicability of the temporal networks, betas were used, 
which captured the cross-lagged associations between variables at t and t+1, 
controlling for all other variables at time t (Epskamp, Waldorp, et al., 2018). Partial-





contemporaneous and between-subject networks, respectively. Before conducting 
Spearman’s rank-order correlation, the DDI items only used in one or two of the 
studies were removed to align the items across studies. When comparing Studies 1 
and 2, not doing things with one’s normal pace was eliminated from Study 2. Doing 
things effortfully and unable to get things done were excluded from Study 2 and 
feeling happy, feeling guilty, and unable to make decisions were removed from 
Study 3 before comparing Studies 2 and 3. Prior to comparing Studies 1 and 3, 
feeling effortless and unable to get things done were eliminated from Study 1 and 
feeling happy, feeling guilty, and unable to do things according to one’s own pace, 
and unable to make decisions were discarded from Study 3.  
For the temporal networks, the betas from Studies 1 and 2, Studies 1 and 3, 
and Studies 2 and 3 were significantly correlated with each other and the 
Spearman’s rhos were .47, .48, and .48, respectively. The networks were highly 
replicable because the correlation coefficients were sizeable. For contemporaneous 
networks, significant associations were found between Studies 1 and 2 and 
between Studies 2 and 3 and the Spearman’s rhos were .60 and .58, respectively. 
The Spearman’s rho of the partial-correlation coefficients between Studies 1 and 3 
was .51; however, given that all three correlations were greater than .50, there was 
likely a degree of replicability beyond what could be expected by chance alone, 
indicating that residual associations among depression symptoms (controlling for 
symptoms at previous time-points) did display substantial reliability. Figure 7.4 
shows the contemporaneous networks of the three studies side by side. 
 





The between-subject networks did not replicate. The Spearman’s rhos 
between Studies 1 and 2, between Studies 1 and 3, and between Studies 2 and 3 
were .39, .11, and .03, respectively. The between-subject networks of the three 
studies were shown in Figure 7.5. 
 
Figure 7.5 The between-subject networks in the three studies 
 
 Moderate to great levels of correlation of the Spearman’s rhos were found 
in the instrength of the temporal networks and both outstrength and instrength of 
the contemporaneous and between-subjects networks (Table 7.10). These sizeable 
correlations implied considerable replicability in centrality in the two networks.  
 
Table 7.10 Spearman’s rhos of the standardized betas of temporal networks and 
partial correlation coefficients of contemporaneous and between-subjects 
networks in Studies 1, 2, and 3 
 
 r 
 Study 1 vs.     
Study 2 
Study 1 vs. 
Study3 
Study 2 vs.    
Study 3 
Temporal network 
Outstrength -.21 .36 .27 









.23 .33 .32 









 Data of 277 participants from three studies were used in a meta-analysis. 
Only associations shared by the three studies were included in this meta-analysis. 
Standardized betas and standard errors were used to compute meta-analysis of the 
temporal networks because it yields reasonably accurate and precise results and 
the sampling errors are reduced (Peterson & Brown, 2005). For the 
contemporaneous and between-subject networks, partial correlation coefficients 
from the three studies were firstly used to calculate standard errors and then the 
partial correlation coefficients and standard errors were used in the meta-analysis 
(Figure 7.6).  
Similar to the temporal networks in the three studies, there were 14 out of 
81 significant associations in the temporal networks across studies (Table 7.11). 
Thus, rendering some but small support for the network theory. Nonetheless, the 
standardized betas of the associations were relatively similar and close to zero but 
most of the large associations were seen in associations between the previous and 
current measurement of the same symptoms. Unable to concentrate at time t had 
the most significant associations with other symptoms at time t+1 and these were 
itself (β = .16), feeling irritable (β = .05), and feeling tired (β = .06). Three significant 
associations between different symptoms were found – feeling irritable related to 
feeling sad later (β = .07), feeling worthless now was associated with feeling 
hopeless later (β = .07), and feeling hopeless was linked to feeling worthless at the 
next time point (β = .09). These significant associations slightly supported the 
network theory.  
In the contemporaneous and between-subjects networks, there were two 
and five significant associations, respectively. The two connections in the 
contemporaneous networks were feeling irritable vs. feeling sad (β = .25) and 
feeling hopeless vs. feeling worthless (β = .27) (Table 7.12). In the between-subjects 
networks, the five associations were feeling irritable vs. feeling sad (β = .34), not 





irritable (β = .21), unable to concentrate vs. feeling restless (β = .25), and feeling 
hopeless vs. feeling worthless (β = .71) (Table 7.13). 
 
 
Figure 7.6 Meta-analysis of the temporal, contemporaneous, and between-subject 
networks in the three studies 
 
Table 7.11 Meta-analysis of the temporal networks in the three studies (N = 277) 
From  To β SE z p 
Sad Sad .14 .02 7.62 < .001 
Sad Irritable .05 .02 2.89 .020 
Sad Enjoy .04 .02 2.31 .082 
Sad Care .02 .02 .95 .569 
Sad Restless -.03 .02 -1.43 .344 
Sad Tired .00 .02 .19 .924 
Sad Worthless .02 .01 1.87 .183 
Sad Concentrate .03 .02 1.62 .272 
Sad Hopeless .03 .01 2.36 .073 
Irritable Sad .07 .02 3.75 < .001 
Irritable Irritable .11 .02 5.90 < .001 
Irritable Enjoy .00 .02 .06 .977 
Irritable Care .01 .01 .85 .621 
Irritable Restless .05 .02 2.60 .041 
Irritable Tired .01 .02 .56 .753 
Irritable Worthless .00 .01 .17 .926 
Irritable Concentrate .01 .02 .44 .801 
Irritable Hopeless .01 .01 .71 .689 
Enjoy Sad .01 .01 .74 .672 
Enjoy Irritable .04 .02 2.37 .073 
Enjoy Enjoy .14 .02 7.40 < .001 
Enjoy Care .01 .01 1.06 .518 





From  To β SE z p 
Enjoy Tired -.02 .01 -1.14 .474 
Enjoy Worthless .01 .01 1.13 .477 
Enjoy Concentrate .01 .01 .50 .777 
Enjoy Hopeless .01 .01 .97 .557 
Care Sad .03 .01 1.74 .225 
Care Irritable .01 .02 .79 .646 
Care Enjoy .00 .02 .02 .997 
Care Care .14 .02 8.14 < .001 
Care Restless -.02 .01 -1.32 .391 
Care Tired -.02 .01 -1.22 .434 
Care Worthless -.01 .01 -.54 .762 
Care Concentrate .00 .01 .01 1.000 
Care Hopeless .01 .01 1.27 .416 
Restless Sad .00 .01 -.20 .919 
Restless Irritable .00 .01 .33 .858 
Restless Enjoy .02 .02 1.20 .445 
Restless Care .00 .01 .00 1.000 
Restless Restless .12 .01 8.31 < .001 
Restless Tired .02 .01 1.33 .387 
Restless Worthless .01 .01 .92 .587 
Restless Concentrate .02 .01 1.44 .340 
Restless Hopeless .01 .01 .43 .804 
Tired Sad .01 .01 .95 .569 
Tired Irritable .02 .01 2.02 .142 
Tired Enjoy .01 .01 1.07 .513 
Tired Care .00 .01 .00 1.000 
Tired Restless .00 .01 .17 .926 
Tired Tired .26 .01 18.12 < .001 
Tired Worthless -.01 .01 -.89 .601 
Tired Concentrate .02 .01 1.31 .399 
Tired Hopeless .00 .01 .26 .890 
Worthless Sad .02 .02 1.15 .469 
Worthless Irritable .03 .02 1.30 .403 
Worthless Enjoy .03 .02 1.19 .447 
Worthless Care .06 .02 2.76 .029 
Worthless Restless .05 .02 2.12 .119 
Worthless Tired .04 .02 1.62 .269 
Worthless Worthless .14 .02 6.49 < .001 
Worthless Concentrate .04 .02 2.29 .085 
Worthless Hopeless .07 .02 3.99 < .001 
Concentrate Sad .04 .01 2.43 .063 
Concentrate Irritable .05 .01 3.69 < .001 
Concentrate Enjoy .03 .01 2.02 .145 





From  To β SE z p 
Concentrate Restless .05 .01 3.41 .006 
Concentrate Tired .06 .01 4.29 < .001 
Concentrate Worthless .01 .01 1.17 .460 
Concentrate Concentrate .16 .02 10.49 < .001 
Concentrate Hopeless .03 .01 2.37 .073 
Hopeless Sad .05 .02 3.10 .011 
Hopeless Irritable .04 .02 2.00 .149 
Hopeless Enjoy .05 .02 2.75 .029 
Hopeless Care .03 .02 1.38 .366 
Hopeless Restless .05 .02 2.54 .049 
Hopeless Tired .00 .02 .01 1.000 
Hopeless Worthless .09 .02 5.10 < .001 
Hopeless Concentrate .02 .02 1.02 .536 
Hopeless Hopeless .15 .02 8.05 < .001 
Note. β = standardized beta; SE = standard error; z = z score; p = p-value. 
 
Table 7.12 Meta-analysis of the contemporaneous networks in the three studies (N = 
277) 
Variable 1 Variable 2 β SE z p 
Irritable Sad .25 .06 4.37 < .001 
Enjoy Sad .19 .06 3.24 .006 
Enjoy Irritable .20 .06 3.42 .006 
Care Sad .05 .06 .83 .633 
Care Irritable .07 .06 1.16 .465 
Care Enjoy .09 .06 1.50 .316 
Restless Sad .01 .06 .17 .926 
Restless Irritable .12 .06 2.01 .146 
Restless Enjoy .06 .06 1.02 .536 
Restless Care -.02 .06 -.38 .831 
Tired Sad .04 .06 .64 .717 
Tired Irritable .06 .06 .98 .555 
Tired Enjoy .03 .06 .49 .780 
Tired Care .03 .06 .54 .763 
Tired Restless .02 .06 .27 .889 
Worthless Sad .11 .06 1.76 .221 
Worthless Irritable .03 .06 .46 .794 
Worthless Enjoy .02 .06 .39 .826 
Worthless Care .07 .06 1.12 .486 
Worthless Restless .05 .06 .84 .624 
Worthless Tired .01 .06 .11 .954 
Concentrate Sad .01 .06 .21 .917 





Variable 1 Variable 2 β SE z p 
Concentrate Enjoy .09 .06 1.44 .341 
Concentrate Care .06 .06 .92 .588 
Concentrate Restless .04 .06 .65 .715 
Concentrate Tired .09 .06 1.48 .326 
Concentrate Worthless .02 .06 .25 .892 
Hopeless Sad .11 .06 1.88 .183 
Hopeless Irritable .07 .06 1.20 .446 
Hopeless Enjoy .08 .06 1.26 .420 
Hopeless Care .05 .06 .76 .667 
Hopeless Restless .06 .06 .92 .588 
Hopeless Tired .02 .06 .26 .890 
Hopeless Worthless .27 .06 4.54 < .001 
Hopeless Concentrate .09 .06 1.51 .311 
Note. β = standardized beta; SE = standard error; z = z score; p = p-value. 
 
Table 7.13 Meta-analysis of the between-subjects networks in the three studies (N = 
277) 
Variable 1 Variable 2 β SE z p 
Irritable Sad .34 .06 6.19 < .001 
Enjoy Sad .44 .05 8.38 < .001 
Enjoy Irritable .06 .06 1.05 .522 
Care Sad -.04 .06 -.66 .713 
Care Irritable .09 .06 1.53 .306 
Care Enjoy .11 .06 1.80 .206 
Restless Sad .03 .06 .54 .764 
Restless Irritable .21 .06 3.70 < .001 
Restless Enjoy .06 .06 .94 .577 
Restless Care -.16 .06 -2.63 .037 
Tired Sad -.03 .06 -.58 .744 
Tired Irritable .12 .06 1.96 .157 
Tired Enjoy .09 .06 1.46 .334 
Tired Care -.09 .06 -1.58 .285 
Tired Restless .14 .06 2.26 .091 
Worthless Sad .11 .06 1.82 .198 
Worthless Irritable -.02 .06 -.32 .858 
Worthless Enjoy -.04 .06 -.63 .722 
Worthless Care .06 .06 1.03 .532 
Worthless Restless .08 .06 1.33 .387 
Worthless Tired .07 .06 1.22 .437 
Concentrate Sad -.06 .06 -.98 .556 
Concentrate Irritable .06 .06 1.02 .540 





Variable 1 Variable 2 β SE z p 
Concentrate Care .03 .06 .42 .814 
Concentrate Restless .25 .06 4.38 < .001 
Concentrate Tired .13 .06 2.19 .107 
Concentrate Worthless -.11 .06 -1.90 .177 
Hopeless Sad .13 .06 2.11 .121 
Hopeless Irritable .06 .06 1.00 .547 
Hopeless Enjoy .04 .06 .69 .698 
Hopeless Care .05 .06 .89 .602 
Hopeless Restless .14 .06 2.40 .067 
Hopeless Tired -.07 .06 -1.14 .477 
Hopeless Worthless .71 .04 16.81 < .001 
Hopeless Concentrate .02 .06 .41 .820 
Note. β = standardized beta; SE = standard error; z = z score; p = p-value. 
 
Discussion 
The results of the three studies only provided limited and marginal support 
for the network theory. Excluding auto-correlations, there were only four significant 
associations out of the 434 possible associations (p < .001) (Table 7.14). When the 
conventional alpha level of .05 was used, the number of significant associations 
increased to 27 and provided the network theory greater support. The number of 
significant associations without auto-correlations in meta-analysis was five when 
the significant level was .001 and it increased to 12 when the alpha level was .05. 
This provided the network theory with greater support.  
 
Table 7.14 Total number of associations and the numbers of significant associations 
(excluding auto-correlations) in the temporal networks in the three studies and 
meta-analysis 
 Total number 
of associations 
Number of significant 
associations when   
p < .001 
Number of significant 
associations when   
p < .05 
Study 1 121 2 11 
Study 2 144 2 8 
Study 3 169 0 7 






The structure of MD was complex as observed in different symptoms taking 
the leading position in centrality measures of outstrength and instrength in the 
three networks. There were few significant lagged correlations indicating the 
existence of unstable and weak causal relationships among some symptoms and 
thus, vaguely supported the network theory and the MPC view but it did not reject 
the essentialist view. Also, the temporal networks replicated across the three 
studies provided the network theory further support. Even though the 
contemporaneous networks did not fully replicate, the Spearman’s rhos were 
sizeable, there was certain level of replicability. The between-subjects networks did 
not replicate. The potential issue regarding multiple comparison was taken care of 
by using false discovery rate to adjust the p-values and the adoption of a lower than 
conventional alpha-level of .001 increased the difficulty to find support for the 
network theory and made the results more robust (Borsboom et al., 2017; Forbes et 
al., 2017a, 2017b; Steinley et al., 2017). Nonetheless, MD is a complicated construct 
so even though the network theory gained some support in this study, it still cannot 
fully explain MD and other theories are needed to paint a complete picture. 
Multiple theories are usually necessary to grasp the details of complex constructs 
such as MD and personality (René Mõttus & Allerhand, 2017). Having the 
essentialist view together with the network theory in the picture would help us to 
understand MD in its entirety. 
The centrality measures of temporal, contemporaneous, and between-
subject networks in the three studies unveiled different MD symptoms were more 
central than the others in the networks across studies. Variances were observed in 
symptoms and some symptoms were better connected than others. Slightly 
consistent with previous research on the connectivity of MD symptoms with other 
symptoms in temporal networks, where positive affect, hopeless, angry, and 
irritable were the leading symptoms in generalized anxiety disorder and MD (A. J. 
Fisher et al., 2017), the weightiest symptom in the three studies was negative affect. 
They reported the symptoms having the greatest outstrength in contemporaneous 





greatest outstrength and instrength in the contemporaneous network and the 
second greatest outstrength and instrength in the between-subjects network in 
Study 3, which was the only study among the three assessed positive mood. Other 
symptoms with high outstrength were feeling irritable, feeling sad, and enjoying 
what one was doing. Poor treatment outcome and severe MD were observed in MD 
patients who had a high level of anger and hostility (L. B. Fisher et al., 2015). 
Although none of the correlations in the outstrength and instrength of the three 
studies and three networks were significant, sizeable replicability was observed in 
the median to high correlations in the instrength of the temporal networks and the 
outstrength and instrength of the contemporaneous networks (r > .5). The 
connectivity found in the temporal and contemporaneous networks may support 
the network theory. However, the symptoms having high outstrength observed in 
the three studies were different from those reported previously. These 
discrepancies either enfeeble the replicability of the network theory or suggested 
centrality rankings diverge greatly among individuals. The latter supports MD as a 
complex construct and the differences are both in the individual and group level. 
The fact of varying levels of connectivity among MD symptoms challenged the 
essentialist view because MD symptoms should not differ in centrality based on the 
essentialist view. 
 Overall, the results of the studies in temporal networks and the meta-
analytic results (e.g., 14 out of 81 associations had a p-value smaller than .001) 
provided the network theory very limited support. However, the number of 
significant associations increased when the conventional alpha level was applied. 
Weighting the pros and cons of adopting a highly conservative alpha level and the 
possibilities of discovering potential symptom associations are the main deciding 
factors. When applying network theory in studying psychiatric disorders, one 
problem in the fundamental assumption was using the DSM (Fried et al., 2017; 
Guloksuz et al., 2017). The DSM classification system have been revised several 
times since the publication of its first edition. As mentioned in Chapter 1 of this 





This inevitably affected relevant scientific research, pharmacological studies, and 
clinical trainings and practices. Bearing these drawbacks in mind, the potential 
contributions or insights of the network theory might bring to psychiatry cannot be 
undermined. As the theory gathered more and more interests from various parties, 
the advancement and improvement of the theory may inspire professionals working 
in the field of psychiatry to see mental disorders from various perspectives. 
 Limitations and future directions 
  The recording frequency of data limits the changes in symptoms that could 
be pinned down in networks (Epskamp, van Borkulo, et al., 2018). Future studies 
may test different frequencies of data collection to capture the most obvious 
temporal changes in MD symptoms or utilize big data recorded every second to 
map out the microscopic and meaningful fluctuations and associations among 











Chapter 8 General discussion: MD is a heterogeneous construct 
 
 
“The mind is attracted to ideas that refer to effects with single causes, possess a 
broad application and are concordant with contemporary ethical premises. 
However, most psychological phenomena are not the product of a single cause, the 
concepts that account for a relation between two measurements are usually limited 
in breath, and the current emphasis on biological contributions to behaviors and 
symptoms is a pleasing idea because it promises the certainty associated with 
materialistic causes and is in accord with the relatively recent ethical imperative to 
avoid blaming the victim…” (Kagan, 2007, p. 372) 
 
 
There are three types of heterogeneity in major depression (MD): signs, 
symptoms, and syndromes, etiology, and dimensional heterogeneity – blending of 
normal and clinical symptoms (Monroe & Anderson, 2015). Here we discuss the 
heterogeneity in MD symptoms (Chapters 1–7) and the heterogeneity in the 
etiology of MD (Chapter 7).  
The debate surrounding whether MD is homogeneous or heterogeneous 
was mentioned in Chapter 1. According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders-V (DSM-V), the diagnosis of MD is established when five or more 
of the nine MD symptoms are present within two weeks (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013b). Among the five or more MD symptoms, at least one must be 
either depressed mood or anhedonia. Taking a closer look of the MD symptoms, 
some symptoms comprise opposite descriptions such as insomnia vs. hypersomnia. 
In addition, the sum-score scheme has been challenged by research reporting 
variances observed in MD symptoms such as impairments in psychosocial 
functioning and the underlying biological mechanisms, how they were affected by 





with personality traits, MD episodes, and demographics (Fried & Nesse, 2014; Fried 
et al., 2014; Lux & Kendler, 2010). 
Summary of findings and contributions and relevance within the literature 
Across the seven chapters, heterogeneity in MD symptoms is a shared 
observation. It could be observed in the inter-correlations between MD symptoms 
in Chapter 2, the associations between MD symptom variability and MD severity 
and moderators in Chapter 3, the relationships between MD symptoms and 
circadian rhythm in Chapter 4, the relationships between MD symptoms and 
personality traits and facets in Chapter 5, the relationships between MD symptoms 
and activity level and heart rate variability in Chapter 6, and the temporal 
relationships between MD symptoms in Chapter 7. The details of the findings from 
each chapter were described below. 
 
In Chapter 2, heterogeneity of MD symptoms was found in inter-correlations 
between the very first momentary MD ratings participants responded. Comparing 
the inter-correlations between the mean momentary MD ratings and between 
retrospective MD ratings showed the mean momentary MD ratings were highly 
inter-correlated and this may be explained by they were the stable estimates of MD 
symptoms because they were the averages. Further testing of the inter-correlations 
between the very first retrospective MD ratings revealed symptom variabilities as 
seen in the weak inter-correlations across the three studies and the large ranges of 
PCA loadings. 
 
In Chapter 3, MD symptom heterogeneity was observed in the relationships 
between the variabilities of MD symptoms and MD severity as measured by the 
Patient Health Quality-9 (PHQ-9) in the three studies and a meta-analysis of the 
three studies. None or only a few of the variabilities in MD symptoms were 
significantly predicted by moderators including age, gender, educational attainment, 
employment status, and marital status. However, within-subject variabilities, the 





correlated as indicated by the variances explained by the first principal components 
in the three studies and the correlations between PCA loadings. But the ranges of 
PCA loadings in the three studies reflected a certain degree of variance between 
symptom variabilities. 
 
In Chapter 4, only some MD symptoms were significantly predicted by the 
afternoon and evening measuring times in the three studies and meta-analysis. The 
varying predictability of measuring times on MD symptoms might suggest MD 
symptoms are heterogeneous.    
 
In Chapter 5, significant associations were only observed between some personality 
traits and facets and some of the PHQ-9 and the Daily Depressive Items (DDI). In 
addition, broad ranges of standardized betas obtained from meta-analyses of 
personality traits and the PHQ-9 items, the means of the DDI items, and the 
standard deviations of the DDI items were observed. These were between the PHQ-
9 items and neuroticism and extraversion, between the means of the DDI items and 
neuroticism, extraversion, and conscientiousness, and between the standard 
deviations of the DDI items and neuroticism and conscientiousness.  
 
In Chapter 6, there were sparing significant associations between activity level and 
heart rate variability and within- and between-subject differences.  
 
In Chapter 7, when using a stringent alpha level of .001 on top of false discovery 
rate to correct for multiple comparisons, marginal support for the network theory 
were found in the temporal networks in the three studies and meta-analysis. While 
using the conventional alpha level (and still controlling for multiple testing) 
provided the network theory with more support. Also, different MD symptoms 
were found to occupy varying positions in the symptom network, having different 





networks and thereby showing the varying importance of symptoms, which is in line 
with previous research on MD symptoms.   
Heterogeneity in MD symptoms challenges the current diagnostic criteria 
These observations of heterogeneity in MD symptoms may place the 
diagnostic criteria currently in use in a questionable position because it uses sum 
scores in clinical diagnoses. The unspoken presumptions of adopting sum scores 
and cut-offs to establish boundaries between nonclinical and clinical populations 
might be “all symptoms are interchangeable and equally good indicators” (Fried & 
Nesse, 2015b, p. 72) or “the same weight is given to each item” (van Eeden et al., 
2019, p. 203). However, neglecting the variances between patients’ expressions of 
symptoms – having varying combinations of symptoms – and differences in 
individual symptoms and treating them as a whole may take its toll on the general 
population including both the clinical and nonclinical population. Even more, the 
resources spend on relevant research. 
Nomothetic versus idiographic view 
 Nomothetic view of using a large sample is widely adopted in psychological 
research while idiographic view of investigating intraindividual differences is 
gradually gaining more attention. Despite many might believe the nomothetic 
approach could be used to deduce general laws that apply to every individual, it 
actually informs “the distribution of variables at the level of the population through 
the use of summary statistics … and help to determine what applied to the 
aggregate – that is, when averaging across individuals … What applies in aggregate 
is not necessarily informative on what is true in general” (Hamaker, 2012, p. 2). 
Ergodicity discusses the conditions when between-subject analysis yields the same 
results in individuals. Two requirements have to be meet to apply results obtained 
from between-subject analyses to each individual – individuals in both the sampling 
population and the population the results would be applied to are homogenous and 
the phenomenon under study is stable or “have constant statistical characteristics 
in time” (P. C. Molenaar & Campbell, 2009, p. 115). Differences between between- 





analysis were found to be substantially different from those of within-subject 
analysis – the idiosyncratic view (A. J. Fisher et al., 2017; Hamaker, 2012; Laukka et 
al., 2018; van Eeden et al., 2019). Conducting within-subject research requires a 
considerable amount of repeated measurements from the same individual, which 
might be hard to collect in the past due to the availability of suitable tools. But the 
progressions in mobile and computing technologies have made data collection and 
analysis easier than before (A. J. Fisher et al., 2017; Hamaker, 2012).  
This thesis also investigates the divergences between intraindividual and 
interindividual differences and the repeated measure data collected in the three 
studies via the adoption of experience sampling methodology to investigate the 
differences between the two approaches.  
 
In Chapter 6, there were no differences between within- and between-subject 
differences in low physical activity level and MD symptoms. The associations 
between low heart rate variability and MD symptoms were only found in within-
subject differences. Between- and within-subject differences in activity level and 
heart rate activity exhibited varying patterns. Replicability of within-individual 
differences was not tested in Chapter 6 because activity level and heart rate 
variability data were collected in one of the three studies. 
 
In Chapter 7, to compare the structures of within- and between-subject networks, 
the correlations of the meta-analytic networks were analyzed. The correlations 
between the networks were sizeable in magnitude. The correlations of temporal vs. 
contemporaneous (r = .31), temporal vs. between-subject networks (r = .38), and 
contemporaneous vs. between-subject networks (r = .59) were moderate in 
magnitude: collectively for three correlations to exceed .3 is unlikely by chance, 
however the between- and within-subject networks were thus generally moderately 
similar.  
The within-individual differences networks did replicated in Chapter 7. The 





moderately correlated. Sizeable associations were found between the 
contemporaneous networks (r > .5). Replicability of within-individual differences 
was not tested in Chapter 6 because only one study was included in this chapter. 
Limitations 
 While the results of this thesis to some degree challenge the assumption of 
MD symptoms being homogeneous and support heterogeneity in MD symptoms, 
there are several limitations in the materials and participants. 
 The participants in the three studies were mostly healthy undergraduate 
students in the University of Edinburgh. Their responses to both the retrospective 
and momentary questionnaires might differ from the clinical population even 
though some of the participants had a PhQ-9 score that exceeded the cut-off of MD 
diagnosis of 10. However, examining the number of participants with a PHQ-9 score 
equal to or greater than the cut-off found the participants in this thesis well 
represented a matching population of undergraduate students. In Studies 1, 2, and 
3, 62 out of 124, 23 out of 75, and 24 out of 78 participants had a PHQ-9 score of 10 
or greater, respectively (Table 8.1). In a review of 24 articles, the prevalence of MD 
was 10% – 85% and a weighted mean prevalence is 30.6% (Ibrahim et al., 2013). 
This shows the participants in the three studies were representative of their age 
group. The prevalence of MD in the general population is 10.4% in 12 months and 
20.6% over a lifetime in the U.S. (Hasin et al., 2018). The relatively high prevalence 
might indicate the mental health of undergraduate students should be taken more 
seriously and handy supports might need to be placed for them. In addition, the 
participants shared similar demographics including age, educational attainment, 
employment status, and marital status, which may make the effects of these 
variables undistinguishable. 
 Extracting the data of the participants whose PHQ-9 score equal to or 
greater than the cut-off might yield more informative findings of the clinical 







Table 8.1 The distribution of PHQ-9 scores in Studies 1, 2, and 3 
PHQ-9 score Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
0 5 1 4 
1 8 4 1 
2 7 7 14 
3 8 4 6 
4 5 7 8 
5 9 7 2 
6 6 8 2 
7 5 7 5 
8 4 3 6 
9 5 4 6 
10 4 4 5 
11 8 0 2 
12 15 4 4 
13 4 1 2 
14 4 2 1 
15 4 3 2 
16 3 4 2 
17 2 0 0 
18 5 3 1 
19 4 1 0 
20 1 0 0 
21 3 0 1 
22 0 0 1 
23 1 0 1 
24 1 0 1 
25 1 0 1 
26 1 0 0 
27 1 1 0 
Prevalence 50% 30.67% 30.77% 
Note. Prevalence shows the percentage of participants with a PHQ-9 score equal to 
or greater than 10. 
 
The materials used in the three studies were on-line and mobile 
questionnaires and activity sensors. Since every material and method has its pros, 
cons, and limitations, so do the materials and methods employed in this thesis. To 
paint a full picture of a complex construct such as MD, applying multiple methods 
would speed up the process of putting the puzzles together as suggested by Georg 





One of the premises of adopting the single-symptom approach in studying 
MD is whether the measurements are reliable. The convergent and divergent 
validity of the DDI was tested in Chapter 2, where the DDI items measuring the 
same symptoms showed greater convergence than those measuring different 
symptoms. However, there were only one to three DDI items dedicated to measure 
individual MD symptom, which places the reliability of these measurements in a 
dangerous position (Fried & Nesse, 2015b). Having several questions measuring 
each symptom might increase the reliability of the measurements.  
Several MD symptoms comprise opposite sub-symptoms and these include 
insomnia and hypersomnia, weight gain and weight loss, appetite gain and appetite 
loss, and psychomotor retardation and psychomotor agitation. In this thesis, these 
sub-symptoms were not extracted and were analyzed collectively. For example, 
participants’ ratings on “I have no appetite during the day” ranged from “Have 
appetite” to ”Don’t have appetite” on a 100-point sliding scale. Participants’ ratings 
for this question could be separated into below and above 50 and analyzed 
separately to investigate the implications on a sub-symptom level. 
Implications and possible applications 
 Since depressive symptoms are different and heterogeneous and there 
might be network-like relationships among them, constructing networks to find out 
the relationships between the depressive symptoms in each patient might help the 
clinicians to identify vital symptoms in patients. Clinicians could then focus on 
treating these symptoms to prevent other symptoms from emerging. Practically, 
this could be done firstly by following the patients for several weeks or months. 
Later, the data could be used to construct temporal and contemporaneous 
networks of the depressive symptoms. Once the key symptoms were identified, the 
clinicians could then tailor treatment plans to alleviate the key symptoms. During 
the course of the treatment, the clinicians could also observe the efficacy of the 
treatment plans and make adjustments when needed. For example, if feeling tired 
is a key symptom, monitoring the fatigue level and sending notifications to remind 





alarming level may prevent other symptoms from occurring. This may ultimately 
make a depressive episode to stop at an early stage or reduce the severity of an 
episode. This could be pictured as removing a few dominos from a chain of dominos 
in an ongoing domino show to stop the chain reaction.  
The MD symptoms being dissimilar rather than similar as reflected in their 
associations with several variables may have challenged the diagnostic criteria of 
MD listed in the two mainstream classification systems because the depressive 
symptoms were treated as if they all have equal weight in diagnoses. Therefore, the 
results of this thesis might provide some insights to re-examine the diagnostic 
criteria of MD. This echoed different initiatives of developing new classification 
systems - the RDoC project sponsored by the NIH (Insel, 2013) and the HiTOP model 
(Kotov et al., 2017). 
  Future directions 
Some of the data collected in the three studies were not analyzed but they 
might provide some insights to MD research. These include lifestyle questions, 
quality of the closest relationship, and three open questions – “Do these questions 
reflect depressive symptoms? Why?”, “In your opinion, could these questions be 
refined to detect finer changes? How? Can you give some examples?”, and “In 
general, what are other suggestions you have toward this study?” Looking into the 
implications of lifestyle questions and the quality of the closest relationship might 
show the influences of these factors on MD symptoms. Analyzing the open 
questions would bring in a qualitative aspect and it might provide some fresh inputs 
from the participants.  
Another possibly interesting aspect might be to change the initial 
retrospective questions in the PHQ-SADS into predictive questions and ask the 
participants to predict their feelings over the period of data collection to explore 
the relationship between predictions and symptom severity. 
Collecting ESM data from MD patients might yield results closer to the real 
experiences of patients suffering from the disorder. However, the MD prevalence in 





similar age group in the general population, extracting the data of those 
participants whose PHQ-9 score equal to or greater than 10 might provide 
informative predictive results of an age-matched patient group. 
The results from clinical population could obtain applicable results that are 
beneficial to improve and develop clinical treatments and applications. In addition, 
the data could be used to compare the differences, similarities, and overlaps 
between the non-clinical and clinical population. These could be used to formulate 
a broad symptom spectrum across the two population.   
Adopting objective measures such as symptom checklists or asking family 
members or friends of the participants to rate the MD symptoms they observed in 
the participants may yield more accurate measures of MD. It could balance the 
biases in self-reports because they are pertain to biases (Furnham et al., 2016; 
Rosenman et al., 2011). After such adjustment, a decrease in the prevalence of MD 
and greater symptom heterogeneity might be observed in the three groups of 
participants. This would coincide the varied symptom profiles in MD patients as 
reported in Fried and Nesse (2015a). 
 
Conclusions 
 The overall conclusion of this thesis is MD symptoms are heterogeneous, 
therefore, they should not be treated collectively and the usage of sum-total score 
in clinical diagnoses should be reconsidered for the furtherance of relevant fields 
and the welfare of those who are affected by MD. Investigating within-individual 
differences might bring forth invaluable fruits in progressing what we think we 





Appendix A: Questionnaires used in the three studies 
 
Demographic and lifestyle questions used in Studies 1 and 2 
 
1. What is your gender? 
Male                         Female 
 
2. How old are you? ____________ 
 
3. What is your highest level of education? (Or the closest equivalent) 
A. Primary 
B. GCSE 
C. A level/Highers 
D. Bachelor’s degree 
E. Master’s Degree 
F. PhD 
 





E. In a relationship 
 
5. What's your employment status?  
A. Employed or self-employed 
B. Part-time employed 








6. Where do you find the information about this study?   
A. Invitation email from the researcher 
B. Social media (e.g., Facebook) 
C. Invitation email from the Hope Park Counselling Centre 
D. Approached by the researcher 




7. Which of the following statement best describes your usual diet?  
A. Fresh veg, meat, fish, and dairy products. 
B. No meat. 
C. 4-6 times of frozen or pre-made meals a week 
D. Mainly snacks 
E. Only veggie 
F. Special medical diet  
 
8. Do you smoke? 
A. No 
B. Less than 1 cigarette a day 
C. 1-9 cigarettes a day 
D. 11-20 cigarettes a day 
E. More than 21 cigarettes a day 
  
9. Do you drink alcohol?  
A. No 
B. Once in a while 
C. 1-2 glasses of wine or 0.5-1 pint of beer a day 





E. More than 7 glasses of wine or 3.5 pints of beer a day 
 
10. Have you been diagnosed, treated, medicated, or monitored for any of the 
following? 
Asthma, metabolic syndrome (i.e., heart disease, stroke, diabetes), frequent colds, 
arthritis, or other major medical conditions. 
A. No 
B. I recovered. 
C. I am receiving treatment. 
D. I am waiting for the diagnosis. 
 
11. How often do you exercise for more than 30 minutes? 
A. Daily 
B. 2-4 times a week 
C. Once a week 
D. Once a month 
E. Seldom 
F. I cannot exercise because of physical problems. 
 
Note. One item was added in Study 3 - "What's the quality of your closest 
relationship?". It has two anchoring points of "very good" and "very poor" on a 9-






Table A.1 PHQ-SADS  
 
Please answer every question to the best of your ability.  
A. During the last 4 weeks, how much have you been bothered by any of the 
following problems? 
 




Stomach pain    
Back pain    
Pain in your arms, legs, or joints (knees, 
hips, etc.) 
   
Feeling tired or having little energy    
Trouble falling or staying asleep, or 
sleeping too much 
   
Menstrual cramps or other problems 
with your periods 
   
Pain or problems during sexual 
intercourse 
   
Headaches    
Chest pain    
Dizziness    
Fainting spells    
Feeling your heart pound or race    
Shortness of breath    
Constipation, loose bowels, or diarrhea    
Nausea, gas, or indigestion    
 
B. Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you been bothered by any of the following 
problems? 
 








Feeling nervous anxiety or on the edge     
Not being able to stop or control 
worrying 
    
Worrying too much about different 
things 
    
Trouble relaxing     
Being so restless that it is hard to sit still     
Becoming easily annoyed or irritable     
Feeling afraid as if something awful 
might happen 







C. Questions about anxiety attacks 
 
 Yes No 
In the last 4 weeks, have you had an anxiety attack - suddenly 
feeling fear or panic? 
  
Has this ever happened before?   
Do some of these attacks come suddenly out of the blue - that is, in 
situations where you don't expect to be nervous or uncomfortable? 
  
Do these attacks bother you a lot or are you worried about having 
another attack? 
  
During your last bad anxiety attack, did you have symptoms like 




D. Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you been bothered by any of the following 
problems? 
 










Little interest or pleasure in doing 
things 
    
Feeling down, depressed, or 
hopeless 
    
Trouble falling or staying asleep, or 
sleeping too much 
    
Feeling tired or having little energy     
Poor appetite or overeating     
Feeling bad about yourself - or that 
you are a failure or have let yourself 
or your family down 
    
Trouble concentrating on things, 
such as reading the newspaper or 
watching television 
    
Moving or speaking so slowly that 
other people could have noticed? Or 
the opposite - being so fidgety or 
restless that you have been moving 
around a lot more than usual 
    
Thoughts that you would be better 
off dead of or hurting yourself in 
some way 








E. If you checked off any problems on this questionnaire (PHQ-SADS), how difficult 
have these problems made it for you to do your work, take care of things at home, 
or get along with other people? 











Table A.2 IPIP 
The following statements concern your perception about yourself in a variety of 
situations. Your task is to indicate the strength of your agreement with each 
statement, choosing the best response on the scale ranging from strong 
disagreement (1) to strong agreement (7). There is no right" or "wrong" answers, so 
select the responses that most closely reflect you in general. Take your time and 
consider each statement carefully. Answering all the questions can take between 15 
and 20 minutes. 
Item 
Anchoring points and response scale 
Strongly Disagree         Strongly Agree 
1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
1  I worry about things  
2  I fear for the worst    
3  I am afraid of many things    
4  I often feel blue   
5  I get stressed out easily    
6  I get angry easily    
7  I get irritated easily    
8  I lose my temper    
9  I am not easily annoyed    
10  I dislike myself    
11  I am often down in the dumps    
12  I feel comfortable with myself    
13  I find it difficult to approach others    
14  I am afraid to draw attention to myself    
15  I only feel comfortable with friends    
16  I am not bothered by difficult social situations   
17  I go on binges    
18  I rarely overindulge    
19  I easily resist temptations    
20  I am able to control my cravings    
21  I panic easily    
22  I become overwhelmed by events    
23  I feel that I'm unable to deal with things     
24  I remain calm under pressure    
25  I make friends easily    
26  I feel comfortable around people    
27  I avoid contacts with others    
28  I prefer to be alone    





Item Anchoring points and response scale 
30  I love large parties    
31  I talk to a lot of different people at parties    
32  I avoid crowds    
33  I take charge    
34  I try to lead others    
35  I take control of things    
36  I wait for others to lead the way    
37  I am always busy    
38  I am always on the go    
39  I do a lot in my spare time    
40  I like to take it easy     
41  I love excitement    
42  I seek adventure    
43  I enjoy being reckless    
44  I act wild and crazy    
45  I radiate joy    
46  I have a lot of fun    
47  I love life    
48  I look at the bright side of life    
49  I have a vivid imagination    
50  I enjoy wild flights of fantasy    
51  I love to daydream    
52  I like to get lost in thought  
53  I believe in the importance of art    
54  I see beauty in things that others might not notice   
55  I do not like poetry    
56  I do not enjoy going to art museums    
57  I experience my emotions intensely    
58  I feel others' emotions    
59  I rarely notice my emotional reactions    
60 
 I don't understand people who get 
emotional    
61  I prefer variety to routine    
62  I prefer to stick with things that I know    
63  I dislike changes    
64  I am attached to conventional ways    
65  I love to read challenging material    
66  I avoid philosophical discussions    
67 
 I have difficulty understanding abstract 
ideas    
68  I am not interested in theoretical discussions    
69  I tend to vote for liberal political candidates    
70  I believe that there is no absolute right and wrong   





Item Anchoring points and response scale 
72  I believe that we should be tough on crime    
73  I trust others    
74  I believe that others have good intentions    
75  I trust what people say    
76  I distrust people    
77  I use others for my own ends    
78  I cheat to get ahead    
79  I take advantage of others    
80  I obstruct others' plans    
81  I am concerned about others    
82  I love to help others    
83  I am indifferent to the feelings of others  
84  I take no time for others    
85  I love a good fight    
86  I yell at people    
87  I insult people    
88  I get back at others    
89  I believe that I am better than others    
90  I think highly of myself    
91  I have a high opinion of myself    
92  I boast about my virtues  
93  I sympathize with the homeless    
94  I feel sympathy for those who are worse off than myself   
95  I am not interested in other people's problems   
96  I try not to think about the needy    
97  I complete tasks successfully   
98  I excel in what I do    
99  I handle tasks smoothly    
100  I know how to get things done   
101  I like to tidy up    
102  I often forget to put things back in their proper place   
103  I leave a mess in my room    
104  I leave my belongings around    
105  I keep my promises    
106  I tell the truth    
107  I break rules    
108  I break my promises    
109  I do more than what's expected of me    
110  I work hard    
111  I put little time and effort into my work    
112  I do just enough work to get by    
113  I am always prepared    





Item Anchoring points and response scale 
115 I waste my time    
116 I have difficulty starting tasks    
117 I jump into things without thinking    
118 I make rash decisions    
119 I rush into things    










Table A.3 Daily Depression Items used in Study 1 
How do you feel right now of the following? 
Items 
Anchoring points and response scale 
0                                                                                   100 
1 I feel sad. Happy                                                                          Sad 
2  I feel irritable. Cheerful                                                              Irritable 
3  I enjoy what I am doing. Enjoy                                                             Don’t enjoy 
4  I don’t care about anything. Care                                                                 Don’t care 
5  
I had no appetite during the 
day.** 
Have appetite                               Don’t have appetite 
6  
I worry about 
sleeping.**,*** 
Worry about sleeping    Don’t worry about sleeping 
7  
I feel that I didn’t have 
enough sleep last night.* 
Enough sleep                                    Not enough sleep 
8  I am restless.*** Restless                                                        Not restless 
9  I am tired. Not tired                                                                  Tired 
10  
It is not effortful to do 
things.***  
Effortful                                                            Effortless 
11  I feel worthless. Not worthless                                                Worthless 
12  
I feel that I can’t get 
anything done. 
Getting things done              Not getting things done 
13  I can’t concentrate. Can concentrate                          Cannot concentrate 
14  I feel hopeless.*** Hopeless                                                             Hopeful 
15 How’s your day?** Very good                                                Not very good 
Note. * Items only presented in the first sampling time of the day; ** Items only 
presented at the last sampling time of the day; *** Reverse scoring items. This 
questionnaire was designed based on the DSM-V diagnostic criteria: depressed 
mood, Items 1 and 2; loss of interest or pleasure, Items 3 and 4; altered appetite, 
Item 5; sleep disturbance, Items 6 and 7; psychomotor changes, Items 8 and 10; 
decreased energy, tiredness, or fatigue, Item 9; sense of worthlessness, Items 11 
and 12; impaired ability to think, concentrate, or make decisions, Item 13; thoughts 






Table A.4 Daily Depression Items used in Study 2 
How do you feel right now of the following? 
 Items 
Anchoring points 
0                                                                                        100  
1 I feel sad. Happy                                                                               Sad 
2  I feel irritable. Calm                                                                          Irritable 
3  I enjoy what I am doing. Enjoy                                                                  Don’t enjoy  
4  I don’t care about anything. Care                                                                      Don’t care 
5  
I have no appetite during the 
day.** 
Have appetite                                    Don’t have appetite 
6  I worry about sleeping.**, *** Worry about sleeping         Don’t worry about sleeping 
7  
I feel that I didn’t have 
enough sleep last night.* 
Enough sleep                                         Not enough sleep 
8  I am restless.*** Restless                                                             Not restless 
9  I am tired. Not tired                                                                       Tired 
10  It is not effortful to do things. Effortless                                                                 Effortful 
11 
I am doing things with my 
normal pace. 
Faster                               Normal                             Slower  
12  I feel worthless.*** Worthless                                                     Not worthless 
13  
I feel that I can’t get anything 
done. 
Getting things done                   Not getting things done 
14  I can’t concentrate. Can concentrate                                Cannot concentrate 
15  I feel hopeless.*** Hopeless                                                                  Hopeful 
16 How’s your day?** Very good                                                     Not very good 
17 
How would you rate your 
overall physical health 
today?** 
Very good                                                     Not very good 
Note. * Items only presented in the first sampling time of the day; ** Items only 
presented at the last sampling time of the day; *** Reverse scoring items. This 
questionnaire was designed based on the DSM V diagnostic criteria: depressed 
mood, Items 1 and 2; loss of interest or pleasure, Items 3 and 4; altered appetite, 
Item 5; sleep disturbance, Items 6 and 7; psychomotor changes, Items 8, 10, and 11; 
decreased energy, tiredness, or fatigue, Item 9; sense of worthlessness, Items 12 
and 13; impaired ability to think, concentrate, or make decisions, Item 14; thoughts 





Table A.5 Daily Depression Items used in Study 3 
How do you feel right now of the following? 
Note. * Items only presented at the first sampling time of a sampling day; ** Items 
only presented at the last sampling time of a sampling day; *** Reverse scoring 
items. This questionnaire was designed based on the DSM-V diagnostic criteria: 
depressed mood, Items 3 – 5; loss of interest or pleasure, Items 6 and 7; altered 
appetite, Item 8; sleep disturbance, Items 9 and 10; psychomotor changes, Items 11 
and 14; decreased energy, tiredness, or fatigue, Item 12; sense of worthlessness, 
Items 13 and 15; impaired ability to think, concentrate, or make decisions, Items 16 





0                                                                                  100 
1 




What time did you wake up this 
morning?* 
 
3  I feel happy.*** Not at all                                                        Very much 
4  I feel sad. Not at all                                                        Very much                     
5  I feel irritable. Calm                                                                    Irritable 
6  I enjoy what I am doing. Enjoy                                                             Don’t enjoy 
7  I don’t care about anything. Care                                                                 Don’t care 
8  
I have no appetite during the 
day.** 
Have appetite                              Don’t have appetite 
9  I worry about sleeping.**, *** Worry about sleeping    Don’t worry about sleeping 
10  
I didn’t have enough sleep last 
night.* 
Enough sleep                                    Not enough sleep 
11  I am restless.*** Restless                                                        Not restless 
12  I am tired. Not tired                                                                  Tired 
13  I feel guilty.***  Guilty                                                               Not guilty 
14  
I am doing things at my normal 
pace. 
Faster                           Normal                            Slower  
15 I feel worthless.*** Worthless                                                Not worthless 
16 I feel that I can’t make decisions. Can make decisions               Cannot make decisions 
17 I can’t concentrate. Can concentrate                          Cannot concentrate 
18 I feel hopeless.*** Hopeless                                                             Hopeful 
19 How’s your day?** Very good                                                Not very good 
20 
How would you rate your overall 
physical health today?** 





Table A.6 Mapping of the DDI items across the three studies 
  Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
1. I feel happy.   x 
2. I feel sad. x x x 
3. I feel irritable. x x x 
4. I enjoy what I am doing. x x x 
5. I don’t care about anything.  x x x 
6. I have no appetite during the day. x x x 
7. I worry about sleeping. x x x 
8. I feel that I don’t have enough sleep last night. x x x 
9. I am restless. x x x 
10. I am tired. x x x 
11. It is not effortful to do things. x x  
12. I feel guilty.   x 
13. I am doing things at my normal pace.  x x 
14. I feel worthless. x x x 
15. I feel that I can’t get anything done. x x  
16. I feel that I can’t make decisions.   x 
17. I can’t concentrate. x x x 
18. I feel hopeless. x x x 
19. How’s your day? x x x 
20. How would you rate your overall physical health 
today?  x x 








Appendix B: R codes of the models in the chapters 
 
Chapter 3 
lm(scale(the SD of the each of DDI items) ~ scale(PHQ-9 score) + scale(Age) + 
scale(Education) + Gender + Marital status + Employment status) 
     
Chapter 4 
Model 1 = lmer(scale(the momentary measures of each of the DDI items) ~ 
scale(PHQ-9 score) + scale(Age) + scale(Education) + Gender + Marital 
status + Employment status + time + (1|ID)) 
 
Model 2 = lmer(scale(the momentary measures of each of the DDI 
items) ~ scale(PHQ-9 score) + scale(Age) + scale(Education) + Gender + Marital 
status + Employment status + time + (1 + time|ID)) 
 
Model 3 = lmer(scale(the momentary measures of each of the DDI 
items) ~ scale(PHQ-9 score) * time + scale(Age) + 




lm(scale(the score of each of the PHQ-9 item/the means of each of the DDI 
items/the SD of each of the DDI items) ~ scale(each personality trait and facet) + 




lmer(scale(the means of activity levels) ~ scale(the momentary measures of each of 
the DDI items) + scale(Age) + scale(Education) + Gender + Marital status + 
Employment status + (1|ID)) 
 
The activity levels were aggregates of acceleration measured 30, 60, and 120 












Figure C.1 Standardized betas of PHQ-9 score from regression models in Studies 1, 2, 
















Figure C.2 Standardized betas of age from regression models in Studies 1, 2, and 3  
 







Figure C.4 Standardized betas of educational attainment from regression models in 
Studies 1, 2, and 3  
 
Figure C.5 Standardized betas of marital status from regression models in Studies 1, 






Figure C.6 Standardized betas of employment status from regression models in 









Table D.1 Partial correlation coefficients and p-values of the contemporaneous 




p (v1 to v2) p (v2 to v1) 
Irritable Sad .38 < .001 < .001 
Enjoy Sad .22 < .001 < .001 
Enjoy Irritable .26 < .001 < .001 
Care Sad .04 .267 .045 
Care Irritable .03 .116 .455 
Care Enjoy .13 < .001 < .001 
Restless Sad -.01 .474 .932 
Restless Irritable .09 < .001 < .001 
Restless Enjoy .06 .011 .011 
Restless Care -.04 .213 .338 
Tired Sad .00 .984 .797 
Tired Irritable .10 < .001 < .001 
Tired Enjoy .04 .041 .073 
Tired Care .04 .119 .110 
Tired Restless -.01 .638 .903 
Effort Sad .01 .699 .550 
Effort Irritable .01 .570 .699 
Effort Enjoy .07 < .001 < .001 
Effort Care -.02 .426 .471 
Effort Restless .12 < .001 < .001 
Effort Tired .20 < .001 < .001 
Worthless Sad .12 < .001 < .001 
Worthless Irritable .04 .226 .126 
Worthless Enjoy .03 .270 .239 
Worthless Care .08 < .001 < .001 
Worthless Restless .02 .669 .416 
Worthless Tired -.01 .680 .633 
Worthless Effort .03 .340 .162 
Done Sad .03 .263 .192 
Done Irritable .01 .496 .831 
Done Enjoy .05 .091 .112 
Done Care .08 < .001 < .001 
Done Restless -.01 .748 .831 
Done Tired .04 .175 .105 
Done Effort .06 .006 < .001 
Done Worthless .07 .011 < .001 








p (v1 to v2) p (v2 to v1) 
Concentrate Irritable .03 .381 .079 
Concentrate Enjoy .06 < .001 < .001 
Concentrate Care .06 .016 .006 
Concentrate Restless .05 .016 .052 
Concentrate Tired .10 < .001 < .001 
Concentrate Effort .09 < .001 < .001 
Concentrate Worthless .01 .629 .764 
Concentrate Done .35 < .001 < .001 
Hopeful Sad .15 < .001 < .001 
Hopeful Irritable .09 < .001 < .001 
Hopeful Enjoy .10 < .001 < .001 
Hopeful Care .05 .033 .006 
Hopeful Restless .07 < .001 < .001 
Hopeful Tired .01 .770 .912 
Hopeful Effort .02 .338 .501 
Hopeful Worthless .25 < .001 < .001 
Hopeful Done .11 < .001 < .001 
Hopeful Concentrate .11 < .001 < .001 
Note. v1 = variable 1; v2 = variable 2; p = p-value 
 
Table D.2 Partial correlation coefficients and p-values of the between-subjects 




p (v1 to v2) p (v2 to v1) 
Irritable Sad .53 < .001 < .001 
Enjoy Sad .61 < .001 < .001 
Enjoy Irritable .09 .414 .681 
Care Sad -.17 .185 .170 
Care Irritable .01 .932 .837 
Care Enjoy .22 .153 < .001 
Restless Sad -.02 .691 .738 
Restless Irritable .01 .784 .794 
Restless Enjoy .01 .973 .947 
Restless Care -.18 .116 .160 
Tired Sad -.09 .366 .853 
Tired Irritable .19 .162 .079 
Tired Enjoy .10 .416 .730 
Tired Care -.01 .926 .804 
Tired Restless .14 .107 .555 
Effort Sad -.10 .460 .517 








p (v1 to v2) p (v2 to v1) 
Effort Enjoy .01 .946 .729 
Effort Care -.16 .115 .237 
Effort Restless .06 .794 .595 
Effort Tired .17 .200 .107 
Worthless Sad .04 .842 .780 
Worthless Irritable -.10 .321 .628 
Worthless Enjoy -.12 .198 .689 
Worthless Care .04 .808 .738 
Worthless Restless .10 .378 .579 
Worthless Tired .13 .185 .461 
Worthless Effort .06 1.000 .391 
Done Sad -.08 .474 .784 
Done Irritable .09 .545 .602 
Done Enjoy -.03 .928 .782 
Done Care .09 .400 .645 
Done Restless -.26 .020 .016 
Done Tired -.05 .769 .784 
Done Effort .00 .823 .889 
Done Worthless .07 .604 .698 
Concentrate Sad -.07 .836 .418 
Concentrate Irritable -.06 .712 .668 
Concentrate Enjoy .19 .156 .129 
Concentrate Care -.06 .545 .869 
Concentrate Restless .22 .045 .070 
Concentrate Tired .21 .115 .059 
Concentrate Effort .10 .301 .616 
Concentrate Worthless -.05 .868 .617 
Concentrate Done .83 < .001 < .001 
Hopeful Sad .20 .101 .088 
Hopeful Irritable .14 .098 .731 
Hopeful Enjoy .13 .126 .837 
Hopeful Care .12 .091 .753 
Hopeful Restless .13 .363 .272 
Hopeful Tired -.09 .416 .689 
Hopeful Effort .05 .448 .974 
Hopeful Worthless .73 < .001 < .001 
Hopeful Done .13 .364 .311 
Hopeful Concentrate -.03 .805 .540 







Table D.3 Partial correlation coefficients and p-values of the contemporaneous 




p (v1 to v2) p (v2 to v1) 
Irritable Sad .25 < .001 < .001 
Enjoy Sad .29 < .001 < .001 
Enjoy Irritable .20 < .001 < .001 
Care Sad .08 .020 .006 
Care Irritable .12 < .001 < .001 
Care Enjoy .08 .011 .029 
Restless Sad .05 .237 .110 
Restless Irritable .13 < .001 < .001 
Restless Enjoy .08 .006 .006 
Restless Care .00 .974 .995 
Tired Sad .08 < .001 < .001 
Tired Irritable .06 .016 .020 
Tired Enjoy .00 .972 .919 
Tired Care .03 .261 .431 
Tired Restless .04 .228 .363 
Effortless Sad -.01 .846 .968 
Effortless Irritable .07 .006 .016 
Effortless Enjoy .11 < .001 < .001 
Effortless Care -.02 .632 .797 
Effortless Restless -.02 .700 .607 
Effortless Tired .20 < .001 < .001 
Pace Sad .02 .874 .381 
Pace Irritable -.03 .616 .295 
Pace Enjoy .01 .669 1.000 
Pace Care -.03 .678 .262 
Pace Restless -.05 .150 .292 
Pace Tired .06 .283 .020 
Pace Effortless .02 .718 .496 
Worthless Sad .12 < .001 < .001 
Worthless Irritable -.03 .435 .601 
Worthless Enjoy .02 .497 .556 
Worthless Care .07 .016 .049 
Worthless Restless .12 < .001 < .001 
Worthless Tired .01 .730 .897 
Worthless Effortless .01 .919 .731 
Worthless Pace .01 .675 .894 
Done Sad .03 .309 .349 
Done Irritable .02 .768 .487 
Done Enjoy .03 .369 .423 
Done Care .02 .569 .581 








p (v1 to v2) p (v2 to v1) 
Done Tired .06 .098 .146 
Done Effortless .11 < .001 < .001 
Done Pace .12 < .001 < .001 
Done Worthless .03 .444 .698 
Concentrate Sad .03 .465 .416 
Concentrate Irritable .01 .744 .738 
Concentrate Enjoy .08 < .001 .033 
Concentrate Care .05 .206 .011 
Concentrate Restless .01 .718 .943 
Concentrate Tired .09 .006 < .001 
Concentrate Effortless .06 .041 .020 
Concentrate Pace .07 .029 .049 
Concentrate Worthless .01 .774 .765 
Concentrate Done .39 < .001 < .001 
Hopeful Sad .07 .025 .052 
Hopeful Irritable .07 .020 .011 
Hopeful Enjoy .04 .294 .262 
Hopeful Care .05 .366 .025 
Hopeful Restless .06 .041 .059 
Hopeful Tired .02 .873 .486 
Hopeful Effortless -.01 .919 .846 
Hopeful Pace .00 .869 .951 
Hopeful Worthless .36 < .001 < .001 
Hopeful Done .11 < .001 < .001 
Hopeful Concentrate .07 .006 .037 
Note. v1 = variable 1; v2 = variable 2; p = p-value 
 
Table D.4 Partial correlation coefficients and p-values of the between-subjects 




p (v1 to v2) p (v2 to v1) 
Irritable Sad .31 .029 < .001 
Enjoy Sad .44 < .001 < .001 
Enjoy Irritable -.03 .616 .919 
Care Sad .07 .960 .240 
Care Irritable .31 .041 < .001 
Care Enjoy -.08 .793 .399 
Restless Sad -.05 .926 .701 
Restless Irritable .18 .461 .119 
Restless Enjoy .09 .612 .646 








p (v1 to v2) p (v2 to v1) 
Tired Sad -.01 .846 .943 
Tired Irritable -.02 .858 .699 
Tired Enjoy -.02 .554 .391 
Tired Care -.27 .037 .037 
Tired Restless .07 .759 .677 
Effortless Sad .40 < .001 < .001 
Effortless Irritable .15 .436 .202 
Effortless Enjoy -.01 .977 .926 
Effortless Care -.16 .480 .146 
Effortless Restless -.18 .157 .361 
Effortless Tired .34 < .001 .011 
Pace Sad -.18 .056 .520 
Pace Irritable -.01 .591 .620 
Pace Enjoy -.08 .699 .545 
Pace Care -.06 .645 .858 
Pace Restless .16 .196 .416 
Pace Tired .04 .908 .716 
Pace Effortless .13 .157 .640 
Worthless Sad .02 .699 .833 
Worthless Irritable -.02 .782 .988 
Worthless Enjoy .06 .974 .545 
Worthless Care .04 .638 .973 
Worthless Restless .16 .506 .190 
Worthless Tired -.05 .919 .694 
Worthless Effortless -.03 .997 .777 
Worthless Pace .09 .405 .730 
Done Sad .11 .759 .361 
Done Irritable .20 .150 .241 
Done Enjoy .22 .292 .063 
Done Care -.19 .607 .070 
Done Restless -.39 .011 < .001 
Done Tired .13 .311 .607 
Done Effortless -.28 .112 .006 
Done Pace -.14 .556 .278 
Done Worthless .18 .200 .295 
Concentrate Sad -.04 .780 .436 
Concentrate Irritable -.14 .544 .295 
Concentrate Enjoy -.12 .223 .737 
Concentrate Care .13 .548 .367 
Concentrate Restless .50 < .001 < .001 
Concentrate Tired .09 .638 .602 
Concentrate Effortless .26 .177 .011 








p (v1 to v2) p (v2 to v1) 
Concentrate Worthless -.14 .270 .569 
Concentrate Done .81 < .001 < .001 
Hopeful Sad .15 .602 .177 
Hopeful Irritable .05 .784 .826 
Hopeful Enjoy .15 .262 .474 
Hopeful Care .05 .889 .731 
Hopeful Restless .23 .067 .211 
Hopeful Tired .00 .836 .837 
Hopeful Effortless -.11 .292 .751 
Hopeful Pace .03 .978 .777 
Hopeful Worthless .69 < .001 < .001 
Hopeful Done .07 .837 .555 
Hopeful Concentrate -.04 .957 .730 
Note. v1 = variable 1; v2 = variable 2; p = p-value 
 
Table D.5 Partial correlation coefficients and p-values of the contemporaneous 




p (v1 to v2) p (v2 to v1) 
Sad Happy .39 < .001 < .001 
Irritable Happy .17 < .001 < .001 
Irritable Sad .02 .498 .733 
Enjoy Happy .26 < .001 < .001 
Enjoy Sad .05 .150 .253 
Enjoy Irritable .11 .006 < .001 
Care Happy -.01 .770 .911 
Care Sad .04 .292 .490 
Care Irritable .08 .006 .025 
Care Enjoy .04 .149 .384 
Restless Happy .04 .445 .137 
Restless Sad .01 .869 .919 
Restless Irritable .17 < .001 < .001 
Restless Enjoy .05 .167 .194 
Restless Care -.03 .641 .569 
Tired Happy .04 .496 .324 
Tired Sad .07 .016 .052 
Tired Irritable -.01 .886 .718 
Tired Enjoy .04 .298 .272 
Tired Care .03 .366 .428 
Tired Restless .04 .380 .504 








p (v1 to v2) p (v2 to v1) 
Guilty Sad .02 .715 .547 
Guilty Irritable -.03 .604 .689 
Guilty Enjoy .01 .614 .941 
Guilty Care .06 .237 .085 
Guilty Restless .13 < .001 < .001 
Guilty Tired .02 .638 .681 
Pace Happy .03 .369 .426 
Pace Sad .00 .794 .696 
Pace Irritable -.02 .689 .421 
Pace Enjoy .05 .239 .076 
Pace Care .01 .932 .700 
Pace Restless .01 .777 .722 
Pace Tired .06 .134 .110 
Pace Guilty .03 .730 .474 
Worthless Happy .00 .926 .768 
Worthless Sad .08 .041 .016 
Worthless Irritable .06 .177 .056 
Worthless Enjoy .02 .763 .669 
Worthless Care .05 .344 .270 
Worthless Restless .04 .167 .590 
Worthless Tired .04 .221 .571 
Worthless Guilty .17 < .001 < .001 
Worthless Pace .03 .379 .671 
Decision Happy .07 .011 .056 
Decision Sad -.01 .802 .479 
Decision Irritable .00 .890 .865 
Decision Enjoy .06 .126 .150 
Decision Care .13 < .001 < .001 
Decision Restless .02 .659 .405 
Decision Tired .04 .255 .438 
Decision Guilty .03 .594 .433 
Decision Pace .02 .926 .584 
Decision Worthless .11 .016 .029 
Concentrate Happy -.01 .952 .662 
Concentrate Sad .01 .678 .782 
Concentrate Irritable .08 .076 .033 
Concentrate Enjoy .13 < .001 < .001 
Concentrate Care .06 .206 .052 
Concentrate Restless .05 .194 .267 
Concentrate Tired .08 .011 .011 
Concentrate Guilty .06 .165 .067 
Concentrate Pace .11 < .001 .006 








p (v1 to v2) p (v2 to v1) 
Concentrate Decision .18 < .001 < .001 
Hopeful Happy .06 .280 .112 
Hopeful Sad .10 < .001 .011 
Hopeful Irritable .04 .157 .369 
Hopeful Enjoy .08 .011 .033 
Hopeful Care .03 .493 .602 
Hopeful Restless .03 .558 .423 
Hopeful Tired .03 .700 .226 
Hopeful Guilty .03 .642 .421 
Hopeful Pace .00 .903 .908 
Hopeful Worthless .19 < .001 < .001 
Hopeful Decision .09 .033 .059 
Hopeful Concentrate .09 .020 < .001 
Note. v1 = variable 1; v2 = variable 2; p = p-value 
 
Table D.6 Partial correlation coefficients and p-values of the between-subjects 




p (v1 to v2) p (v2 to v1) 
Sad Happy .45 < .001 < .001 
Irritable Happy .19 .037 .468 
Irritable Sad -.04 .869 .770 
Enjoy Happy .51 < .001 < .001 
Enjoy Sad .01 .782 .890 
Enjoy Irritable .11 .794 .248 
Care Happy .00 .730 .530 
Care Sad .07 .248 .782 
Care Irritable -.01 .456 .419 
Care Enjoy .10 .426 .593 
Restless Happy -.22 .029 .217 
Restless Sad .19 .088 .291 
Restless Irritable .49 < .001 < .001 
Restless Enjoy .10 .662 .448 
Restless Care -.11 .291 .567 
Tired Happy -.03 1.000 .738 
Tired Sad .03 .730 1.000 
Tired Irritable .13 .949 .020 
Tired Enjoy .17 .263 .307 
Tired Care -.05 .754 .746 
Tired Restless .19 .270 .116 
Guilty Happy .19 .126 .261 








p (v1 to v2) p (v2 to v1) 
Guilty Irritable -.02 .634 .820 
Guilty Enjoy .08 .513 .820 
Guilty Care .11 .388 .419 
Guilty Restless .06 .987 .376 
Guilty Tired -.19 .404 .037 
Pace Happy .08 .794 .369 
Pace Sad .05 .748 .759 
Pace Irritable -.06 .421 .974 
Pace Enjoy -.18 .183 .206 
Pace Care -.03 .770 .884 
Pace Restless -.01 .987 .950 
Pace Tired .10 .380 .707 
Pace Guilty .10 .241 .753 
Worthless Happy -.17 .140 .372 
Worthless Sad .29 .033 .016 
Worthless Irritable .11 .712 .358 
Worthless Enjoy .00 .907 .919 
Worthless Care .12 .410 .369 
Worthless Restless -.03 .908 .823 
Worthless Tired .10 .784 .378 
Worthless Guilty .42 < .001 < .001 
Worthless Pace .02 .331 .620 
Decision Happy .05 .794 .782 
Decision Sad -.13 .730 .221 
Decision Irritable -.26 .045 .020 
Decision Enjoy .06 .664 .889 
Decision Care .08 .622 .642 
Decision Restless .09 .586 .640 
Decision Tired .24 .016 .307 
Decision Guilty .10 .975 .228 
Decision Pace .03 .426 .789 
Decision Worthless .07 .283 .803 
Concentrate Happy .09 .669 .604 
Concentrate Sad -.06 .629 .823 
Concentrate Irritable .39 < .001 < .001 
Concentrate Enjoy .02 .952 .928 
Concentrate Care .06 .879 .595 
Concentrate Restless -.01 .543 .744 
Concentrate Tired .04 .846 .623 
Concentrate Guilty .00 .946 .973 
Concentrate Pace -.03 .789 .919 
Concentrate Worthless -.19 .132 .338 








p (v1 to v2) p (v2 to v1) 
Hopeful Happy .18 .642 .020 
Hopeful Sad -.02 .974 .765 
Hopeful Irritable -.06 .879 .592 
Hopeful Enjoy -.20 .734 .006 
Hopeful Care -.05 .671 .823 
Hopeful Restless .08 .679 .614 
Hopeful Tired -.10 .237 .858 
Hopeful Guilty -.10 .327 .768 
Hopeful Pace -.16 .568 .076 
Hopeful Worthless .71 < .001 < .001 
Hopeful Decision .25 .073 .056 
Hopeful Concentrate .17 .283 .297 
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